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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Mutual funds in a bird’s-eye view
With more than 17.8 trillion dollars of assets under management by the end of 2005, the
mutual fund industry is perhaps the largest financial industry worldwide.1 Not surprisingly,
numerous studies have been conducted to investigate how mutual funds serve investors’
needs. In this dissertation we bundle four empirical studies that provide new insights
into the mutual fund industry and mutual fund performance. To pin-point the main
contributions of these studies, we first briefly sketch the institutional context of mutual
funds, and provide an overview of some important developments in the academic literature.
Mutual funds are registered investment companies that pool capital from investors
and collectively invest this capital in stocks, bonds, money market instruments, and other
securities. Investors can participate in a mutual fund by purchasing a share that is is-
sued by the fund, or that is traded in the open market. While the enormous growth
of the mutual fund industry is only recent, mutual funds have been around for a long
time and date back to the second half of the 18th century. As a matter of fact, the
first mutual fund Eendragt Maakt Magt originated in 1774 in Amsterdam, the Nether-
lands (Eendragt Maakt Magt was the maxim of the Dutch Republic at that time meaning
“Unity Creates Strength”, see Rouwenhorst (2004)). Although the mutual fund indus-
try has undergone many changes over time, the main motivations for investors to invest
through mutual funds remain unchanged. While by the end of 2005 the Investment Com-
pany Institute (i.e., the national association of the U.S. investment company industry)
stresses the diversification benefits that are provided to investors through investing in mu-
tual funds, the “prospectuses” of the first mutual funds in the 18th century mention these
1This number is obtained from the Investment Company Institute (ICI, 2006).
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very same benefits.
The rationale behind diversification is to minimize insurable risk to investors: negative
returns of some investments in a portfolio can be compensated by the positive returns
of others. Theoretically, the highest degree of diversification an investor can reach is
obtained by holding a portfolio that includes a share of all tradable assets (i.e., the market
portfolio).2 However, there are several practical problems an individual investor is faced
with when trying to hold such an optimally diversified portfolio. First of all, it requires
a large investment budget to purchase a sufficiently large number of securities and reach
a reasonable degree of diversification. Moreover, investment budgets are typically not
divisible in a round lot of securities and individual investors may find it difficult to be fully
invested at all times. Another problem is that managing such a portfolio involves significant
transaction costs. Because transaction costs typically consist of a fixed and a variable part,
the costs are larger for portfolios that hold more different securities. Diversification can
therefore be costly to an investor with a limited investment budget and may not outweigh
the transaction costs it brings along.
Basically, all problems mentioned here are related to the limited size of the invest-
ment budget of individual investors. Because mutual funds pool large amounts of capital,
they can offer individual investors diversification at relatively low costs through economies
of scale. The paragraph below is from the prospectus of one of the first mutual funds
Voordelig en Voorsigtig (“Profitable and Prudent”) that was organized in 1776 in Utrecht,
the Netherlands, and is evidence that the diversification benefits to investors through in-
vesting in mutual funds are not a product of this age.
“... It is indisputable that prudent investing requires the manager to spread as much
as possible monies over good and solid securities. Because nothing is completely certain
but subject to fluctuations, it is dangerous for people to allocate their capital to a single
or a small number of securities. Not everyone has the opportunity to invest his money in a
variety of securities. ... For the sum of 525 guilders one can participate in this negotiatie.
..., which will be profitable with sufficient certainty. No one has reason to expect that all
securities in this negotiatie will cease to pay off at the same time, and the entire capital
be lost. If one had reason to fear such a general bankruptcy, one never ought to invest any
money.” (Rouwenhorst, 2004)
2Elton et al. (2003) conduct an international experiment, and demonstrate that 60–90 percent of the
risk on an individual stock can be eliminated by holding a random portfolio of stocks within a selection of
national markets and among national markets.
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Another interesting commonality that is observed when we collate current mutual fund
prospectuses with those from the old days is that mutual funds offer investors a service that
is often referred to as “professional investment management”. Here, professional invest-
ment management relates to the ability of fund managers to increase returns to investors
by selecting the most profitable securities, and by buying or selling securities at the right
time. For example, consider the following quotation from the prospectus of the Fidelity
Magellan Fund (one of the largest mutual funds at the time writing) which states that
the fund will use “fundamental analysis of each issuers financial condition and industry
position and market and economic conditions to select investments”. Now consider the
following quotation from the prospectus of Concordia Res Parvae Crescunt (one of the
first mutual funds introduced in 1779 in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, see Rouwenhorst
(2004)): “the negotiatie would invest in solid securities and those that based on the decline
in their price would merit speculation and could be purchased below their intrinsic value,
... of which one has every reason to expect an important benefit”. Not unexpectedly, fund
managers charge a fee to investors for these services; another feature of mutual funds that
has not changed over time.3
Even though the benefits of diversification and professional investment management
have been acknowledged by investors for a long time, it was only in the early 1960s when
the first comprehensive studies were performed to assess how mutual funds actually serve
investors’ needs by offering them these services. The rise of this stream of literature was
stimulated by several breakthroughs in asset pricing theory, the increasing availability of
data, and advancements in technology. Below, we briefly describe these developments.
Asset pricing theory tells us that investors require a premium to compensate them for
the time they have to wait for the pay-offs of their investments (i.e., the risk-free rate),
and a premium for the risk or uncertainty that is involved with these pay-offs (i.e., the
risk premium). While it might seem obvious that investors require higher returns on
investments that are more risky, academics found it was a non-trivial task to precisely
formulate the concept of “risk”. In fact, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) were rewarded
with the Nobel prize in Economics for their Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) that
3For the reader’s information: Rouwenhorst (2004) calculates that Concordia Res Parvae Crescunt
charged investors a yearly expense ratio of 0.20 percent of assets under management. By comparison, the
Fidelity Magellan Fund reports a total expense ratio of 0.59 percent in its prospectus, and the average
expense ratio charged by U.S. equity funds at the time writing is about 1.5 percent.
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provides us a testable framework to describe the risk-return relation.4 This framework
turned out to be successful in explaining the returns of securities both from a theoretical
and an empirical point of view.
Basically, the CAPM states that financial markets reward investors only for taking nec-
essary risk, not for unnecessary risk. As we mentioned earlier, investors can substantially
reduce investment risk by holding a diversified portfolio. However, some part of the risk is
inescapable and cannot be diversified away. This part is often referred to as market risk or
systematic risk. The central prediction of the CAPM is that the more a security is exposed
to overall market movements, the higher the expected return will be that investors require
on the security. A security’s exposure to market movements is often referred to as its
“market beta”, and the CAPM tells us that the relation between a security’s market beta
and its expected return is linear. The mechanism that causes the risk-return relation to
be linear is arbitrage. For example, if a security is expected to yield a return that is lower
than its market beta times the expected return on the market portfolio, investors would
be better off by investing their money in a combination of the market portfolio and the
risk-free rate.5 (E.g., by doing so, investors are expected to earn a higher return per unit
of market risk than what they would earn by investing in the security.) This would make
the security an unattractive investment and cause investors to sell the security, thereby
lowering its price and increasing its expected return. On the other hand, if a security has
an expected return that is too high given its market beta, investors would exploit this “free
lunch” and buy the security, thereby increasing its price and lowering its expected return.
Consequently, in equilibrium the relation between all securities’ market betas and their
expected returns are linear.
Within the last few decades, a large body of literature has been dedicated to investigate
to what extent the CAPM is able to describe security returns. Whereas several authors
report that securities’ market betas suffice to describe security returns (see e.g., Fama and
MacBeth (1973)), others argue that the CAPM omits important risk factors and report
significant anomalies. For example, stocks with a small market capitalization (i.e., small
caps), and stocks with a high book-to-market value are found to have returns that are
too high given their exposure to market risk (see e.g., Banz (1981) and Fama and French
(1992)). Also, de Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) report
4Other models have been proposed by Merton (1973) and Ross (1976).
5Because the risk-free rate and the return on the market portfolio are uncorrelated by definition,
investors can achieve any desired level of market beta by investing in a combination of the two assets. This
mechanism is often referred to as “leverage”.
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reversal and momentum effects in stock returns that cannot be explained by the CAPM.
As a response to these findings, several models have been proposed in the performance
evaluation literature that augment a traditional CAPM specification as in Jensen (1968)
with additional risk factors or benchmarks, such as size, value, and momentum (see e.g.,
Hendricks et al. (1993), Elton et al. (1996), and Carhart (1997)).6
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed literature overview
on the development of asset pricing theory, it is of crucial importance to understand the
risk-return relation for securities when evaluating the performance of mutual funds: high
fund returns are not necessarily evidence of managerial skill. They may well be premiums
for the funds’ exposures to common risk factors. The developments in the field of asset
pricing made it possible to disentangle which part of a fund’s return can be attributed to
exposures to common risk factors (or could be obtained by following a passive strategy),
and which part to the fund manager.
Another important development that stimulated the research on mutual fund perfor-
mance was the increasing availability of data on mutual funds. In the aftermath of Black
Thursday in 1929 when the New York Stock Exchange crashed, the U.S. congress wrote
several Acts into federal law to better regulate financial markets and protect investors.
Among these Acts was the Investment Company Act of 1940. This Act is regulated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and requires investment companies (including
mutual funds) to publicly disclose financial information. Commercial information services
started to collect these data and set up comprehensive databases that became available to
researchers.7
Finally, the advancements in technology over the past decades have also been of crucial
importance to the research on mutual funds. The rise of computers and media to store large
computer-readable files, and new insights in non-parametric methods enabled researchers
to perform complex empirical analyses.
6It is unclear whether momentum can be attributed to a common risk factor. While Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) argue that momentum is caused by behavioral biases of investors, Harvey and Siddique
(2000) demonstrate that momentum is related to systematic skewness. However, irrespective whether
momentum represents risk, Carhart (1997) shows that it is important to include a momentum factor when
evaluating mutual fund performance.
7The largest providers of data on mutual funds are currently the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) and Morningstar.
20
16 Current status of the literature and contributions of this thesis
1.2 Current status of the literature and contributions
of this thesis
The central research questions in the literature are typically related to the extent to which
mutual funds serve investors’ needs by offering them the benefits of diversification and
processional investment management.
Most authors acknowledge that mutual funds do a good job in offering investors diver-
sification benefits, see e.g., Jensen (1968). A common approach to investigate the degree
of diversification for mutual funds is to split up fund risk into a systematic part (i.e., risk
that cannot be diversified away) and a non-systematic part (i.e., risk that can be diversified
away). The higher the portion of systematic risk, the higher the degree diversification that
is offered to investors, and vice versa. Basically all studies report that the largest part of
mutual fund risk is systematic. To give the reader a more material impression about the
proportion between systematic and non-systematic risk for mutual funds, we conduct an
experiment and compute which part of mutual fund risk is because of systematic risk in a
large sample of U.S. equity mutual funds over the period 1963–2003.8 The results of this
exercise indicate that on average 82 percent of the funds’ variance is explained by expo-
sures to common risk factors. The bottom quartile of variance explained by common risk
factors is 80 percent, and the top quartile is 92 percent. Less than 6 percent of the funds
have a higher exposure to non-systematic than systematic risk. Based on these figures one
could indeed argue that most mutual funds offer investors a high degree of diversification.
However, when we consider the literature on the value added by professional invest-
ment management of mutual funds, empirical evidence does not appear to unambiguously
indicate that fund managers are able to systematically increase returns through selecting
the most profitable securities, and by buying or selling securities at the right time. In
fact, there is evidence that indicates that most fund managers that pursue selection or
timing strategies are not able to earn back the fees they charge to investors. The typical
approach to investigate this issue is to test for persistence in fund performance. That is, it
is investigated whether some funds systematically earn higher risk-adjusted returns than
others, including index funds (i.e., passively managed funds whose main objective is to
provide investors a high degree of diversification at relatively low costs). While studies
8The sample of mutual funds is described in the paper “One the Use of Multi-Factor Models to Evaluate
Mutual Fund Performance” of this thesis. Funds with less than 36 consecutive monthly return observations
over the entire sample period are excluded from the analyses. As a measure for systematic risk we employ
the four factors from Carhart (1997).
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by, among others, Hendricks et al. (1993), Goetzman and Ibbotson (1994), Elton et al.
(1996), and Gruber (1996) report persistence in the returns of the top performing U.S.
equity mutual funds, Carhart (1997) demonstrates that most of this is explained by differ-
ences in exposures to common risk-factors, including size, book-to-market, and one-year
momentum. Moreover, the author reports that funds’ expenses are better predictors of
future performance than past performance (i.e., the higher a fund’s expenses, the lower its
expected return). These findings suggest that there is only little evidence to believe that
fund managers are able to systematically increase returns through active stock selection
and timing strategies, and that investors are better off by purchasing shares of passively
managed index funds.
In the first paper of this thesis, we contribute to this steam of literature by investigating
performance persistence for a large sample of diversified U.S. equity mutual funds over short
horizons. Our motivation to investigate persistence over short horizons stems from the
theoretical work of Berk and Green (2004) who argue that the lack of evidence of persistence
in mutual fund performance over longer horizons does not imply that fund managers’
selection and timing skills are nonexistent. Moreover, Bollen and Busse (2005) investigate
persistence in mutual fund performance using high-frequency daily data and report that
there is persistence in risk-adjusted performance over short horizons. We investigate three
issues regarding this phenomenon. First, do we also observe this predictability in a large
sample of funds over a more extensive (and recent) time period? Second, is the persistence
effect economically significant? And third, does persistence vary across the cross-section
of mutual funds? To investigate these issues, we employ a large sample of monthly fund
returns in combination with a Bayesian estimation method to cope with short ranking
periods.
Our results clearly support the idea that past performance of mutual funds has predic-
tive power for future performance. When funds are ranked on their performance over the
past 36 or 12 months, the top deciles subsequently outperform the bottom deciles across
all subsamples and using alternative ex post performance measures. More interestingly,
using our Bayesian estimation method we are able to capture short-run persistence in ab-
normal performance as documented by Bollen and Busse (2005) using monthly data for
a much larger and more recent sample of US equity funds. When traditional frequentist
approaches are used to estimate fund performance, the findings are only a weak indica-
tion of such a relation. Further, given the large cross-section of available funds and the
limited demands imposed by our Bayesian procedure, we are able to investigate the per-
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sistence effect across different subsamples of funds. Accordingly, we investigate whether
the superior performance of the top decile is canceled out by load fees. When we focus
on the subsample of no-load funds, the persistence pattern is even stronger than for the
entire sample. Apparently, the top deciles’ superior performance is not reduced by load
fees that are involved with a strategy of chasing winners. In addition, we form subgroups
of different types of funds, and investigate whether the persistence effect is related to in-
vestment style. Indeed we find that persistence varies across styles, and manifests itself
most strongly among relatively young, small cap/growth funds.
In the second paper, we investigate persistence in performance for mutual funds that
invest in bonds. Despite the enormous size of the market for actively managed bond funds,
surprisingly little is known about whether active portfolio management contributes to bond
investment returns. Since research on bond funds is scarce and not well developed, this
paper fills several gaps in the literature. First, to our knowledge, our study is the first
to analyze the full universe of more than 3,500 bond funds in the CRSP survivorship-
bias free mutual fund database over the period 1990–2003. This large sample helps us to
overcome the small-sample problems that plague earlier studies on bond fund performance.
Second, earlier bond fund studies use only a subset of all common approaches that were
originally developed in research on equity funds to test for persistence. We show that these
and other methods produce a consistent story regarding performance persistence of bond
funds. In doing so, we provide new insights into long-running debates on the benefits of
actively managed funds vis-a`-vis passive portfolios. Previous studies suggest that bond
index funds are a superior alternative compared to actively managed funds, once we take
expenses into account. In contrast to earlier studies, we offer strong evidence of a “hot
hands” phenomenon in the bond fund market that translates into strategies that yield both
economically and statistically significant excess returns.
In the third paper, we contribute to the extant literature by testing the cross-sectional
explanatory power of multi-factor models to explain mutual fund returns and the conse-
quences for evaluating mutual fund performance.9 The multi-factor models whose empiri-
cal performance is under investigation in this study are the Fama and French (1993, 1995,
1996) three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Our main motivation
is that we are concerned that performance estimates resulting from these models suffer from
systematic biases. The proxies that are used with factor model approaches are based on
9This paper also contributes to the stream of literature on the implications of benchmark misspecifi-
cation for performance evaluation, e.g., Roll (1978), Lehman and Modest (1987), Grinblatt and Titman
(1994), and Coles et al. (2006).
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hypothetical stock portfolios. Because these proxies do not incorporate transaction costs
and trading restrictions, the predicted factor premiums are likely to be over- or underes-
timated. Accordingly, resulting performance estimates for funds with significant exposure
to these factors may be biased. While miscalculation of the factor premiums is a general
concern (i.e., even if fund returns were fully described by a single-factor model, overesti-
mation of the premium on this factor will cause performance estimates to be biased), the
resulting biases are more important for multi-factor approaches.
Our results indicate that the factor premiums are indeed miscalculated, and that this
miscalculation induces serious biases in performance estimates for mutual funds. More
specifically, we find that funds with a value oriented style earn a premium that is smaller
than projected by the commonly employed value factor, while the return differential be-
tween past winners and losers is larger than projected by the momentum proxy. As a result,
the use of three- or four-factor alphas leads to systematically too pessimistic performance
estimates for value funds compared to growth funds, and, similarly, performance estimates
for past winner funds tend to be overestimated. We propose an alternative that does not
suffer from these biases where the factors are constructed using mutual fund returns net of
expenses rather than hypothetical stock returns. Resulting alphas from this model do not
exhibit systematic patterns and appear to provide unbiased estimates of a fund manager’s
performance.
Finally, we add to the literature on how mutual fund families anticipate investor behav-
ior to maximize cash flows into their funds. Most authors report that investors chase past
winners, and that raw fund returns are important determinants of investors’ cash flows to
funds (see e.g., Gruber (1996), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), and
Del Guercio and Tkac (2002)). It seems that mutual fund companies are well aware of
this, and anticipate investor behavior to maximize assets under management by pursuing
certain strategies. For example, Brown et al. (1996) and Brown et al. (2001) report that
fund managers strategically alter the risk of their portfolios to increase the change to be
among the “winners”. Other strategies that have been documented include marketing and
distribution activities (see e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998), Jain and Wu (2000), and Barber
et al. (2005)), and organization into family complexes (see e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998),
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1993), and Nanda et al. (2004)). Nanda et al. (2004) argue
that the latter strategy is built upon the observation that cash flows are not only affected
by the funds’ own performance, but also by the performance of other funds in the family.
The authors show that stellar performance of a fund generates substantial spillovers in the
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sense that cash inflows to other funds in the family are above and beyond what one would
expect given the funds’ own performance.
In the fourth paper, we investigate the impact of fund marketing on investor flows to
other funds in the family. For example, do high-marketing funds generate spillovers, and
enhance cash inflows to low-marketing funds in the family? We find that small and young
low-marketing funds that are operated by a family with high marketing expenses have
substantially larger inflows after positive returns than otherwise similar funds that are op-
erated by a family with low marketing expenses. These results indicate that high-marketing
families provide favorable conditions to incubate new funds. Given the findings of Kho-
rana and Servaes (2005) that families that start more funds have higher market share, one
might expect high-marketing families to have a considerable competitive advantage over
low-marketing families. One interpretation of these results is that the observed spillovers
are a by-product of individual fund marketing whereby the entire family is made more
visible to investors, and search costs for small and young funds are lowered. A critical as-
sumption underlying this interpretation is that funds’ allocated marketing and distribution
expenses are directly proportional to the funds’ exposure in the media and broker-dealer
channels. An alternative explanation of this observation is that funds with low marketing
expenses are directly subsidized by family members with high marketing expenses. A fam-
ily could pay for advertising and distribution activities of a certain fund through expenses
allocated to other funds. We develop and perform a set of tests to evaluate the alternative
hypotheses. The body of evidence in this paper supports the subsidization hypothesis and
suggests that at least a part of the spillovers can be attributed to favoritism towards par-
ticular funds. These results suggest that conflicts of interest between investors and fund
families have been exacerbated by competition in the mutual fund industry.
To summarize, in the first two papers we investigate performance persistence for both
equity and bond mutual funds. In the third paper, we test the cross-sectional explanatory
power of multi-factor models to evaluate the performance of equity mutual funds. Finally,
in the fourth paper we investigate spillovers of marketing and distribution activities in fund
families.
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Chapter 2
Cross-Sectional Learning and
Short-Run Persistence in Mutual
Fund Performance∗
2.1 Introduction
Despite the large growth of the mutual fund industry during the last decades, empirical evi-
dence does not appear to unambiguously indicate that some funds managers systematically
outperform passive benchmarks. While studies by, among others, Hendricks et al. (1993),
Goetzman and Ibbotson (1994), Elton et al. (1996), and Gruber (1996) report persistence
in superior performance, Carhart (1997) demonstrates that most of this is explained by dif-
ferences in exposures to common risk-factors, including size, book-to-market, and one-year
momentum. These results do not support the existence of “skilled” managers who are able
to outperform passive benchmarks after expenses. Nevertheless, using high frequency daily
data Bollen and Busse (2005) find short-term persistence in superior performance beyond
momentum. Their results indicate that performance persistence is observable using short
measurement horizons. In the present paper, we investigate three issues regarding this
phenomenon. First, do we also observe this predictability in a large sample of funds over
a more extensive (and recent) time period? Second, is the persistence effect economically
significant? And third, does persistence vary across the cross-section of mutual funds? To
investigate these issues, we employ a large sample of monthly fund returns in combination
with a Bayesian estimation method to measure performance.
The typical approach to investigate persistence in fund performance is to sort funds
∗This chapter is forthcoming as Huij and Verbeek (2007) in the Journal of Banking & Finance.
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into rank portfolios based on a measure of past performance (e.g., three- or four-factor
alphas), and evaluate the rank portfolios’ subsequent performance. However, particularly
when short horizons of monthly returns are used, pre-ranking alphas are hampered by
potentially high levels of inaccuracy. With only a small number of observations available,
it is notoriously difficult to separate managerial skill from simple luck. Funds that are less
well-diversified and have higher levels of non-systematic risk experience a larger probability
of ending up with an extreme ranking because the managers of these funds typically place
larger bets. Consequently, the top and bottom deciles in performance rankings will to a
large extent be attributable to simple luck rather than managerial skill. When subsequent
performance of the ranked funds is analyzed, results may be biased towards finding no
relation between past and future performance of these funds.
While it seems that the use of longer return histories leads to more accurate inferences
when estimating a fund’s performance, there are a number of disadvantages. First, fund
performance may vary over time, for example relating to a change of fund manager or
the age of the fund. Second, the investment style of the fund may change, resulting in
time varying exposures to common risk or benchmark factors, see e.g., Ferson and Schadt
(1996). Third, longer histories are only available for funds that have been active over
an extended period. Focusing upon, e.g., three- or five-year return histories substantially
reduces the number of available funds and may lead to several survival-related biases as
documented by Brown et al. (1992). Finally, a stream of literature suggests that even
though managerial skill is heterogeneous across fund managers, the relation between past
performance and subsequent fund flows as documented by Sirri and Tufano (1998) causes
performance persistence to fade out quickly (see Berk and Green (2004) and Zhao (2004)).
On the other hand, the use of higher frequency data (e.g., daily returns) is hampered
by its limited availability, leading to a substantial reduction in the cross-section of funds or
the relevant time span that can be investigated. Consequently, it is useful to consider more
accurate ways to estimate performance measures on the basis of short monthly return his-
tories. Recently, several papers have advocated the use of Bayesian alphas to measure fund
performance. Using this approach prior information related to funds’ expenses, investors’
beliefs about managerial skills, benchmark pricing abilities, or the returns on other mutual
funds and benchmark factors are incorporated in the resulting estimates (see Baks et al.
(2001) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2002b,a)). However, although these approaches allow
for more efficient inference, Jones and Shanken (2005) and Busse and Irvine (2006) demon-
strate that the predictive accuracy of Bayesian alphas is greatly affected by the investor’s
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prior belief about managerial skill.
In this paper, we consider Bayesian alphas exploiting the entire cross-section of mutual
fund returns. This approach does not require investors to explicitly formulate their beliefs
about managerial skill, or to make assumptions about cross-sectional characteristics that
drive performance. Rather, inference is based upon monthly returns only. As stressed by
Jones and Shanken (2005) such an approach can be motivated by cross-sectional learning
of investors. In this case, investors’ prior beliefs are not independent across funds and an
investor’s expectation about the performance of a fund is partly a belief about the abilities
of mutual fund managers as a group. On the other hand, the use of Bayesian estimators
can be motivated purely on the basis of statistical arguments. When the cross-section of
alpha estimates is considered, the top and bottom decile are more than average subject
to positive and negative estimation errors, respectively, and shrinking them towards the
cross-sectional average may result in more accurate inferences.
The main advantage of our approach is that it is based on monthly return data only,
which are much more readily available than daily frequency data. Based on the entire CRSP
universe of more than 6,400 US equity funds over the past 20 year we find strong evidence
that superior performance persists in the near future. When we rank funds on Bayesian
alphas over the past 12 months, we find that the top decile of funds earns a statistically
significant, superior return of 0.26 percent in the month after ranking. While these results
confirm the findings of Bollen and Busse (2005) based on a sample of 230 mutual funds,
it has not yet been investigated whether this effect is economically significant. It could be
questioned whether superior performance persists beyond the transaction costs that are
involved with a strategy of chasing winning funds, or that the effect is canceled out by
the load fees that are charged by the majority of funds. Because we are able to study
persistence across a large sample of funds, restricting our attention to a specific type leaves
us with enough funds in the cross-section. When we only include strictly no-load funds
in our sample, we find clear evidence that superior performance persists beyond load fees.
Likewise, we are able to focus attention to subsamples of funds characterized by investment
style or other characteristics such as age. Our findings indicate that superior performance
varies across different types of funds, and is mainly concentrated in relatively young, small
cap/growth funds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss
the literature on Bayesian performance evaluation and learning priors, and introduce our
approach. In Section 2.3, we describe our data. Section 2.4 presents the results of an
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analysis in which we analyze the efficiency of Bayesian alphas. In Section 2.5, we analyze
performance persistence of US equity funds at different horizons, using monthly data from
the CRSP Database over the period 1984–2003. We perform several robustness tests in
Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes and discusses the main findings.
2.2 Mutual fund performance measurement and
Bayesian estimation
Mutual fund performance is often measured by a fund’s alpha, defined as the intercept term
in a regression of the fund’s excess returns on the excess returns of one or more benchmark
factors. Denoting excess returns of benchmark factor j in period t by xjt, consider the
following linear model
rit = αi + β1ix1t + β2ix2t + . . .+ βkixkt + εit, (2.1)
where rit denotes the excess return of fund i in period t, βji denotes the sensitivity of
fund i to factor j (j = 1, ..., k), and εit denotes the residual return. The intercept term αi
measures the expected return of fund i in excess of a factor-mimicking benchmark portfolio.
As a result, alpha can be thought of the portion of return that can be attributed to the
fund manager. We can write the above model in matrix notation as
ri = Xiθi + εi, (2.2)
where ri denotes a vector of the excess returns of fund i, Xi denotes the matrix of excess
returns of the benchmarks factors, including an intercept, θi denotes a k + 1 vector of
unknown parameters, containing alpha and the k factor sensitivities of fund i, and εi
denotes the vector of the residual returns. The length of the evaluation period is denoted
by Ti, which may be different across funds.
Traditionally, the above model is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). However,
particularly with only a small number of observations available, the measurement error
(or sampling error) of alpha estimates may be substantial. For example, consider the case
where all true alphas are very close to zero. When a relatively high alpha estimate is
reported for a given fund, this is likely to be an overestimate of the fund’s true alpha. On
the other hand, relatively low alpha estimates are likely to be underestimates of their true
values. In the extreme case where there is no ability and all alphas are equal to zero, a
large positive or negative alpha estimate is solely due to luck rather than managerial skill.
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While OLS provides (under appropriate conditions) unbiased or asymptotically unbi-
ased estimators for the underlying true alphas, it does not perform very well in reproducing
the cross-section of true fund alphas. To obtain alpha estimates that more closely resemble
the true underlying distribution of managerial skills, it is advisable to shrink, in some way,
the raw alpha estimates towards zero, or some other value for the (long-run) cross-sectional
average. Shrinking individual estimates towards a common mean has been advocated in
the 1970s for the estimation of security market betas of individual stocks, see Blume (1971)
and Vasicek (1973). Currently, commercial information services like Bloomberg and Merrill
Lynch provide simple routines to compute adjusted betas based upon these ideas. More
recently, several papers have advocated the use of more advanced shrinkage procedures
within a formal Bayesian framework to estimate mutual fund alphas, see, e.g., Baks et al.
(2001), Pastor and Stambaugh (2002b,a), Jones and Shanken (2005), and Busse and Irvine
(2006). A full Bayesian approach requires the specification of a prior distribution for the
parameters of interest, which may be based upon different assumptions about investors’
prior beliefs about managerial skill and fund characteristics that drive performance. For
example, an investor might incorporate, among other things, the stylized fact that funds
with relative high expenses generally underperform those with lower expenses, see e.g.,
Elton et al. (1993). Intuitively, estimates of alpha are shrunk towards the negative of the
funds’ expenses conditional on how strongly one beliefs in managerial skill in general.
However, such a set-up assumes that there is a negative and monotonic relationship
between funds’ alphas and expenses. While empirical analyses indicate that the worst per-
forming funds indeed have substantially higher expenses than the average fund, it does not
appear to be the case that the best performing funds have below average expenses (see e.g.,
Gruber (1996) and Carhart (1997)). In fact, when the worst performing funds are excluded,
the relation between funds’ expenses and performance seems rather more U-shaped than
monotonically decreasing. More generally, the use of Bayesian alphas typically requires the
formulation of prior, often subjective, beliefs, which may be inappropriate. While using
informative priors may introduce a substantial subjective element in performance evalu-
ation, using less informative priors makes it more difficult to identify the worst and best
performing funds. For example, Jones and Shanken (2005) and Busse and Irvine (2006)
demonstrate that the accuracy of Bayesian alphas is greatly affected by the prior beliefs
that are attributed to the investor.
Another issue with the formulation of subjective priors is the following: Studies by
among others Malkiel (1995) and Brown and Goetzmann (1995) suggest that the degree
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to which managerial skill persists depends upon the time period observed. Consequently,
a diffuse belief in managerial skill might dominate a sceptical belief over a certain time
period, while it might yield inferior results over a different time period. These market
dynamics make it necessary to allow beliefs in managerial skill to be time-varying.
In this study we incorporate the large cross-section of mutual fund alphas in measuring
the skill of an individual fund manager. By allowing the prior to learn across other mutual
funds, the resulting belief in managerial skill is no longer fully subjective, but entirely
data-based. Furthermore, by incorporating cross-sectional information in this way, prior
beliefs about alpha are ‘adaptive’ in the sense that they can vary over time and adjust to
market dynamics and structural shifts.
To describe our Bayesian procedure, we start by specifying the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of funds’ alphas and betas as normal
θi ∼ N (µ,Σ) , (2.3)
where θi = (αi, β1i, ..., βki)
′, µ denotes a (k+1)-dimensional vector of cross-sectional means
of alphas and factor sensitivities, and Σ denotes a (k + 1) by (k + 1) covariance matrix.
Assuming that the error terms in Eq. (2.2) are IIN(0, σ2i ), the posterior distribution of θi
is normal with expectation
E(θi) =
(
1
σ2i
X ′iXi + Σ
−1
)−1(
1
σ2i
X ′iXiθˆi + Σ
−1µ
)
, (2.4)
where θˆi denotes the OLS estimate, and σ
2
i denotes the variance of εi (see for example
Maddala et al. (1997)). The corresponding covariance matrix V (θi) is given by
V (θi) =
(
1
σ2i
X ′iXi + Σ
−1
)−1
. (2.5)
Eq. (2.4) shows that the posterior “estimates” of alpha and betas are a matrix-weighted
average of the OLS estimates θˆi and the prior µ. We can interpret this equation as a
shrinkage formula, which shrinks the raw OLS estimates towards a common mean, where
the degree of shrinkage depends on the precision of the OLS estimates and the cross-
sectional dispersion reflected in Σ. For example, raw alpha estimates for funds with higher
levels of non-systematic risk are shrunk more towards the overall mean than passively
managed funds, such as index-trackers, with lower levels of non-systematic risk. Similarly,
the degree of shrinkage is higher for funds with short return histories. Note that shrinkage
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is applied to alphas as well as to the factor sensitivities, which may also be inaccurately
estimated on the basis of short time series.
Bayesian alphas (and factor sensitivities) are determined using Eq. (2.4) and require
a choice for the hyperparameters µ and Σ. Instead of fixing these parameters at some
a priori values, we use the entire cross-section of funds to estimate µ, the cross-sectional
mean, and Σ, the cross-sectional covariance matrix. A range of alternative approaches is
available to implement this, including maximum likelihood estimation, (iterative) empir-
ical Bayesian approaches, and Gibbs sampling (see Blattberg and George (1991), Casella
and George (1992), Maddala et al. (1997), and Stern (2000)). Basically, the (iterative) em-
pirical Bayesian approach initializes the (hyper)parameter with OLS estimates, and then
re-estimates the (hyper)parameters until a pre-specified degree of convergence is reached.
Using Gibbs sampling, conditional draws are simulated from the posterior distribution to
generate a sample of this distribution rather than deriving it analytically. From Markov
chain theory it follows that the simulated sample will eventually converge to the true den-
sity function of the posterior distribution. Parameter values are then estimated from this
simulated sample.
2.3 Data
Consistent with most of the literature, we focus on non-specialized US equity funds.
Monthly return data are extracted from the December 2003 CRSP database, which goes
back to 1962. Given the results of Elton et al. (2001), who report that the differences in
returns reported by CRSP and Morningstar are marginal when data are used after the
mid-1980s, we examine the period 1984–2003. To select funds in our data set we follow a
procedure similar to the one used by Pastor and Stambaugh (2002b). We use the infor-
mation that CRSP provides about classifications by Wiesenberger, Micropal/Investment
Company Data, Inc., Strategic Insight, and the funds themselves. We exclude funds with
unknown objectives, no expense, or load data in the annual summary at the end of each
previous year. Additionally, we exclude flexible funds, bond funds, mortgage-backed funds,
multi-manager funds, money market funds, balanced funds, funds that invest in precious
metals, international funds, and specialized funds. From the remaining funds, we select
funds that are classified as small cap/growth, growth, or growth & income. These are the
same types of funds that are included in the analyses of Carhart (1997) and Bollen and
Busse (2005). In addition, we construct two subsamples of funds by whether or not they
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charge load fees. Exact details on our selection procedure are provided in the Appendix.
Table 2.1 lists the number of available funds over the period 1984–2003. In total, our sam-
ple covers 6,429 equity funds that have more than 12 consecutive returns over the whole
sample period. Since CRSP includes all funds that existed during this period, our data
are free of survivorship bias as documented by Brown et al. (1992). Our subsamples cover
3,101 no-load, 2,134 small cap/growth, 3,349 growth, and 1,837 growth & income funds,
respectively.
Throughout this study, fund performance is measured using the four-factor model em-
ployed by Carhart (1997):
rit = αi + β1iRMRFt + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + β4iUMDt + εit, (2.6)
where rit is the return of fund i in month t in excess of the one-month Treasury bill
rate, RMRFt is the excess return on the value-weighted aggregate market proxy, SMBt
and HMLt are returns of value-weighted, zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios for
size and book-to-market (Fama and French, 1992, 1993), and UMDt captures one-year
momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) in month t, respectively. The intercept αi is a
measure for the performance of fund i, while βji is the sensitivity of fund i for benchmark
factor j. Monthly returns on the benchmark factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s
webpage, while one-month Treasury bill rates are obtained from Ibbotson and Associates.
2.4 Efficiency of Bayesian alphas
Below we report the results of a simulation study to evaluate the efficiency of Bayesian
alphas and compare them to those of standard OLS estimates. Additionally, we compare
the implications for fund rankings based on the two alternatives. We use actual data of
mutual fund and factor returns to determine the parameter values for the return generating
processes. This ensures that data are generated in a realistic way, while the experimental
setting allows us to compare estimates with the underlying true values that are used to
generate the returns.
First, we estimate the long-run performance for each fund in our sample over the period
1984–2003. To do so, we estimate alpha and the benchmark sensitivities in Eq. (2.6)
using standard OLS and the entire return history of each fund. Sample averages of the
resulting parameter estimates and benchmark returns are reported in Table 2.2. Consistent
with the current literature we find that the average fund underperforms the employed
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benchmarks with an average alpha of -0.22 percent per month. We use Eq. (2.6) to generate
simulated samples of mutual fund returns. The simulated factor returns, fund alphas, and
benchmark sensitivities are all drawings from an IID normal distribution with mean and
standard deviation corresponding to the empirical estimates reported in Table 2.2. We also
experiment with a GARCH(1,1) specification for the benchmark return variances. These
results are qualitatively similar to those reported here, and are available upon request. The
idiosyncratic returns (εit) are generated from a serially uncorrelated normal distribution
with mean zero and variance σ2i . Following Brown et al. (1992), Hendricks et al. (1997),
and ter Horst et al. (2001) we allow non-systematic risk to depend upon the fund’s market
beta β1i as
σ2i = ω(1− β1i)2, (2.7)
where ω captures the relation between non-systematic risk and market beta. We hereby
impose that index funds, with a market beta close to one, typically have low values of
non-systematic risk, while actively managed portfolios whose market betas deviate from
one are generally less well diversified. In the simulations, we set the value for ω to 0.0050,
which closely corresponds to the values reported by Brown et al. (1992) and ter Horst et al.
(2001).
Simulated fund returns are generated for measurement horizons of 12, 24, 36 and 60
months. The number of funds in the cross-section is set to 1,000. We then estimate
the factor models using standard OLS and our Bayesian estimator. Bayesian alphas are
estimated using an empirical Bayes approach. Per simulation we evaluate the accuracy
of OLS and Bayesian alphas, as well as their ranking ability. The number of replications
for each measurement horizon is set to 1,000. The main question that we address is
to what extent Bayesian alphas provide better estimates of (relative) fund performance
than standard OLS estimates. An additional point of interest is whether this difference
in accuracy remains substantial when more observations are available. Furthermore, to
test whether our results are robust to non-normal errors, we run additional simulations
where we generate the error terms from Student’s t-distribution with 5 degrees of freedom,
keeping all parameters at their previous values.
As a measure of accuracy we consider the cross-sectional average of the root mean
squared error (RMSE) of both estimators. RMSE is the root of the average squared
distance between the estimates and the true value of alpha, and can be interpreted as a
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standard error. RMSE is computed as
RMSE =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(αi − αˆi)2, (2.8)
where N is the number of funds in the cross-section, αi is fund i’s true alpha, and αˆi
its estimate. To investigate the benefit of sorting on Bayesian alphas in the context of
persistence analysis, we assign funds to decile portfolios based on their estimated rankings,
and compute the average true alpha for the top and bottom deciles. The results of this
exercise are reported in Table 2.3. Clearly, the average RMSEs of standard OLS are
substantially higher than those of Bayesian alphas. For example, using a measurement
horizon of 12 months, the RMSE of OLS is 0.67 percent, while this is 0.38 percent for
Bayesian estimation. Hence, for this measurement horizon, Bayesian alphas are about
40 percent more accurate than standard OLS estimates. We find that the advantage of
Bayesian estimation remains substantial when up to 60 observations are available. For
measurement horizons of 24, 36, and 60 months, Bayesian alphas are about 30 percent, 25
percent, and 20 percent more accurate than standard OLS estimates.
Furthermore, the average true alpha of the top decile is higher for rankings on Bayesian
alphas than for rankings on standard OLS alphas. From Table 2.3 it follows that the average
true alpha of the top decile based on Bayesian alphas exceeds that of the top decile based
on OLS alphas by 0.13 percent for measurement horizons of 12 months. For measurement
horizons of 24, 36, and 60 months, these excess returns are 0.08 percent, 0.05 percent, and
0.03 percent, respectively. In a similar fashion, the results for the bottom decile indicate
that Bayesian alphas are better in identifying poor performing funds. All differences are
highly significant. In fact, the empirical p-values are zero for all simulations. The results
of the simulations with t-distributed error terms are consistent with the results of the
simulations with normal error terms in the sense that Bayesian alphas have lower RMSEs
and produce better fund rankings. In fact, the difference between both estimators becomes
larger. While the presence of “fat tails” increases the RMSE of standard OLS by about
30 percent, irrespective of the length of the estimation window, the corresponding increase
for Bayesian alphas is only half. In an unreported experiment, we generate the error terms
from Student’s t-distribution with 3 degrees of freedom, keeping all parameters at their
previous values. Compared to the results of the simulation with 5 degrees of freedom, we
observe an increase in the difference between both estimators. These results indicate that
the advantage of using Bayesian alphas over standard OLS becomes larger when the data
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are more leptokurtic, e.g., exhibit “fatter tails”.
2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Methodology
In this section, we employ Bayesian alphas to study short-run persistence in the perfor-
mance of US equity mutual funds over the period 1984–2003. The typical setup is to rank
funds based on a measure of past performance, and analyze the relation between rank
and subsequent performance. Hendricks et al. (1993) study relative performance persis-
tence for 165 no-load growth funds over the period 1974–1988 using quarterly returns.
In each quarter the authors assign funds to octile portfolios based on funds’ raw returns
over the past one to eight quarters. Post-ranking alphas are estimated for the stacked
time series of equally weighted portfolio returns using several benchmark sets. Their re-
sults indicate that fund performance tends to persist in the near future. Using a monthly
sample of 188 funds over the period 1977–1993, Elton et al. (1996) rank funds on one-
and three-year alphas with respect to several benchmark indices, and demonstrate that
when fund rankings are based on risk-adjusted returns, performance persists over holding
periods up to three years. However, Carhart (1997) demonstrates that almost all of this
persistence is explained by expenses and the one-year momentum effect documented by
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). He replicates the methodology of Hendricks et al. (1993)
using a survivorship-bias free data set containing monthly returns of 1,892 funds over the
period 1962 to 1993. When post-ranking alphas are estimated using a four-factor model
that includes momentum, the spread in alphas between the portfolios disappears. Addi-
tionally, portfolios are formed based on four-factor alphas over the previous three-years.
While there appears to be some consistency in risk-adjusted rankings, these results are
only significant for the lowest ranked funds. More recently, using daily return data on
230 funds over the period 1985–1995, Bollen and Busse (2005) find significant short-term
persistence in fund performance beyond momentum when short measurement horizons are
used. Every quarter, funds are sorted into decile portfolios based on three-month ranking
periods, and the portfolios’ performance is evaluated over the subsequent quarter. Using
this framework, they find that the top decile earns a statistically significant positive alpha
over the subsequent period. When they employ longer measurement horizons, the superior
performance disappears. These results suggest that superior performance is a short-lived
phenomenon that is only observable using short measurement horizons.
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We investigate short-run performance persistence using the entire CRSP universe of
mutual funds. For the main tests of our empirical analysis, we form dynamic portfolios
of mutual funds based on past performance, and evaluate the portfolios’ post-ranking
performance. Each month, funds are sorted into rank portfolios on their estimated alphas
over the past period with respect to proxies for market, size, value, and momentum. Funds
are required to have a complete return history available over the employed ranking period.
Pre-ranking alphas are estimated using an empirical Bayes approach. We follow Hendricks
et al. (1993) in assigning the funds to deciles based on their rank and calculate the equally
weighted returns over the subsequent month for all rank portfolios. Portfolio weights are
readjusted if a fund disappears after ranking. Finally, we estimate post-ranking alphas for
the stacked time series of portfolio returns using OLS regression with Newey-West standard
errors.
2.5.2 Short-run persistence in superior performance
We investigate performance persistence using measurement horizons of 36 and 12 months.
We not only build portfolios of funds based on Bayesian alphas, but also on raw returns and
standard OLS alphas as in Hendricks et al. (1993) and Carhart (1997). More specifically,
portfolios of mutual funds are formed from January 1984 to December 2003, yielding a time
series of monthly portfolio returns over a period of 20 years. The analysis is conducted
on our entire sample of funds. We start by sorting funds into decile portfolios based on
36-month ranking periods. In the average month, 980 funds are available ranging from 261
funds in 1984 to 2,982 funds in 2003. To measure post-ranking performance, we additionally
estimate the portfolios’ raw returns and Sharpe ratios. As we discuss in more detail in
Section 2.6, using different performance measures over the pre- and post-ranking period is
one way to prevent spurious persistence patterns arising due to a misspecification of the
performance evaluation model. The results in Table 2.4 indicate a relation between past
and future performance over measurement horizons of 36 months. Higher ranked funds
seem to earn higher post-ranking returns. However, most of this predictability is explained
by differences in the funds’ exposures to common risk factors. When we employ the Sharpe
ratio to measure post-ranking performance, the findings are only a weak indication of such
relation. Further, when we consider the deciles’ post-ranking alphas, it appears that all
predictability is concentrated in the bottom deciles. Only the worst performing funds earn
post-ranking alphas that are significantly different from zero. The top decile of funds earns
a post-ranking alpha that is economically and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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Apparently, fund managers are unable to outperform the passive benchmarks over longer
periods of time. When we consider the portfolios’ sensitivities to the benchmark factors,
it appears that higher ranked funds are more exposed towards growth stocks (negative
loading on HML), while lower-ranked funds are more exposed to value stocks (positive
loading on HML). Further, funds with more extreme rankings are more exposed to SMB.
Also, the pattern in R2-values points out that funds in the more extreme deciles take more
non-systematic risk. All in all, our results indicate relative performance persistence at a
three-year measurement horizon. However, this effect is mainly concentrated in persistently
underperforming funds. The top decile of funds appear to earn back their expenses, while
the bottom deciles strongly underperform the market. These results are very similar to
those of Carhart (1997), and hold irrespective of which method of estimation is used to
rank the funds.
Next, we rerun the analysis with a measurement horizon of 12 months. In the average
month, 1,461 funds are available with at least 12 months of return history ranging from
306 funds in 1984 to 4,348 funds in 2003. The results of this analysis, reported in Table 2.5,
indicate that short-run performance predicts future performance better than performance
estimated over longer measurement horizons. The expected alpha of the top (bottom)
decile for rankings based on 12-month measurement horizons is substantially higher (lower)
than that of rankings based on 36-month horizons. Furthermore, the relation between past
and future performance is close to monotonic. These results hold irrespective of which
method of estimating alpha is used. Moreover, Bayesian alphas appear to capture persistent
superior performance of the top decile of funds. We find a statistically significant, superior
return of 0.26 percent per month for the top decile when funds are ranked on Bayesian
alphas. In contrast, sorts on raw returns and standard OLS alphas yield post-ranking
alphas that are not or only marginally significant. It should be stressed that in this analysis
the different pre-ranking performance measures are only relevant to the extent that they
result in a different composition of the top (and bottom) deciles. For example, the funds in
the OLS and Bayesian top deciles have an overlap of slightly less than 75 percent. Further,
we observe similar patterns for the deciles’ sensitivities to the benchmark factors: higher
ranked funds are more growth oriented, and funds with extreme rankings are more exposed
to the size factor.
2.5.3 Lifespan of persistence and fund age
Bollen and Busse (2005) find that the persistent outperformance of the top decile in their
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sample lasts over a period of slightly more than a month, while the bottom decile’s under-
performance declines at a constant rate over time. To investigate this issue in our sample,
we rank funds on one-month lagged alpha estimates over the past 12 months, e.g., fund
rankings in February 1984 are based on alphas estimated over the period January 1983 to
December 1983. Consistent with Bollen and Busse, our results in Table 2.6 indicate that
the superior performance of the top decile is only short-lived. While the top decile is still
earning a positive alpha of 0.10 percent per month, this value is not significantly differ-
ent from zero. We also find that the bottom decile’s underperformance persists strongly.
In fact, in tests not reported, we find that lagged alpha estimates over periods of 5, 11,
and even 35 months are predictive for the bottom decile’s future underperformance. This
finding is consistent with persistent negative abnormal returns driven by funds’ extremely
high expenses as documented by Carhart (1997).
A potential explanation for the difference between the analyses with measurement hori-
zons of 36 and 12 months is that the results are based on different samples of funds. In
particular, the use of a measurement horizon of 36 months excludes relatively young funds
from the analysis. This greatly influences the relevant cross-section of funds. By requiring
funds to have 36 observations available over the past three years, on average more than
one third of the existing funds are eliminated from our sample. When a full return history
over the past year is required, less than 5 percent of the funds is left out our analysis.
Furthermore, we find that almost 40 percent of the dead funds listed in our sample have
been active for less than three years. Ignoring this group of funds might have substantial
implications for inferences about the mutual fund industry as a whole, inducing some sort
of survivorship bias. To investigate this issue, we conduct the analysis with the measure-
ment horizon of 12 months on the same sample of funds that is used in the 36-month
analysis. Likewise, we analyze performance persistence on a sample of only relative young
funds (return history of 12 to at most 35 months). In the average month, 977 funds are
classified as “old”, and 480 funds as “young”. The results of this analysis are presented in
Table 2.7. When the analysis is conducted on older funds, the top decile of funds earns a
statistically significant post-ranking alpha of 0.21 percent per month. When only relatively
young funds are included in the analysis, the top decile’s post-ranking alpha equals 0.35
percent per month, suggesting that the persistence effect is substantially stronger among
for relatively young funds. It also seems that the bottom decile’s underperformance is
lower for younger funds. Most likely this can be attributed to the fact that a large part of
the dead funds is left out of the analysis when a longer return history is required.
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2.5.4 Economic significance and persistence across different types
of funds
So far, we have demonstrated that the use of Bayesian estimation enables us to capture
persistence in superior performance using monthly data. Our results, based on the entire
CRSP universe of US equity funds over an extensive time period, complement the evidence
provided by Bollen and Busse (2005) on the existence of short-run performance persistence.
However, several additional questions are raised by these findings. For example, it is unclear
whether the reported persistence is economically significant; a strategy of investing in
past winners could involve significant transaction costs. Furthermore, it is not clear what
the underlying economic reasons for these findings are. Empirical results on the relation
between performance persistence and fund characteristics, such as investment style, may
provide an insight into this phenomenon. To answer these questions, we repeat the analysis
using particular subsets of funds, e.g., no-load funds. While doing so reduces the available
cross-section of funds considerably, thereby exacerbating noise in portfolio returns, the
benefit of our Bayesian approach in this context is evident. Because we only require
monthly return data, which are much more readily available than daily frequency data,
restricting attention to a specific type leaves us with a sufficiently large number of funds
in the cross-section.
We first investigate whether superior performance persists beyond the transaction costs
that are involved with a strategy of chasing winning funds. Only the 3,101 funds that
do not charge load fees are included in the analysis. As before, funds are sorted into
decile portfolios based on 12-month alpha estimates, and the rank portfolios post-ranking
performance is evaluated. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 2.8, and provide
clear evidence that the superior performance of the top decile (0.31 percent per month)
persists beyond load fees. Apparently, the top funds’ superior performance is not canceled
out by load fees that are involved with a strategy of chasing winners. In fact, it even seems
that managerial skill plays a more important part in the performance for no-load funds
than for otherwise similar funds. To investigate this issue more closely, we also perform the
analysis on funds that do charge load fees. Our sample covers 4,025 load funds. The results
of this analysis are in Panel B of Table 2.8. With a post-ranking alpha of 0.20 percent per
month for load funds versus 0.31 percent per month for no-load funds, our findings add to
the evidence that load funds tend to underperform no-load funds (see Morey (2003)).
Second, we analyze persistence across different investment styles. Funds are sorted into
deciles on 12-month raw returns, standard OLS alphas, and Bayesian alphas. Table 2.9
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lists the top deciles’ performance for the different types of funds. The post-ranking alpha of
the top decile of small cap/growth funds has a statistically significant value of 0.24 percent
per month (using Bayesian estimation). For growth funds and growth & income funds,
the top decile’s post-ranking alphas have (insignificant) values of 0.20 and 0.08 percent per
month, respectively. When funds are ranked on raw returns or OLS alphas, we find only
marginal evidence of persistence in superior performance for small cap/growth funds; the
type of fund among which this effect manifests itself most strongly.
Interestingly, none of the three style-specific top deciles outperforms the top decile
based on the pooled sample of funds. This indicates that the style composition of the
top decile in Table 2.5 varies over time and that part of its superior performance can be
attributed to style timing, i.e., being in the right investment style at the right time. Since
we observe more homogeneity in funds’ factor exposures within samples of funds with the
same classification, one could expect the prior for alpha to be more precise when this
value is based on funds with the same classification than when based on the entire cross-
section of funds. Therefore, we perform an analysis where funds’ raw alphas are shrunk to
the cross-sectional average of similar funds. Using this setup, not only is the value of the
prior dependent on the funds’ classifications, but also the degrees of shrinkage varies across
different types of funds. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.10. Compared
to the results in Table 2.5 the post-ranking alpha of the top decile increases to 0.28 percent
per month, with a t-value of 2.41. Apparently, the benefits from using conditional priors
are only marginal.
Up to this point, the empirical results indicate that the Bayesian approach works well
in capturing persistence in superior performance of the top decile of mutual funds. Even
though the differences are sometimes small, Bayesian alphas are uniformly outperforming
raw returns and standard OLS alphas; both in terms of economic and statistical signifi-
cance. To compare the predictive power of standard OLS and Bayesian alphas formally,
we perform a Diebold-Mariano test (Diebold and Mariano, 1995). This test basically in-
volves a comparison of the average forecast error of both estimators, and is the standard
approach in the econometric literature to compare forecasts. At the begin of each year
during our sample period 1984–2003, we compute the root mean squared error (RMSE) of
alpha forecasts over the preceding 12 months using both estimators, relative to the realized
values over the subsequent year. Hereby, realized alphas are estimated using standard OLS.
While OLS estimates obviously do not correspond to true alphas, they provide an unbiased
measure of a fund’s ex-post performance. We then consider the two sequences of forecasts
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errors, and test whether the average difference in RMSE between both estimators is equal
to zero. The variance is computed using the Newey-West estimator. The analysis is per-
formed on all subgroups of funds we defined earlier. Table 2.11 lists the results. It appears
that the RMSE of Bayesian estimates is substantially (and significantly) lower than that
of OLS alphas. When we consider the complete sample of funds, the average RMSE is 1.12
percent per month using OLS alphas, and 0.91 percent per month using Bayesian alphas.
These outcomes are consistent and in the same order of magnitude across all subgroups of
funds.
2.6 Robustness
2.6.1 Model specification
In this subsection, we report the results of several robustness tests. We first investigate
whether our findings of short-run persistence are robust to a potential misspecification of
the factor model we employ to evaluate fund performance. Misspecification of the employed
factor model can lead to spurious persistence results, since any misspecification is also likely
to persist. In particular, we investigate the sensitivity of the found persistence patterns
to industry effects. For this purpose, we employ the approach advocated by Pastor and
Stambaugh (2002b), and Jones and Shanken (2005) to evaluate post-ranking performance.
Using this approach, we employ principal components analysis (PCA) to extract factors
that represent returns in specific industries that are not captured by the funds’ sensitivities
to the common risk factors. More specifically, excess returns on the Fama and French 30
industry portfolios are regressed on a constant and the four Carhart (1997) factors. PCA
is conducted on the time series of the residuals of each regression plus the intercept in
that regression. Finally, the first three normalized components are taken as weights for the
industry portfolios. The monthly return data on the 30 industry portfolios are obtained
from Kenneth French’s webpage. We augment our base four-factor model with the first
three factor-mimicking principal components:
rit = αi + β1iRMRFt + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + β4iUMDt+
β5iIP1t + β6iIP2t + β7iIP3t + εit,
(2.9)
where IP1, IP2, and IP3 are the three industry factors.
Additionally, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to time-varying exposures to
common risk factors. For this purpose we employ the conditional performance measure of
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Ferson and Schadt (1996) to evaluate the fund deciles’ post-ranking performance. Using
this approach, we extend our factor model with interaction terms of the benchmark returns
with a set of pre-determined information variables:
rit = αi + β1iRMRFt +B
′
1i[zt−1RMRFt] + β2iSMBt +B
′
2i[zt−1SMBt]+
β3iHMLt +B
′
3i[zt−1HMLt] + β4iUMDt +B
′
4i[zt−1UMDt] + εit,
(2.10)
where zt−1 denotes a vector holding the lagged values of the information variables, and
vector B′ji captures the response of fund i’s exposure to benchmark j to this information.
Following Ferson and Schadt (1996), we employ the following information variables: (1)
the lagged level of the one-month Treasury bill yield, (2) the lagged dividend yield of the
S&P500, (3) a lagged measure of the slope of the term structure, and (4) a lagged default
spread in the corporate bond market. The dividend yield is defined as the dividend per
share as a percentage of the share price over the past 12 months for the index. The term
spread is defined as a constant-maturity 10-year Treasury bond yield minus the 3-month
Treasury bill yield. And the default spread is defined as Moody’s BAA-rated corporate
bond yield minus the AAA-rated corporate bond yield. One-month Treasury bill rates are
obtained from Ibbotson and Associates, data on the dividend yield on the S&P500 are
obtained from Thompson Financial, and the bond yield are obtained from the webpage of
the Federal Reserve Bank. The resulting factor model includes 20 scaled factors, and an
intercept. We evaluate the deciles post-ranking performance for fund rankings on 12-month
raw returns, standard (four-factor) OLS alphas, and (four-factor) Bayesian alphas.
The results of the analyses are in Table 2.12. The differences between the alternative
factor models used for evaluation are typically small. Irrespective of the model that is
employed, the top decile based on Bayesian alphas over the past 12 months delivers a
statistically significant positive alpha of about 0.3 percent per month. These results indi-
cate that our finding of abnormal returns for the top decile is robust to alternative factor
models and cannot be explained by the conditional performance measure of Ferson and
Schadt (1996). Further, it suggests that the reported performance persistence is unlikely
to be caused by misspecification of the factor model.
2.6.2 Persistence tests
An alternative methodology that is used to investigate mutual fund performance persis-
tence are cross-sectional regressions, see e.g., Bollen and Busse (2005). In this section we
explore the robustness of our findings with respect to this alternative approach. With
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the cross-sectional regressions, funds’ post-ranking alphas are regressed on performance
estimates over the pre-ranking period:
αˆi,post = at + btPerf i,pre + ²i,t, (2.11)
where αˆi,post is the post-ranking alpha estimate of fund i, and Perf i,pre is fund i’s pre-
ranking performance. The funds’ post-ranking alphas are estimated using standard OLS
over 12-month periods, and the funds’ pre-ranking performance is estimated using raw
returns, standard OLS alphas, and Bayesian alphas over 36-month and 12-month periods.
The cross-sectional regression is estimated for all available funds at the beginning of every
year, and the average of the coefficient estimates is taken over the entire sample period from
1984 to 2003. The standard deviations of the cross-sectional regression estimates are used
to generate the sampling errors for these estimates (see Fama and MacBeth (1973)). A
significant loading on the slope coefficient would be consistent with persistence in relative
fund performance.
We perform these regressions for all subsamples of funds. The results of these anal-
yses are reported in Table 2.13. Clearly, performance over the past year is much more
informative about future relative performance than performance over the past three years:
the slope coefficients are generally higher and more significant for regressions for one-year
horizons than three-year horizons. However, note that these tests check the persistence in
relative performance and do not necessarily indicate that the winners provide abnormal
positive returns. A positive loading on the slope coefficient could therefore be the result
of persistent underperformance of a group of funds.
2.7 Conclusion
When evaluating mutual fund performance, it is notoriously difficult to separate managerial
skill from simple luck, particularly at short measurement horizons. In this paper, we employ
a simple and straightforward empirical Bayes approach, based upon monthly returns, that
is able to measure fund performance substantially more efficiently than standard OLS.
Using Bayesian alphas, we investigate the persistence in mutual fund performance using
the entire sample of US equity funds reported by CRSP over the period 1984–2003.
The results in this paper clearly support the idea that past performance of mutual funds
has predictive power for future performance. When funds are ranked on Bayesian four-
factor alphas, estimated over horizons of 36 or 12 months, the top deciles subsequently
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outperform the bottom deciles across all subsamples and using alternative ex post per-
formance measures. More interestingly, we are able to capture short-run persistence in
abnormal performance as documented by Bollen and Busse (2005) using monthly data for
a much larger and more recent sample of US equity funds. When funds are sorted into
decile portfolios based on Bayesian alphas over the previous 12 months, we find a mono-
tonically decreasing spread in post-ranking alphas between the top and bottom deciles, the
top decile earning a significant positive abnormal return of 0.26 percent in the first month
after ranking. When raw returns or standard OLS alphas rather than Bayesian alphas are
used, the findings are only a weak indication of such a relation. The predictive accuracy
of OLS alphas is also significantly lower than that of Bayesian alphas.
Given the large cross-section of available funds and the limited demands imposed by
our Bayesian procedure, we are able to investigate the persistence effect across different
subsamples of funds. Accordingly, we investigate whether the superior performance of the
top decile is canceled out by load fees. When we focus on the subsample of no-load funds,
the persistence pattern is even stronger than for the entire sample, with a post-ranking
alpha of the top decile of 0.31 percent per month. Apparently, the top deciles superior
performance is not reduced by load fees that are involved with a strategy of chasing winners.
In addition, we form subgroups of different types of funds, and investigate whether the
persistence effect is related to investment style. Indeed we find that persistence varies
across styles, and manifests itself most strongly among relatively young, small cap/growth
funds.
47
43
Appendix - Bayesian approaches
This appendix describes the methods that are applied in this study to estimate mutual
fund alphas. Consider the following performance model
ri = Xiθi + εi, (2.12)
where ri denotes a Ti by 1 vector of the excess returns of fund i, Xi denotes a Ti by k + 1
matrix of excess returns of the benchmarks factors, including an intercept, and θi denotes
a k + 1 vector of unknown parameters, containing alpha and the k factor sensitivities of
fund i. Now assume that
θi ∼ N (µ,Σ) . (2.13)
Under the assumption of i.i.d. normal error terms, the posterior distribution of θi is normal
with expectation
θ∗i = E(θi) =
(
1
σ2i
X ′iXi + Σ
−1
)−1(
1
σ2i
X ′iXiθˆi + Σ
−1µ
)
, (2.14)
and covariance V (θi) given by
V (θi) =
(
1
σ2i
X ′iXi + Σ
−1
)−1
. (2.15)
In the empirical Bayesian approach (see Casella and George (1992) and Maddala et al.
(1997)) the hyperparameters µ, σ2i , and Σ, are computed as follows:
µ∗ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
θˆi, (2.16)
σ2∗i =
1
Ti − k (ri −Xiθˆi)
′(ri −Xiθˆi), (2.17)
and
Σ∗ =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
θˆi − 1
N
N∑
i=1
θˆi
)(
θˆi − 1
N
N∑
i=1
θˆi
)′
. (2.18)
Alternatively, an iterative procedure could be employed, where the preceding equations are
solved iteratively with the OLS estimate θˆi as initial value. To improve convergence with
the iterative procedure, Maddala et al. (1997) advocate to estimate Σ∗ as
Σ∗ =
1
N − 1
[
D +
N∑
i=1
(θ∗i − µ∗)(θ∗i − µ∗)′
]
, (2.19)
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whereD denotes a diagonal matrix with small positive entries (e.g., 0.0001). This procedure
is repeated until a prespecified degree of convergence is reached for the parameter estimates.
With Gibbs sampling (see Casella and George (1992) and Stern (2000)), drawings
are simulated from the posterior distribution to generate a sample of this distribution
rather than deriving it analytically. Parameter values such as the posterior means are
then estimated from this simulated sample. For this purpose, the density function of the
posterior distribution of the parameters is partitioned such that the resulting conditional
densities are easy to simulate from. The conditional distribution of θi is simulated from the
normal distribution with mean E(θi) given by Eq. (2.14) and covariance matrix V (θi) given
by Eq. (2.15). The conditional distribution of µ is simulated from the normal distribution
with mean E(µ) given by
E(µ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
θi, (2.20)
and variance V (µ) given by
V (µ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[θi − E(µ)][θi − E(µ)]′. (2.21)
The conditional distribution of σi is simulated from the χ
2-distribution:
(ri −Xiθi)′(ri −Xiθi)
σ2i
∼ χ2(Ti + 4), (2.22)
The conditional distribution of Σ is simulated from the inverted Wishart distribution with
parameter matrix S given by
S =
N∑
i=1
(θi − µ)(θi − µ)′ (2.23)
and k + 1 degrees of freedom. Draws from these distributions are simulated iteratively,
conditional on draws of the previous iteration using θˆi as prior for θi. The first set of draws
are then dropped for burn-in of the Markov Chain.
While the iterative procedure and Gibbs sampling are generally less sensitive to initial-
ization, we conducted some simulation experiments, the results of which suggest that this
advantage is only very marginal for the applications in this study. On the other hand, these
approaches require us to make some arbitrary assumptions on the number of iterations,
simulations, or the length of the burn-in period. Accordingly, the results presented in this
study are based on the empirical Bayesian approach.
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2.8 Appendix - Fund selection
To select funds from the 2003 CRSP database we follow a procedure similar to the one used
by Pastor and Stambaugh (2002b). We use the information that CRSP provides about
classifications by Wiesenberger (OBJ), Micropal/Investment Company Data, Inc. (ICDI
OBJ), Strategic Insight (SI OBJ), and the funds themselves (POLICY). We exclude funds
with unknown objectives, no expense, turnover, or load data in the annual summary at the
end of each previous year. Additionally, we exclude flexible funds, bond funds, mortgage-
backed funds, multi-manager funds, money market funds, balanced funds, funds that invest
in precious metals, and international funds. Funds with the following classifications are
excluded:
OBJ: BAL, BQ, BY, CBD, CGN, CHY, CIM, CSB, CSI, CSM, FLX, GB, GGN, GM,
GOV, GPM, GS, GSM, IBD, ICA, IE, IFL, INT, IOH, IPA, MBD, MF, MGN, MHI,
MHY, MIS, MMA, MMF, MMI, MNJ, MNY, MOH, MQ, MSS, MT, MTG, MTX, MVA,
OI, OTH, SCU, SUT, TFG, TFM, TMM
ICDI OBJ: BL, BQ, BY, GB, GE, GM, GS, IE, MF, MG, MQ, MS, MT, MY, PM
SI OBJ: BAL, BGA, BGC, BGE, BGN, BGS, CGN, CHQ, CHY, CIM, CMQ, CPF, CPR,
CSI, CSM, CVR, ECH, ECN, EGG, EGS, EGT, EGX, EID, EIG, EIS, EIT, EJP, ELT
,EPC, EPX, ERP, ESC, FLG, FLX, GBG, GBS, GGN, GIM, GLD, GMA, GMB, GSM,
IAZ, ICA, ICO, ICT, IFL, IGA, IHI, IKS, IKY, IMA, IMD, IMI, IMN, IMT, IMX, INC,
IND, INJ, INM, INY, IOH, IOR, IPA, ISC, ISD, ITN, ITX, IVA, IVT, IWA, IWV, JPN,
LCA, LFL, LKY, LMA, LMD, LMI, LNC, LNY, LTN, LVA, MAL, MAR, MAZ, MCA,
MCO, MCT, MDE, MFL, MGA, MGN, MHI, MHY, MIA, MID, MIL, MIM, MIN, MIS,
MKS, MKY, MLA, MMA, MMD, MME, MMI, MMN, MMO, MMS, MMT, MNC, MND,
MNE, MNH, MNJ, MNM, MNY, MOH, MOK, MOR, MPA, MPR, MRI, MSC, MSD,
MSM, MTN, MTX, MUT, MVA, MVT, MWA, MWI, MWV, OPI, PAC, SBA, SBE, SBP,
SBT, SBY, SCU, SIA, SIE, SIP, SIT, SIY, SPE, SPR, SPY, SUA, SUT, TAL, TAZ, TBG,
TCA, TCT, TFG, TFI, TFL, TGA, TMA, TMD, TMI, TMN, TNC, TNJ, TNY, TOH,
TPA, TTN, TTX, TVA
POLICY: B & P, Bal, Bonds, C & I, Flex, GS, Hedge, Leases, MF, MM, TFM
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We assign the remaining funds to the following investment styles, using the classifica-
tions provided by CRSP:
Small cap/growth: OBJ: MCG, SCG, AGG; ICDI OBJ: AG, AGG; SI OBJ: SCG, AGG
Growth: OBJ: G, G-S, S-G, GRO, LTG; IDCI OBJ: LG; SI OBJ: GRO
Growth & income: OBJ: GCI, G-I, G-I-S, G-S-I, I-G, I-G-S, I-S-G, S-G-I, S-I-G, GRI;
ICDI OBJ: GI; SI OBJ: GRI
Funds are classified as no-load fund when they charge no front-end load fees, nor de-
ferred sales charges and redemption fees (TOT LOAD = 0). Finally, we exclude funds
with less than 12 consecutive returns over the whole sample period.
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: Number of US equity funds over time.
Equity No-load Small cap/growth Growth Growth & income
1984 362 171 91 182 89
1985 398 199 94 207 97
1986 456 233 90 272 94
1987 533 263 97 326 110
1988 601 302 102 372 127
1989 673 336 104 419 150
1990 681 336 96 457 128
1991 691 353 142 331 218
1992 730 374 153 358 219
1993 962 433 287 455 298
1994 1,226 574 323 567 337
1995 1,684 786 471 742 473
1996 1,903 896 571 807 529
1997 2,203 1,030 668 942 597
1998 2,858 1,375 883 1,245 738
1999 3,233 1,457 1,019 1,417 809
2000 3,634 1,593 1,133 1,616 895
2001 3,947 1,702 1,244 1,759 947
2002 4,621 1,925 1,497 2,041 1,084
2003 4,973 2,130 1,607 2,235 1,132
The table lists the number of available US equity mutual funds over the period 1984–2003. The data
are extracted from the CRSP database. To be included in our sample, funds must be classified as a
non-specialized US equity fund, and expense and load data of the funds should be available in the annual
summary report at the end of the preceding year. In total, the samples cover 6,429 US equity funds, 3,101
no-load funds, 2,134 small cap/growth, 3,349 growth, and 1,837 growth & income funds that have more
than 12 consecutive returns over the whole sample period.
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Table 2.2: Parameter values of the data generating process.
Alpha RMRF SMB HML UMD
A. Return
- 0.64% (4.57%) 0.01% (3.46%) 0.35% (3.31%) 0.86% (4.54%)
B. Sensitivity
-0.22% (0.49%) 0.99 (0.25) 0.20 (0.38) 0.05 (0.39) 0.03 (0.18)
Fund performance is measured using the four-factor Carhart (1997) model. Alphas and benchmark sensi-
tivities are estimated using standard OLS and the entire return history of each fund. The sample is from
1984 to 2003 and covers 6,429 US equity funds. The table lists the benchmark factors’ average returns
(Panel A), and the cross-sectional means of funds’ alphas and benchmark sensitivities (Panel B). The
standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Monte Carlo results.
1. Using normal error terms 2. Using t-dist(5df) error terms
OLS Bayes Difference p-value OLS Bayes Difference p-value
A. RMSE
12M 0.67% 0.38% −0.28% 0.00 0.86% 0.45% −0.42% 0.00
24M 0.41% 0.28% −0.14% 0.00 0.53% 0.32% −0.21% 0.00
36M 0.32% 0.24% −0.09% 0.00 0.42% 0.27% −0.14% 0.00
60M 0.24% 0.20% −0.05% 0.00 0.32% 0.23% −0.09% 0.00
B. Alpha D1 (top decile)
12M 0.26% 0.39% 0.13% 0.00 0.18% 0.34% 0.16% 0.00
24M 0.42% 0.50% 0.08% 0.00 0.34% 0.46% 0.12% 0.00
36M 0.48% 0.54% 0.05% 0.00 0.42% 0.51% 0.09% 0.00
60M 0.54% 0.57% 0.03% 0.00 0.49% 0.54% 0.05% 0.00
C. Alpha D10 (bottom decile)
12M -0.70% -0.83% −0.13% 0.00 -0.61% -0.77% −0.16% 0.00
24M -0.86% -0.94% −0.08% 0.00 -0.78% -0.90% −0.12% 0.00
36M -0.93% -0.98% −0.05% 0.00 -0.86% -0.95% −0.09% 0.00
60M -0.98% -1.01% −0.03% 0.00 -0.93% -0.99% −0.05% 0.00
Simulated fund returns are generated using the Carhart (1997) model for measurement horizons of 12,
24, 36, and 60 months. The number of funds in the cross-section is set to 1,000. We then estimate the
factor models using standard OLS and an empirical Bayes approach. The number of replications for each
measurement horizon is set to 1,000. The table lists the average RMSE of alpha using standard OLS and
Bayesian estimation (Panel A), and the average true alpha for the top (D1) and bottom (D10) deciles of
funds resulting from rankings based on both estimators (Panel B and C).
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Table 2.4: Rankings on three-year measurement horizons.
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t RMRF SMB HML UMD R2
A. Rankings on raw returns
D1 0.58% 0.10 -0.13% -1.18 0.98 0.43 -0.26 0.20 0.93
D2 0.66% 0.13 -0.02% -0.23 0.98 0.27 -0.14 0.11 0.96
D3 0.55% 0.12 -0.11% -2.03 0.97 0.19 -0.05 0.05 0.98
D4 0.55% 0.12 -0.09% -2.36 0.97 0.11 -0.00 0.02 0.98
D5 0.54% 0.12 -0.08% -1.64 0.96 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.98
D6 0.53% 0.12 -0.09% -1.74 0.97 0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.98
D7 0.53% 0.12 -0.10% -1.54 0.97 0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.97
D8 0.50% 0.11 -0.11% -1.33 0.97 0.06 0.11 -0.06 0.94
D9 0.50% 0.11 -0.11% -1.16 0.99 0.13 0.14 -0.08 0.92
D10 0.35% 0.08 -0.21% -2.01 0.96 0.20 0.11 -0.11 0.90
B. Rankings on OLS alphas
D1 0.60% 0.11 -0.01% -0.10 0.98 0.39 -0.16 0.04 0.95
D2 0.60% 0.13 -0.02% -0.39 0.97 0.20 -0.05 0.02 0.97
D3 0.59% 0.13 -0.03% -0.56 0.97 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.97
D4 0.54% 0.12 -0.10% -2.32 0.98 0.10 0.06 -0.01 0.98
D5 0.54% 0.12 -0.07% -1.54 0.95 0.08 0.02 -0.00 0.98
D6 0.52% 0.12 -0.12% -2.42 0.98 0.06 0.04 -0.00 0.98
D7 0.51% 0.11 -0.13% -2.64 0.97 0.09 0.05 -0.00 0.98
D8 0.53% 0.12 -0.13% -2.18 0.98 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.97
D9 0.51% 0.11 -0.16% -2.28 0.99 0.18 0.04 0.03 0.97
D10 0.35% 0.07 -0.28% -3.18 0.96 0.32 -0.01 0.02 0.94
Each month funds are sorted into equally weighted decile portfolios based on 36-month ranking periods.
Pre-ranking performance is measured using raw returns (Panel A), standard OLS alphas (Panel B), and
Bayesian alphas (Panel C). The sample is from 1984 to 2003 and covers 6,429 US equity funds. The
table lists the deciles’ post-ranking excess returns, Sharpe ratios, parameter estimates of the Carhart
(1997) model, and R2-values. The deciles’ post-ranking alphas are estimated using standard OLS over the
stacked time series of portfolio returns.
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Table 2.4 continued
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t RMRF SMB HML UMD R2
C. Rankings on Bayesian alphas
D1 0.62% 0.12 0.01% 0.11 0.99 0.30 -0.16 0.04 0.94
D2 0.58% 0.12 -0.03% -0.44 0.98 0.17 -0.07 0.02 0.97
D3 0.56% 0.12 -0.08% -1.35 0.98 0.15 -0.01 0.01 0.97
D4 0.51% 0.11 -0.10% -1.88 0.95 0.15 0.02 -0.01 0.98
D5 0.58% 0.13 -0.03% -0.64 0.95 0.11 0.02 -0.01 0.98
D6 0.52% 0.11 -0.13% -2.26 0.99 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.98
D7 0.54% 0.12 -0.08% -1.54 0.96 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.97
D8 0.52% 0.12 -0.12% -1.73 0.97 0.11 0.06 -0.01 0.96
D9 0.50% 0.11 -0.17% -2.13 0.98 0.17 0.05 0.02 0.96
D10 0.36% 0.08 -0.33% -3.27 0.98 0.23 0.07 0.04 0.92
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Table 2.5: Rankings on one-year measurement horizons.
E(r) Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t RMRF SMB HML UMD R2
A. Rankings on raw returns
D1 0.97% 0.16 0.04% 0.36 0.96 0.57 -0.13 0.40 0.91
D2 0.77% 0.16 -0.04% -0.51 0.97 0.36 -0.04 0.23 0.96
D3 0.68% 0.15 -0.06% -1.13 0.97 0.21 -0.01 0.14 0.98
D4 0.59% 0.13 -0.12% -3.22 0.97 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.98
D5 0.52% 0.12 -0.12% -2.65 0.97 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.98
D6 0.48% 0.11 -0.12% -2.22 0.97 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.98
D7 0.47% 0.10 -0.09% -1.53 0.96 0.04 0.03 -0.07 0.97
D8 0.38% 0.08 -0.13% -1.60 0.96 0.07 0.04 -0.13 0.95
D9 0.30% 0.06 -0.17% -1.63 0.97 0.08 0.06 -0.20 0.92
D10 0.12% 0.02 -0.21% -1.54 0.94 0.15 0.03 -0.33 0.88
B. Rankings on OLS alphas
D1 0.89% 0.16 0.24% 1.95 0.95 0.45 -0.15 0.11 0.90
D2 0.70% 0.14 0.03% 0.57 0.98 0.25 -0.04 0.06 0.97
D3 0.59% 0.13 -0.03% -0.79 0.95 0.12 -0.00 0.02 0.98
D4 0.55% 0.13 -0.08% -1.87 0.95 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.98
D5 0.54% 0.12 -0.08% -1.72 0.95 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.98
D6 0.51% 0.12 -0.11% -2.29 0.96 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.98
D7 0.46% 0.10 -0.16% -2.86 0.96 0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.98
D8 0.43% 0.09 -0.19% -3.32 0.97 0.13 0.04 -0.02 0.97
D9 0.42% 0.09 -0.21% -2.79 0.99 0.18 0.04 -0.01 0.96
D10 0.18% 0.04 -0.44% -4.22 0.98 0.30 0.07 -0.04 0.92
Each month funds are sorted into equally weighted decile portfolios based on 12-month ranking periods.
Pre-ranking performance is measured using raw returns (Panel A), standard OLS alphas (Panel B), and
Bayesian alphas (Panel C). The sample is from 1984 to 2003 and covers 6,429 US equity funds. The
table lists the deciles’ post-ranking excess returns, Sharpe ratios, parameter estimates of the Carhart
(1997) model, and R2-values. The deciles’ post-ranking alphas are estimated using standard OLS over the
stacked time series of portfolio returns.
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Table 2.5 continued
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t RMRF SMB HML UMD R2
C. Rankings on Bayesian alphas
D1 0.95% 0.18 0.26% 2.26 0.93 0.44 -0.15 0.16 0.89
D2 0.74% 0.15 0.08% 0.99 0.97 0.25 -0.09 0.09 0.96
D3 0.61% 0.13 -0.04% -0.74 0.96 0.17 -0.04 0.05 0.98
D4 0.59% 0.13 -0.04% -0.76 0.97 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.98
D5 0.50% 0.11 -0.11% -2.09 0.95 0.09 0.01 -0.00 0.97
D6 0.49% 0.11 -0.12% -2.00 0.97 0.09 0.05 -0.03 0.97
D7 0.44% 0.10 -0.16% -2.39 0.97 0.10 0.04 -0.04 0.97
D8 0.40% 0.09 -0.21% -2.92 0.97 0.12 0.05 -0.04 0.96
D9 0.36% 0.08 -0.28% -3.21 0.99 0.15 0.08 -0.03 0.95
D10 0.19% 0.04 -0.43% -3.70 0.98 0.20 0.13 -0.06 0.91
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Table 2.6: The lifespan of performance persistence.
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t RMRF SMB HML UMD R2
D1 0.78% 0.14 0.10% 0.92 0.94 0.43 -0.20 0.16 0.90
D2 0.71% 0.15 0.04% 0.55 0.97 0.26 -0.09 0.10 0.97
D3 0.58% 0.12 -0.06% -1.29 0.98 0.17 -0.06 0.05 0.98
D4 0.58% 0.13 -0.04% -0.85 0.95 0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.98
D5 0.53% 0.12 -0.10% -1.85 0.96 0.11 0.04 -0.01 0.98
D6 0.51% 0.11 -0.11% -1.80 0.98 0.09 0.05 -0.03 0.97
D7 0.47% 0.11 -0.15% -2.14 0.97 0.11 0.06 -0.02 0.96
D8 0.46% 0.10 -0.14% -2.18 0.96 0.12 0.06 -0.04 0.96
D9 0.40% 0.09 -0.22% -2.60 0.98 0.14 0.08 -0.05 0.95
D10 0.27% 0.06 -0.34% -3.08 0.96 0.18 0.14 -0.05 0.90
Each month funds are sorted into equally weighted decile portfolios on 1-month lagged alpha estimates
over the preceding 12 months. Pre-ranking performance is measured using Bayesian alphas. The sample
is from 1984 to 2003 and covers 6,429 US equity funds. The table lists the deciles’ post-ranking excess
returns, Sharpe ratios, parameter estimates of the Carhart (1997) model, and R2-values. The deciles’
post-ranking alphas are estimated using standard OLS over the stacked time series of portfolio returns.
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Table 2.7: Performance persistence of older versus younger funds.
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t RMRF SMB HML UMD R2
A. Old Funds
D1 0.89% 0.17 0.21% 2.04 0.94 0.39 -0.14 0.15 0.92
D2 0.73% 0.15 0.05% 0.67 0.97 0.23 -0.06 0.09 0.96
D3 0.61% 0.13 -0.04% -0.99 0.96 0.16 -0.03 0.06 0.98
D4 0.63% 0.14 -0.01% -0.11 0.97 0.13 -0.01 0.02 0.98
D5 0.56% 0.12 -0.06% -1.17 0.96 0.08 0.01 -0.00 0.97
D6 0.47% 0.10 -0.15% -2.52 0.97 0.08 0.05 -0.03 0.97
D7 0.44% 0.10 -0.16% -2.40 0.98 0.09 0.03 -0.04 0.97
D8 0.40% 0.09 -0.20% -2.83 0.98 0.11 0.05 -0.05 0.96
D9 0.33% 0.07 -0.31% -3.35 1.00 0.14 0.06 -0.03 0.95
D10 0.22% 0.05 -0.38% -3.36 0.99 0.20 0.09 -0.07 0.91
B. Young Funds
D1 1.03% 0.17 0.35% 2.02 0.91 0.53 -0.17 0.16 0.74
D2 0.81% 0.16 0.14% 1.38 0.98 0.29 -0.10 0.08 0.93
D3 0.62% 0.13 0.02% 0.31 0.93 0.20 -0.06 0.02 0.96
D4 0.49% 0.11 -0.12% -1.91 0.95 0.12 0.02 -0.01 0.96
D5 0.47% 0.11 -0.14% -2.12 0.94 0.12 0.02 -0.00 0.95
D6 0.46% 0.11 -0.12% -1.43 0.92 0.09 0.05 -0.03 0.95
D7 0.41% 0.09 -0.15% -2.10 0.93 0.09 0.04 -0.05 0.94
D8 0.39% 0.09 -0.19% -2.18 0.94 0.15 0.04 -0.05 0.94
D9 0.33% 0.07 -0.30% -3.43 0.96 0.17 0.10 -0.03 0.93
D10 0.16% 0.04 -0.53% -3.96 0.97 0.22 0.24 -0.02 0.85
Each month funds are sorted into equally weighted decile portfolios based on 12-month ranking periods.
Pre-ranking performance is measured using Bayesian alphas. The analysis is conducted on funds that have
at least 36 observations available (Panel A), and on funds with 12 to at most 35 observations available
(Panel B). The sample is from 1984 to 2003 and covers 6,429 US equity funds. In the average month, 977
funds are classified as “old”, and 480 funds as “young”. The table lists the deciles’ post-ranking excess
returns, Sharpe ratios, parameter estimates of the Carhart (1997) model, and R2-values. The deciles’
post-ranking alphas are estimated using standard OLS over the stacked time series of portfolio returns.
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Table 2.8: Performance persistence for no-load and load funds.
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t RMRF SMB HML UMD R2
A. No-load Funds
D1 0.98% 0.18 0.31% 2.48 0.92 0.45 -0.18 0.17 0.88
D2 0.75% 0.16 0.10% 1.47 0.95 0.24 -0.09 0.08 0.96
D3 0.59% 0.13 -0.05% -1.08 0.96 0.16 -0.01 0.03 0.97
D4 0.59% 0.13 -0.04% -0.77 0.96 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.97
D5 0.53% 0.12 -0.08% -1.37 0.95 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.97
D6 0.52% 0.12 -0.10% -1.56 0.96 0.09 0.08 -0.03 0.96
D7 0.46% 0.10 -0.16% -2.40 0.96 0.10 0.08 -0.03 0.96
D8 0.41% 0.09 -0.17% -2.27 0.94 0.12 0.07 -0.05 0.95
D9 0.37% 0.08 -0.26% -2.96 0.98 0.15 0.10 -0.03 0.94
D10 0.24% 0.05 -0.41% -3.30 0.97 0.21 0.20 -0.06 0.88
B. Load Funds
D1 0.89% 0.17 0.20% 1.79 0.94 0.43 -0.14 0.16 0.89
D2 0.76% 0.15 0.09% 1.05 0.97 0.25 -0.09 0.09 0.95
D3 0.59% 0.13 -0.05% -0.73 0.95 0.18 -0.06 0.06 0.97
D4 0.55% 0.12 -0.07% -1.64 0.97 0.12 -0.02 0.01 0.97
D5 0.53% 0.12 -0.08% -1.47 0.97 0.08 -0.00 -0.01 0.97
D6 0.45% 0.10 -0.17% -2.67 0.98 0.08 0.02 -0.02 0.97
D7 0.44% 0.10 -0.16% -2.36 0.97 0.10 0.02 -0.04 0.97
D8 0.39% 0.08 -0.23% -3.01 1.00 0.12 0.04 -0.03 0.96
D9 0.34% 0.07 -0.31% -3.17 1.00 0.15 0.06 -0.02 0.94
D10 0.15% 0.03 -0.44% -3.82 0.98 0.21 0.07 -0.07 0.91
Each month funds are sorted into equally weighted decile portfolios based on 12-month ranking periods.
Pre-ranking performance is measured using Bayesian alphas. The analysis is performed on strictly no-load
funds (Panel A), and on fund that do charge sales loads (Panel B). The samples are from 1984 to 2003 and
cover 3,101 no-load funds, and 4,025 load funds. The table lists the deciles’ post-ranking excess returns,
Sharpe ratios, parameter estimates of the Carhart (1997) model, and R2-values. The deciles’ post-ranking
alphas are estimated using standard OLS over the stacked time series of portfolio returns.
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Table 2.9: Performance persistence across different investment styles.
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t RMRF SMB HML UMD R2
A. Rankings on raw returns
D1 Small cap/growth 1.06% 0.17 0.09% 0.73 0.98 0.67 -0.20 0.47 0.92
D1 Growth 0.92% 0.16 0.02% 0.20 0.99 0.42 -0.10 0.35 0.87
D1 Growth & income 0.74% 0.18 -0.03% -0.44 0.90 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.95
B. Rankings on OLS alphas
D1 Small cap/growth 0.93% 0.15 0.22% 1.85 1.01 0.65 -0.20 0.14 0.93
D1 Growth 0.81% 0.15 0.19% 1.42 0.95 0.31 -0.15 0.08 0.83
D1 Growth & income 0.65% 0.16 0.03% 0.46 0.92 -0.00 0.18 -0.03 0.93
C. Rankings on Bayesian alphas
D1 Small cap/growth 0.99% 0.16 0.24% 2.01 1.00 0.65 -0.18 0.19 0.92
D1 Growth 0.87% 0.16 0.20% 1.57 0.95 0.29 -0.15 0.13 0.83
D1 Growth & income 0.71% 0.18 0.08% 1.20 0.91 -0.02 0.17 -0.02 0.93
Each month funds are sorted into equally weighted decile portfolios based on 12-month ranking periods.
Pre-ranking performance is measured using raw returns (Panel A), standard OLS alphas (Panel B), and
Bayesian alphas (Panel C). The analysis is conducted on different types of funds. The samples are from
1984 to 2003 and cover 2,134 small cap/growth, 3,349 growth, and 1,837 growth & income funds. The
table lists the top deciles’ post-ranking excess returns, Sharpe ratios, parameter estimates of the Carhart
(1997) model, and R2-values. The deciles’ post-ranking alphas are estimated using standard OLS over the
stacked time series of portfolio returns.
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Table 2.10: Rankings on one-year measurement horizons using conditional priors.
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t RMRF SMB HML UMD R2
D1 0.98% 0.18 0.28% 2.41 0.95 0.47 -0.17 0.17 0.89
D2 0.71% 0.15 0.05% 0.67 0.96 0.26 -0.09 0.09 0.96
D3 0.58% 0.13 -0.07% -1.39 0.96 0.16 -0.03 0.04 0.98
D4 0.55% 0.12 -0.06% -1.45 0.96 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.98
D5 0.51% 0.12 -0.12% -2.40 0.95 0.07 0.04 -0.00 0.97
D6 0.52% 0.12 -0.08% -1.43 0.95 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.97
D7 0.43% 0.10 -0.18% -2.89 0.97 0.09 0.06 -0.04 0.97
D8 0.41% 0.09 -0.20% -2.92 0.98 0.12 0.05 -0.04 0.97
D9 0.36% 0.08 -0.26% -2.93 0.98 0.15 0.06 -0.03 0.95
D10 0.19% 0.04 -0.43% -3.75 0.98 0.25 0.11 -0.06 0.91
Each month funds are sorted into equally weighted decile portfolios based on 12-month ranking periods.
Pre-ranking performance is measured using Bayesian alphas. Funds’ raw alphas are shrunk towards the
cross-sectional average of funds with the same investment style. The sample is from 1984 to 2003 and covers
6,429 US equity funds. The table lists the deciles’ post-ranking excess returns, Sharpe ratios, parameter
estimates of the Carhart (1997) model, and R2-values. The deciles post-ranking alphas are estimated using
standard OLS over the stacked time series of portfolio returns.
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Table 2.11: Comparing forecasts of both estimators.
RMSEOLS RMSEBayes Difference Difference-t
All equity 1.12% 0.91% -0.21% -9.98
No-load 1.10% 0.89% -0.21% -9.85
Small cap/growth 1.24% 1.02% -0.21% -11.46
Growth 1.14% 0.92% -0.22% -8.91
Growth & income 0.74% 0.61% -0.13% -8.15
Each year, the root mean squared error (RMSE) is computed for alpha forecasts based on the preceding
12 months, and realized values over the subsequent year. Forecasts are obtained using standard OLS
and Bayesian estimation. Realized alphas are estimated using standard OLS. The analysis is conducted
on different types of funds. The samples are from 1984 to 2003 and cover 6,429 US equity funds, 3,101
no-load funds, 2,134 small cap/growth, 3,349 growth, and 1,837 growth & income funds. The table lists
both estimators’ average RMSEs, and the Diebold-Mariano test on equality of the two.
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Table 2.12: Robustness-tests: Industry effects and time-varying benchmark sensitivities.
1. Carhart 2. Carhart + industries 3. Ferson & Schadt
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t Alpha Alpha-t Alpha Alpha-t
A. Ranking on raw returns
D1 0.97% 0.16 0.04% 0.36 0.10% 0.84 -0.00% -0.02
D2 0.77% 0.16 -0.04% -0.51 -0.02% -0.21 -0.09% -1.34
D3 0.68% 0.15 -0.06% -1.13 -0.03% -0.55 -0.07% -1.40
D4 0.59% 0.13 -0.12% -3.22 -0.08% -2.08 -0.11% -2.83
D5 0.52% 0.12 -0.12% -2.65 -0.08% -1.80 -0.09% -2.48
D6 0.48% 0.11 -0.12% -2.22 -0.07% -1.64 -0.07% -1.81
D7 0.47% 0.10 -0.09% -1.53 -0.05% -0.88 -0.06% -1.16
D8 0.38% 0.08 -0.13% -1.60 -0.09% -1.07 -0.08% -1.25
D9 0.30% 0.06 -0.17% -1.63 -0.12% -1.19 -0.09% -1.05
D10 0.12% 0.02 -0.21% -1.54 -0.15% -1.08 -0.11% -0.92
B. Ranking on OLS alphas
D1 0.89% 0.16 0.24% 1.95 0.32% 2.54 0.26% 2.02
D2 0.70% 0.14 0.03% 0.57 0.07% 1.12 0.05% 0.97
D3 0.59% 0.13 -0.03% -0.79 0.00% 0.10 -0.02% -0.39
D4 0.55% 0.13 -0.08% -1.87 -0.05% -1.11 -0.07% -1.80
D5 0.54% 0.12 -0.08% -1.72 -0.03% -0.74 -0.05% -1.32
D6 0.51% 0.12 -0.11% -2.29 -0.06% -1.39 -0.10% -2.54
D7 0.46% 0.10 -0.16% -2.86 -0.12% -2.29 -0.16% -3.54
D8 0.43% 0.09 -0.19% -3.32 -0.16% -2.80 -0.18% -4.06
D9 0.42% 0.09 -0.21% -2.79 -0.18% -2.44 -0.18% -2.70
D10 0.18% 0.04 -0.44% -4.22 -0.39% -3.89 -0.37% -3.89
Each month funds are sorted into decile portfolios based on 12-month ranking periods. Pre-ranking
performance is measured using raw returns (Panel A), standard OLS alphas (Panel B), and Bayesian
alphas (Panel C). The sample is from 1984 to 2003 and covers 6,429 US equity funds. The table lists
the deciles’ post-ranking excess returns, Sharpe ratios, and alphas. The deciles’ post-ranking alphas are
estimated using the Carhart (1997) model, the Carhart model augmented with three industry factors, and
the Ferson and Schadt (1996) model with standard OLS over the stacked time series of portfolio returns.
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Table 2.12 continued
1. Carhart 2. Carhart + industries 3. Ferson & Schadt
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t Alpha Alpha-t Alpha Alpha-t
C. Ranking on Bayesian alphas
D1 0.95% 0.18 0.26% 2.26 0.33% 2.70 0.28% 2.31
D2 0.74% 0.15 0.08% 0.99 0.11% 1.45 0.09% 1.24
D3 0.61% 0.13 -0.04% -0.74 -0.01% -0.23 -0.03% -0.55
D4 0.59% 0.13 -0.04% -0.76 -0.00% -0.05 -0.01% -0.19
D5 0.50% 0.11 -0.11% -2.09 -0.06% -1.14 -0.09% -2.05
D6 0.49% 0.11 -0.12% -2.00 -0.08% -1.35 -0.11% -2.23
D7 0.44% 0.10 -0.16% -2.39 -0.11% -1.58 -0.15% -2.67
D8 0.40% 0.09 -0.21% -2.92 -0.16% -2.42 -0.19% -3.15
D9 0.36% 0.08 -0.28% -3.21 -0.24% -2.87 -0.24% -3.36
D10 0.19% 0.04 -0.43% -3.70 -0.39% -3.51 -0.35% -3.36
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Table 2.13: Robustness-tests: Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions.
1. Three-year horizon 2. One-year horizon
a b R2 a b R2
A. Regressions on raw returns
All equity -0.14 (-2.14) 0.07 (1.93) 0.01 -0.11 (-1.73) 0.13 (3.28) 0.04
No-load -0.15 (-2.55) 0.10 (2.44) 0.02 -0.11 (-1.90) 0.14 (3.65) 0.05
Small cap/growth -0.20 (-2.18) 0.16 (1.93) 0.05 -0.14 (-1.66) 0.16 (4.59) 0.06
Growth -0.10 (-1.52) 0.03 (0.71) 0.02 -0.09 (-1.56) 0.12 (2.39) 0.04
Growth & income -0.08 (-1.30) 0.01 (0.12) 0.03 -0.16 (-2.37) 0.15 (2.27) 0.06
B. Regressions on OLS alphas
All equity -0.08 (-1.45) 0.15 (4.54) 0.01 -0.07 (-1.39) 0.18 (6.46) 0.04
No-load -0.08 (-1.45) 0.19 (5.99) 0.02 -0.07 (-1.34) 0.19 (6.02) 0.06
Small cap/growth -0.11 (-1.21) 0.29 (4.64) 0.05 -0.10 (-1.20) 0.19 (10.84) 0.05
Growth -0.07 (-1.34) 0.07 (1.76) 0.01 -0.06 (-1.24) 0.16 (4.14) 0.04
Growth & income -0.06 (-1.84) 0.09 (1.43) 0.02 -0.07 (-2.56) 0.15 (3.85) 0.07
C. Regressions on Bayesian alphas
All equity -0.08 (-1.49) 0.26 (3.60) 0.01 -0.07 (-1.42) 0.33 (5.34) 0.04
No-load -0.07 (-1.35) 0.30 (3.31) 0.02 -0.06 (-1.36) 0.37 (4.97) 0.05
Small cap/growth -0.12 (-1.30) 0.36 (2.89) 0.04 -0.10 (-1.26) 0.34 (8.77) 0.04
Growth -0.07 (-1.36) 0.17 (2.34) 0.01 -0.06 (-1.29) 0.31 (3.47) 0.04
Growth & income -0.06 (-2.12) 0.16 (1.81) 0.02 -0.07 (-2.33) 0.27 (4.36) 0.04
At the begin of each year, realized alphas over the subsequent 12 months are regressed on a measure
of performance over the preceding 36 and 12 months. Fund performance is measured using raw returns
(Panel A), standard OLS alphas (Panel B), and Bayesian alphas (Panel C). The analysis is conducted
on different types of funds. The samples are from 1984 to 2003 and cover 6,429 US equity funds, 3,101
no-load funds, 2,134 small cap/growth, 3,349 growth, and 1,837 growth & income funds. The table lists
the regressions’ intercept, slope coefficients, and R2-values. Realized alphas are estimated using standard
OLS. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Chapter 3
“Hot Hands” in Bond Funds∗
3.1 Introduction
Despite the enormous size of the market for actively managed bond funds, surprisingly
little is known about whether active portfolio management contributes to bond investment
returns. A priori, we might expect that the value added by active bond management
would be only marginal. The returns of a fixed-income portfolio are almost fully driven by
nondiversifiable processes that we know are very hard to predict. (See, e.g., Litterman and
Scheinkman (1991), Knez et al. (1994), and Gultekin and Rogalski (1995). These studies
suggest that only a few factors account for bond returns.)
There are also very few studies that provide empirical evidence to support the existence
of skilled bond fund managers. For example, Blake et al. (1993) suggest that return spreads
between actively managed bond portfolios can be explained either by differences in the
maturity range or by differences in the risk premiums of the securities that are held. The
absence of any predictability of risk-adjusted bond performance supports the oft-cited claim
that none of the cross-sectional differences in bond fund returns are attributable to fund
management skills.
If there is one variable that researchers can use to predict future bond fund performance,
it is the fund’s expenses. Bond funds with relatively high expenses generally underperform
funds with lower expenses (see, e.g., Blake et al. (1993) and Detzler (1999)). Skeptism on
managerial skill in the bond market combined with these empirical findings makes a strong
case against active bond fund management. The investment implications seem clear: buy
shares of bond index funds.
We demonstrate that this argument is not necessarily true. In this study, we show
∗This chapter is based on the article by Huij and Derwall (2006).
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that we can predict future bond fund performance by using historical excess returns. By
applying dynamic fund sorts in the tradition of Hendricks et al. (1993) on a large and
survivorship-bias free bond fund sample, we show strong evidence of relative out-of-sample
predictability. We find that after we control for multiple benchmark return sensitivities,
deciles of bond funds with high historical alphas outperform deciles of funds with lowest
alphas out-of-sample by more than 3.5 percent per year.
To investigate whether investors can exploit the observed persistence pattern to earn
abnormal returns, we simulate an investment strategy by applying modern portfolio theory
on past returns. Even after taking the sales load into account, we find that our simulated
portfolio of funds strongly outperforms a strategy that invests in passive indexes by more
than 1.79 percent per year. Our evidence that bond funds can deliver positive abnormal
returns tells an important story: active bonds funds can have incremental economic value.
Since research on bond funds is scarce and not well developed, this paper fills several
gaps in the literature. First, to our knowledge, our study is the first to analyze the
full universe of more than 3,500 bond funds in the CRSP survivorship-bias free mutual
fund database over the period 1990–2003. This large sample helps us to overcome the
small-sample problems that plague earlier studies on bond fund performance. Second,
earlier bond fund studies use only a subset of all common approaches that were originally
developed in research on equity funds to test for persistence. We show that these and other
methods produce a consistent story in this study on performance persistence. Examples of
persistence tests are the cross-sectional regression of current fund alphas on prior-period
alphas, where the focus is on the significance of the regression’s slope coefficient (see Blake
et al. (1993)), and the allocation of funds to one of four cells in a (two-by-two) current-
past performance contingency matrix, where persistence is proven when the frequency by
which past winners (losers) repeat their performance exceeds a threshold probability (see,
e.g., Kahn and Rudd (1995)). We complement prior studies by introducing variants of
the methods used by Hendricks et al. (1993), Elton et al. (1996), and Carhart (1997),
which enable us to investigate the economic significance of strategies based on short-run
persistence in bond fund performance. In doing so, we provide new insights into long-
running debates on the benefits of actively managed funds vis-a`-vis passive portfolios.
Although Hendricks et al. (1993) find that equity fund managers with “hot hands” in
the past continue to outperform managers with “icy hands” in the near future, their top-
performing fund portfolio does not outperform standard benchmark indexes. Equivalently,
previous studies in the bond area suggest that bond index funds are a superior alternative
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compared to actively managed funds, once we take expenses into account. In contrast
to earlier studies, we offer strong evidence of a “hot hands” phenomenon in the bond
fund market that translates into strategies that yield both economically and statistically
significant excess returns.
We also perform a bootstrap analysis to cover the possibility that our results are driven
by distributional features of the data that could make tests of performance persistence
prone to a Type I error. We find that this is not the case. We simulate persistence
tests based on artificially generated data, in which we preserve non-normality features and
intentionally impose zero alpha. By doing so, we can determine the distributions of the
tests statistics when persistence is predetermined to be a chance result. Even the most
extreme values for the simulated test statistics are not in the order of the ones we obtain
from the actual bond fund data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses our methods in the empirical
analysis. Section 3.3 describes the bond fund sample. Section 3.4 presents the empirical
results. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 compare the robustness of our results to a wide range of model
specifications and bootstrapped test statistics. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Performance measurement
Consistent with most studies that hunt for new performance evaluation models for bonds,
we measure bond fund performance relative to the return predicted by a multi-index model:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi +
K∑
j=1
βj,i(Ij,t −Rf,t) + ²i,t, (3.1)
where Ri,t is the total return of fund i, Rf,t is the risk-free rate at time t , αi is the average
risk-adjusted performance of fund i, Ij,t is the return on index j at time t, βj,i is the
sensitivity of the excess return of fund i to index j, K is the number of indexes we use,
and ²i,t is the residual return of fund i at time t.
We can interpret models that include a mixture of indexes along several lines. One
interpretation is that these models are similar to multi-factor models for stocks. Theoreti-
cally, these models can be justified by various alternatives to the CAPM of Sharpe (1964)
and Lintner (1965), such as the ICAPM of Merton (1973) and the APT of Ross (1976). In
this setup, the factors are proxies for the underlying term and default risks in the economy
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that are of hedging concern to investors. The models’ betas measure the funds’ systematic
risk, and their residual returns reflect risk-adjusted performance.1 An alternative interpre-
tation is that the indexes are control variables in a performance attribution model, as in
Kahn (1991) and Carhart (1997), where the passive indexes multiplied by their estimated
weights (betas) most closely reproduce a fund’s return variation. In that case, we are using
a set of bond indexes to describe bond portfolio returns but make no claim about their
role in the return-generating process. Either way, one can think of the model’s intercept
(alpha) as the portion of return that is not explained by factors that do not involve active
management. In both scenarios, we can assume that alpha conveys information about the
skill of a bond fund manager.
Our base model is from Blake et al. (1993), who indicate that only a few factors are
necessary to describe the return on a bond portfolio:
Ri,t−Rf,t = αi+β1,i(BIGt−Rf,t)+β2,i(HYt−Rf,t)+β3,i(GNMAt−Rf,t)+ ²i,t, (3.2)
where BIG is a proxy for returns of the overall bond market, HY is a proxy for the returns
from holding low-grade debt.
GNMA is a proxy for returns of mortgage-backed securities. Contrary to normal bonds,
mortgage-backed securities have an uncertain maturity, because consumers have the right
to sell or refinance their homes at any time. If interest rates decrease, consumers tend
to sell or refinance more often, thereby shortening the life of the securities. As a result,
returns on mortgage securities typically exhibit option-like characteristics.
With this model, we capture term risk by the funds’ betas to the overall bond market.
We interpret these betas as a first-order approximation of the yield curve, (duration).
Funds with a higher (lower) duration than the index will have a bond market beta above
(below) one.
3.2.2 Persistence tests
At the heart of persistence in mutual fund performance lies the relation between past and
future fund returns. However, in practice there is no consensus on which method is best
for testing persistence. To ensure that our results are not a manifestation of exogenously
specified parameters, we use four different approaches to investigating performance persis-
tence. These alternatives have been used in many equity fund performance studies up to
1Consistent with this interpretation, Gebhardt et al. (2005) suggest that proxies for term and default
risk are successful in explaining the cross-section of corporate bond returns. However, their focus is only
on investment-grade bonds.
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this point (see, e.g., Hendricks et al. (1993), Malkiel (1995), Carhart (1997)), but have not
been used rigorously in the bond fund literature. In all our analyses, we essentially consider
an evaluation period and an (out-of-sample) post-evaluation period. We estimate funds’
risk-adjusted performance over both periods and investigate the relation between past and
future performance. In other words, we ask if past performance predicts future perfor-
mance for bond funds. More importantly, we investigate whether any of this predictability
is attributable to managerial skill.
We start with two basic methods, regression and correlation, to describe the relation
between past and future performance. First, with the regression method, we estimate all
funds’ alphas over both the evaluation and the post-evaluation period for nonoverlapping
time periods of 12 months. At the beginning of each year, we run a cross-sectional regression
of past performance on future performance:
αˆi,t = at + btαˆi,t−1 + ²i,t, (3.3)
where αˆi,t is fund i’s alpha over year t, αˆi,t−1 is fund i’s alpha over the previous year, and
²i,t the residual.
We follow Fama and MacBeth (1973), estimating the intercept and the slope in Eq.
(3.3) by using standard OLS tests, and take the time-series average of the coefficient esti-
mates over the whole sample period. We use the standard deviations of the cross-sectional
regression estimates to generate the sampling errors for these estimates. A significant load-
ing on the slope coefficient would be consistent with a relation between past and future
performance, that is, with persistence in bond fund performance.
In addition, we use the Sharpe ratio as a measure of post-evaluation performance, and
run the following cross-sectional regression:
Sharpei,t = at + btαˆi,t−1 + ²i,t, (3.4)
where Sharpei,t is the Sharpe ratio of fund i over year t. This alternative regression
prevents that spurious persistence patterns arise due to a misspecification of the factor
model.
Second, we measure the correlation between the past and future performance of bond
funds with the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. The most attractive feature of this
statistic is that we can use it to give an R-estimate when the distribution of the data makes
the standard Pearson’s correlation coefficient undesirable.
At the beginning of each year, we estimate performance for all available funds over both
the preceding and the subsequent year. We then rank funds on the selected performance
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measure, and compute the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the rankings in
the previous period and those in the subsequent period:
ρt,t−1 = 1−
6
∑
d2t,t−1
N(N2 − 1) , (3.5)
where
∑
d2t,t−1 is the sum of the squared differences between the funds’ ranks over the
evaluation and the post-evaluation period, and N is the number of ranks.
As with the cross-sectional regressions, we estimate rank correlations year by year and
compute the time-series average of correlation coefficients. We use the time-series standard
deviation to gauge the significance of the correlation between past and future performance.
Third, we use contingency tables to investigate performance persistence. We assign
funds to one of the four cells in a two-by-two contingency table, based on a measure of
performance relative to the median. Every year, we assign all funds to one of the following
cells: past loser (alpha below median over preceding year)/future loser; past loser/future
winner (alpha above median over subsequent year); past winner/future loser; and past
winner/future winner. Under the null hypothesis of no relation between historical and
future performance, the probabilities in each cell of the matrix are equal, i.e., 25 percent.
The alternative hypothesis is that at least one cell has a frequency different from 25
percent. To gauge the statistical significance of these frequencies, we perform a chi-square
test with one degree of freedom. Again, we measure fund performance over the subsequent
year with the Sharpe ratio.
The methods we have discussed thus far are well suited for discovering persistence in
relative performance among bond funds, but do little for the funds’ returns relative to a
set of passive indexes. Our fourth method tackles this shortcoming. We form mutually
exclusive portfolios of funds ranked on past performance and evaluate their returns over
post-formation periods. Every month, we separate our universe of funds into deciles, using
the funds’ alphas over the last 36 months as the discriminating criterion. For example, the
top decile contains the 10 percent best-performing bond funds over the past three years,
the second decile the next 10 percent, etc.
Before we allocate the funds to rank portfolios, we follow Elton et al. (1996) by excluding
funds from our analysis that have a R2-value that is lower than 0.4 over the pre-ranking
period in the factor regression. After sorting the funds into rank portfolios, we calculate
the equally weighted returns over the subsequent month for all deciles. After one month,
we re-estimate the prior three-year alphas for all funds and re-form the decile portfolios
accordingly. We also readjust the portfolios’ weights if a fund disappears after ranking.
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After having repeated this procedure up to the end of the sample period, we estimate alphas
over the post-ranking period January 1993 to December 2003. (The first 36 observations
of our dataset January 1990 to December 1992 are used to initialize the procedure.)
Although our performance attribution models should be able to detect managers with
investment skills among all bond funds, we apply our tests on both the full bond fund
sample and subsamples composed of funds for specific classes of debt.
There are reasons why examining persistence of fund performance within specific seg-
ments of the bond market is informative. First, due to risk and liquidity restrictions,
investment practitioners might not be able to exploit persistence across the entire fund
spectrum. Second, subsample analysis adds to our understanding of the robustness of our
results.
3.3 Data
To our knowledge, ours is the first study on bond fund performance that fully exploits the
information content of the CRSP mutual fund database. In our study we use the largest
sample of bond funds investigated to date. It does not suffer from survivorship-bias of the
kind described in Brown et al. (1992) and Brown and Goetzmann (1995).2 The 2003 CRSP
universe includes data on all mutual funds in the United States for any given date since
1962, including funds that are defunct. The database covers monthly total returns of more
than 21,400 open-ended mutual funds over the period 1962–2003. Of these funds, about
7,000 are defunct. The database also includes important supplementary data, such as fund
classifications by Wiesenberger, Micropal/Investment Company Data Inc. and Strategic
Insight, and each fund’s expense history.
We select all bond funds that CRSP classifies as government, corporate, high-yield,
or mortgage-backed at the final quarter of each year. Our sample comprises bond funds
with the following classifications: Wiesenberger (OBJ): CBD, CHY, GOV, MTG; Mi-
cropal/Investment Company Data, Inc. (ICDI OBJ): BQ, BY, GM, GS; Strategic Insight
(SI OBJ): CGN, CHQ, CHY, CIM, CMQ, CSM, GGN, GIM, GMA, GMB, GSM. Follow-
ing Blake et al. (1993), we omit money market and municipal bond funds. In total, 3,549
funds satisfy these criteria over the 1990–2003 period.3
2Elton et al. (2001) point out that CRSP does suffer from a form of survivorship bias called omission
bias because only some small funds under $15 million in total net assets have monthly data in the CRSP
database. Unreported persistence tests on a sample free of such small funds does not affect the conclusions
of this paper. The results are available upon request.
3We remove one outlier: CRSP reports a return of 391 percent over March 1995 for the IDS Strategy
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In separate tests, we split our sample in two subgroups of funds, based on whether or
not these funds charge load fees. Our no-load subsample comprises 1,837 funds over the
1990–2003 period. Table 3.1 lists the number of funds and some of the funds’ characteristics
over our sample period, such as the average total net assets, expense ratio, maximum sales
loads, and turnover ratio. We note that for 1991, the 2003 CRSP mutual fund database
does not report turnover ratios.
We use the following bond indexes to measure bond fund performance: the 30-day
Treasury-bill rate from Ibbotson and Associates as our proxy for the risk-free rate; the
Citigroup U.S. broad investment grade index (US BIG) as our proxy for the overall bond
market; the Merrill Lynch High Yield index as our proxy for low-grade debt; and the
Citigroup Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA, “Ginnie Mae”) index as
our proxy for mortgage-backed securities. The total investment returns on the CGBI
U.S. Broad Investment-Grade Bond Index, the Merrill Lynch High Yield index, and the
Citigroup GNMA index are from Thompson Financial. The Citigroup bond indexes provide
us with stable and easily replicated benchmarks by including all investment opportunities
that are available to market participants under regular conditions. U.S. BIG is a value-
weighted index that includes fixed-rate Treasury, government-sponsored, mortgage, asset-
backed, and investment-grade issues that have a remaining maturity of at least one year.
The issues are eligible for inclusion when they pass a size criterion that is designed to
ensure the bonds are reasonably accessible.
3.4 Empirical results
3.4.1 Performance persistence
Our first series of results involve the nonoverlapping cross-sectional regressions of future
alpha on past alpha, which we estimate at the beginning of each year over 12-month
horizons. We regress bond fund alphas over 1991 on alphas over 1990, alphas over 1992
on those over 1991, and so forth. On average, 1,128 funds are available. The number of
available funds ranges from 420 over 1990–1991 to 1,745 over 2002–2003.
Panel A in Table 3.2 reports the Fama and MacBeth (1973) averages of the cross-
sectional coefficient estimates and corresponding t-values derived from the time series
standard errors. Panel A1 shows the estimated relation between future alpha and past
alpha according to Eq. (3.3) for the full sample, the investment-grade fund sample, the
Short Term Income Fund (CRSP-Identifier: 19890).
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high-yield fund sample, and the mortgage-backed fund sample, respectively. The full-
sample slope coefficient in Panel A1 is 0.17, and the corresponding t-statistic points out
that the observed positive association between past and future fund performance is signif-
icant at the conventional cut-off level (e.g., 2.18 at a 5 percent level of significance with 12
degrees of freedom). Panel B1, which reports the regression estimates when we measure
fund performance with the Sharpe ratio (see Eq. (3.4)), corroborates our previous results.
Our analyses of samples broken up into subsets generally support our full-sample evi-
dence. The relation between the past and future excess returns of investment-grade bond
funds is similar to full-sample results and highly significant, regardless of whether we use
alpha or the Sharpe ratio as the regressant in the Fama and MacBeth (1973) models (see
Panels A1 and B1). In the high-yield fund sample, the regressions produce marginally
significant evidence of persistence. The slopes suggest that high-yield funds that display
relatively high excess returns repeat their relative performance in the next year. The sig-
nificance of the slope estimates varies across the different specifications. For the mortgage-
backed fund sample, we again find strong evidence of persistence.
Our second set of results concerns the Spearman test on the rank ordering. Panel B in
Table 3.2 shows the relation we measure between future alpha and past alpha (Panel B1),
and between future Sharpe ratio and past alpha (Panel B2). Consistent with the Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regression results, the Spearman rank correlation coefficients indicate
a significant persistence pattern in bond fund performance. The results are robust across
subsamples. All t-values are large and far above their critical values, thus rejecting the
null hypothesis of randomness in fund orderings.
In Panel C of Table 3.2, we present the contingency table, reporting initial fund rankings
paired with subsequent rankings. In Panel C1, we base the subsequent rankings on fund
alphas. In Panel C2, we report the subsequent rankings based on the Sharpe ratio. As
explained earlier, the null hypothesis of no persistence in bond fund performance implies
that all quadrants contain probabilities equal to 25 percent. Our results provide clear
evidence to the contrary, regardless of the choice of performance measure. A sizeable
portion of funds that are classified as “losers” in the first period continue to be “losers”
in the second, and a considerable number of “winner” funds also repeat their superior
performance in the subsequent period. Regardless of whether we measure performance by
alphas or by the Sharpe ratio, both the probability that a winning fund continues to be a
winner and the probability that a loser remains a loser is about 60 percent. Again, we find
that the results prevail for high-quality, high-yield, and mortgage-backed bond funds. For
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all subgroups we obtain chi-square statistics that are beyond critical values, thus rejecting
the null hypothesis strongly.
Our final out-of-sample results on relative fund performance concern our periodical
sorting of funds into decile portfolios, based on their return relative to our passive bench-
marks. On average, over the evaluation period more than 97 percent of all available funds
at each point in time have a R2-value that is higher than 0.4 in the factor regressions. We
conclude that the models do a good job of explaining bond fund returns.
Table 3.3 presents the post-ranking performance of fund deciles that we estimate with
the three-factor benchmark model. The results in Panel A involve sorts applied on the
entire fund sample; those in B focus exclusively on high-quality funds; and the results in
Panels C and D concentrate on high-yield funds and mortgage-backed funds, respectively.
For each decile, we report the post-ranking annualized average return, the annualized
Sharpe ratio, annual alpha, and benchmark factor sensitivities.
We note several striking observations that are common to all samples in our study.
First, on average we find below-zero alphas. The vast majority of deciles earn negative and
statistically significant risk-adjusted returns. The underperformance is most pronounced
for high-yield funds.
Second, the out-of-sample excess return of the fund decile, as measured by either alpha
or the Sharpe ratio, increases almost monotonically with the decile rank. A portfolio
composed of funds ranked highest according to their recent alphas considerably outperforms
worst-performing funds in the subsequent period. Over the entire post-ranking evaluation
period, the difference in alpha between the top decile and the bottom decile amounts to
about 3.5 percent per annum (see Panel A). Moreover, the predictability of (relative) fund
returns is prevalent within high-quality, high-yield, and mortgage-backed fund markets (see
Panels B, C, and D). The top decile of high-quality bond funds outperformed its lowest-
ranked counterpart by 1.8 percent. For high-yield and mortgage-backed funds, these figures
are 4.6 and 1.5 percent per year, respectively. In all cases, the difference in Sharpe ratio is
also substantial.
Third, across all panels we observe that the difference in return between the funds is
largely due to the strong and statistically significant underperformance of the lowest deciles.
The returns of the top-performing deciles do not differ significantly from those predicted by
the benchmark model. The sensitivities to the three benchmark factors tend to vary from
one decile rank to another. However, there are no clear commonalities in factor loadings
across the subsamples. For example, although the results in Panel A suggest that the top
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and bottom deciles tend to load less strongly on BIG and stronger on the high-yield index
compared to the other deciles, Panels B and C show that these patterns disappear when
we split funds according to investment policy. The top and bottom deciles of high-quality
funds have a higher than average exposure to BIG. Top-performing high-yield funds have
a lower than average exposure to high-yield index returns.
3.4.2 Persistence and expenses
In this section, we examine the extent to which persistence in bond fund performance can
be explained by persistent differences in funds’ expenses. To do so, we run two alternative
tests.
First, we simply examine the pre-expense returns of the rank portfolios from Table
3.3 over the post-ranking period, where pre-expense returns are obtained every month
by taking the sum of a fund’s monthly return and one-twelfth of the yearly expense ratio
reported by the fund in the respective year. Table 3.4 gives an impression of the explanatory
power of expense ratios by showing post-rank risk-adjusted returns both before and after
expenses are added back. It appears that most of the 3.5 percent post-expense return
difference is not subsumed by difference in expenses between the top and bottom deciles.
The spread in pre-expense return between the top and bottom fund deciles continues to
be large (2.9 percent) and statistically significant.
Second, we run regressions of funds’ contemporaneous risk-adjusted returns before ex-
penses on prior-year pre-expense returns in the Fama and MacBeth (1973) setup. The
slope coefficient and respective t-statistic are 0.14 and 2.57. When we use pre-expense
Sharpe ratios in our regressions as dependent variable, we obtain a slope of 0.25 and a
t-statistic of 3.76.
In conclusion, the persistence uncovered by earlier tests is not unique to post-expense
samples.
3.4.3 Economic significance
So far, we have demonstrated that relative bond fund performance persists in the near
future. We now investigate whether an investor can exploit this knowledge to earn an
abnormal return. For this purpose, we follow Elton et al. (1996) and simulate an investment
strategy for which we use modern portfolio theory (MPT). This strategy consists of three
steps. First, at each point in time, we evaluate funds’ performance over the past 36 months
using the three-factor model, as specified earlier. As in the previous section, we exclude
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funds with an R2 below 40 percent from our sample. Second, we construct a portfolio from
the top decile of funds. The weight assigned to a particular fund is given by
wi =
(αi/σ²i)∑N
i=1 (αi/σ²i)
, (3.6)
where σ²i is the standard deviation of fund i’s error term in Eq. (3.1). Besides excluding
funds with a low R2, to ensure that the resulting portfolio has long positions only we also
exclude funds with a negative pre-ranking alpha estimate from the top decile. Third, we
compute the portfolio’s weighted return over the subsequent month. We readjust portfolio
weights if a fund disappears after ranking.
We form portfolios of funds as from January 1993 to December 2003, yielding a time
series of monthly portfolio returns over a period of 11 years. On average, each portfolio
consists of 95 funds, ranging from 38 funds in 1993 to 142 funds in 2003. The maximum
weight that we assign to a particular fund over the entire sample period is 26.5 percent,
the average weight is about 1 percent, and the minimum is zero by construction. Hence,
the resulting portfolio of funds is well diversified.
In Table 3.5 we present performance evaluation results for the MPT-weighted fund
portfolio after we allow for changes in two important parameters.
First, we believe it is important to bear in mind that returns reported for load bond
funds do not fully represent the net income to fund holders, because holders of these funds
are charged with sales loads when entering or exiting the fund4. Table 3.1 shows that these
loads can easily amount to 2 percent per round-trip transaction. To strengthen the practical
implications of our study, we additionally report the outcomes from a separate analysis
(Panel B in Table 3.5). To ensure that we obtain economically significant results, we omit
all 1,712 load funds from the sample, because loads are not incorporated in reported fund
returns.
Second, we also believe it is important to explore performance subject to changes in
portfolio rebalancing frequency. From the perspective of mutual fund investors, exploit-
ing short-term performance persistence through frequent fund ranking may come at the
expense of high rebalancing costs.
However, all results in Table 3.5 display strong parallels. Panel A shows that the top-
performing MPT-weighted bond fund portfolio delivers a post-ranking return above that
predicted by the factor models. The alphas are economically large and their corresponding
4The separation between load and no-load funds is also important to avoid persistency mechanically
induced by different share classes of the same fund.
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t-statistics are far beyond critical levels. Panel B shows that the benefits of chasing winner
funds are independent of sales loads. For example, the monthly rebalanced no-load portfolio
yields a post-ranking abnormal return of almost 1.8 percent and a t-value of 8.55. Panel C
shows that investors using MPT can earn abnormal returns in the high-quality bond fund
market. The top decile of high-quality funds earns a statistically significant alpha in the
range of 0.8 to 1.3 percent.
Moreover, the excess returns on the portfolios in Panels A, B, and C of all tables
withstand a decrease in rebalancing frequency. Changing the rebalancing frequency from
monthly to quarterly has little influence on the post-ranking alphas. Remarkably, even
annually rebalanced fund portfolios can enjoy “hot hands” in bond funds. The annually
rebalanced decile outperforms the benchmark indexes by more than 0.5 percent per year
in the full-sample case, by 1.3 percent in the restricted (no-load) sample, and by approxi-
mately 0.8 percent in the high-quality fund sample.
Panels D and E, which report our results for the high-yield and mortgage-backed fund
sample, suggest that MPT marginally improves the performance of the top high-yield
decile. The excess return on the monthly rebalanced portfolio is not significantly different
from zero. The performance deteriorates with rebalancing frequency.
There are several possible reasons for interpreting the high-yield and mortgage-backed
results with caution. The first is that the samples are small and each decile contains a
small number of funds, which potentially induces estimation error. The second and most
important reason to interpret the results carefully is that the market for high-yield and
mortgage-backed debt does not offer index funds. Therefore, relative performance is the
most important criterion for fund selection in these segments of the market, not abnormal
performance.
Overall, the results strongly suggest that an investment strategy based on MPT enables
investors to beat passive benchmarks.
3.5 Alternative model specifications
In this section, we examine whether the persistence we found in previous sections of the
paper can be explained by more complex models that account for managers’ timing ability,
funds’ time-varying risk exposures, sensitivities to changes in fundamental economic vari-
ables, and changes in the term structure that are not fully picked up by duration. Here, we
ask whether these extra performance attribution variables eliminate the persistence in the
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performance of the portfolios we formed based on past performance. Although models that
incorporate these components consume considerable degrees of freedom, we can still use
them for ex post performance evaluation of the deciles introduced in the previous section.
Our principal benchmark model does not explicitly incorporate a component that sep-
arates timing from security selection skills. Therefore, we measure the timing ability of
fund managers with models analogous to those developed by Treynor and Mazuy (1966)
and Hendricksson and Merton (1981). Our variant takes the form:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + β1,i(BIGt −Rf,t) + β2,i(HYt −Rf,t) + β3,i(GNMAt −Rf,t)+
γi(BIGt −Rf,t)2 + ²i,t,
(3.7)
where the first three factors are the ones from the Blake et al. (1993) three-factor model,
and γi measures the timing ability of the manager of fund i. As explained by Chen et al.
(2005), timing ability implies a convex relation between bond fund returns and the return
on an aggregate market index. We follow Bollen and Busse (2005) and compute abnormal
returns as:
Ri,γ −Rf,t = 1
N
N∑
t=1
[
αi + γi(BIGt −Rf,t)2
]
. (3.8)
We also follow studies that account for funds’ time-varying exposure to common risk
factors. We use a variant of the Ferson and Schadt (1996) model to arrive at a conditional
version of the Blake et al. (1993) model. Time variation in factor sensitivity is captured by
variables describing the interaction between benchmark factor returns and a set of lagged
instrumental variables:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + β1,i(BIGt −Rf,t) +B′1i[zt−1(BIGt −Rf,t)] + β2,i(HYt −Rf,t)+
B′2i[zt−1(HYt −Rf,t)] + β3,i(GNMAt −Rf,t) +B′3i[zt−1(GNMAt −Rf,t)] + ²i,t,
(3.9)
where zt−1 is a vector that consists of lagged values of pre-determined information variables,
and B′ji captures the response fund i’s exposure to benchmark factor j to this information.
We use the variables that Ferson et al. (2006) identify as relevant in predicting variation in
exposures to common risk factors for fixed income funds: the lagged level of the one-month
Treasury bill rate, the lagged default spread in the corporate bond market, and a measure
of industrial production and capacity utilization. We define the default spread as Moody’s
BAA-rated corporate bond yield minus the AAA-rated corporate bond yield. We obtain
our data on industrial production and capacity utilization from the Federal Reserve Board
website. The resulting model includes 12 scaled factors and an intercept.
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Further, we use the APT setup advanced by Elton et al. (1995) to extend the Blake
et al. (1993) three-factor model with premiums for sensitivities to changes in innovation
and in economic development:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + β1,i(BIGt −Rf,t) + β2,i(HYt −Rf,t) + β3,i(GNMAt −Rf,t)+
β4,i(INFt−1 + λINF ) + β5,i(GDPt−1 + λGDP ) + ²i,t,
(3.10)
where INFt−1 is the one month lagged unexpected change in inflation, GDPt−1 is the one
month lagged change in economic growth, and λINF and λGDP are the risk premia for
sensitivities to changes in inflation and economic growth, respectively. As in Elton et al.
(1995), we obtain the risk premiums by simultaneously estimating the following regression
for a set of passive benchmark indexes using nonlinear least squares:
Ri,t −Rf,t = δi + β1,i(BIGt −Rf,t) + β2,i(HYt −Rf,t) + β3,i(GNMAt −Rf,t)+
β4,iINFt−1 + β5,iGDPt−1 + ²i,t,
(3.11)
subject to the restriction:
δi = β4,iλINF + β5,iλGDP . (3.12)
As a measure of economic growth, we use the growth rates from the Federal Reserve Board’s
production and capacity utilization index. We base our inflation variable on the monthly
data from the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. The advantage of
survey data stems from the data’s ability to quantify unexpected changes in inflation,
which we measure as the monthly change in the expected inflation rate.
To calibrate the parameters in the APT model for determining the risk premiums, we
use the following bond indexes as the dependent variables: subsets of the U.S. BIG for
maturities of one to three years, three to seven years, and seven to ten years; and 10+
years, Treasury subsets of the U.S. BIG for maturities of one to three years, three to seven
years, seven to ten years, 10+ years, and 20+ years; AAA/AA-rated corporate subsets of
the US BIG for maturities of one to three years, three to seven years, and seven to ten
years; and A-rated corporate subsets of the U.S. BIG for maturities of one to three years,
three to seven years, and seven to ten years. When we jointly estimate the regressions
for the 15 passive benchmarks over the period 1990-2003, we obtain λˆINF = −0.71 and
λˆGDP = −0.25.
Finally, we introduce a new method for assessing bond fund performance. To capture
the effect of changes in the term structure of Treasury yields that are not fully picked up
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by duration, we rely on a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) similar to the analyses of
Pastor and Stambaugh (2002b,a) and Jones and Shanken (2005). We use PCA to extract
factors that represent yield changes in certain ranges of the maturity spectrum that are
not captured the funds’ sensitivities to aggregate bond return variation. The advantage of
PCA is that removes redundant dimensions in multivariate data, caused by a high degree of
correlation among the indexes, by re-expressing the returns so that the first few components
capture the majority of information about expected bond returns. We develop time series
of residual excess returns for Treasury subsets of the U.S. BIG for maturities of one to three
years, three to seven years, seven to ten years, 10+ years, and 20+ years by regressing the
returns on the indexes on a constant and the three benchmark variables described in Eq.
(3.2). Then, we conduct a PCA on the time series of the residuals of each regression
plus the intercept from that regression. We take the first three normalized components as
portfolios weights for the Treasury portfolios. Because Litterman and Scheinkman (1991)
report that most of the variance in the yield curve is described by three factors, we add
the first three factor-mimicking principal components to the baseline three-factor model
(PCA6FM):
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + β1,i(BIGt −Rf,t) + β2,i(HYt −Rf,t) + β3,i(GNMAt −Rf,t)+
β4,iPC1t + β5,iPC2t + β6,iPC3t + ²i,t.
(3.13)
Inspection of the eigenvectors, which we do not report here due to space constraints, shows
that the principal components jointly explain 99 percent of the variation in index returns
that is left unexplained by the three-index model. In all cases, we estimate the models’
parameters by using standard ordinary least squares (OLS) tests.
We measure the deciles’ post-ranking performance using these models for sorts on
three-factor alphas. We analyze all subsamples of funds and present the results in Table
3.6. The table reports fund alphas for the ten deciles we extract from the four bond fund
(sub)universes. None of the benchmark models is able to eliminate the monotonic decline in
performance that we observe as we move from the first to the tenth decile. The magnitude
of the risk-adjusted difference between the top and bottom deciles remains on the order of
the return difference reported earlier (which is also reported in the first row of each panel),
regardless of which segment of the fund market we test.
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3.6 Bootstrap analysis
Although the evidence of a hot-hands phenomenon in the bond mutual fund industry
is compelling, the distributional assumptions that typically underlie tests of performance
persistence might be too stringent. Recent studies show that fund returns do not follow the
normality assumption inherent in most popular research designs. Violation of the normality
assumption could induce a Type I error, in the sense that empirical tests reject evidence of
no persistence when persistence patterns are actually absent. This problem motivates us to
explore the size of our persistence tests. We perform a bootstrap simulation that enables
persistence tests in an environment of artificially generated data. In this environment,
predictable patterns in fund performance are predetermined to be a chance outcome, and
non-normality features are preserved in the data. Our bootstrap approach is comparable
to the residual and factor resampling procedure outlined in Kosowski et al. (2006) and
Kosowski et al. (2007).
First, we estimate all funds’ alphas, factor loadings, and residual returns using the
Blake et al. (1993) three-factor model:
Ri,t−Rf,t = αi+β1,i(BIGt−Rf,t)+β2,i(HYt−Rf,t)+β3,i(GNMAt−Rf,t)+ ²i,t. (3.14)
We store the coefficient estimates {βˆ1,i, βˆ2,i, βˆ3,i, i = 1, 2, . . . , N}, and the time-series of
estimated residuals {²ˆi,t, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, t = 1, 2, . . . , T}.
Next, for each bootstrap iteration b, we draw samples by using replacements from the
funds’ stored residuals {²ˆbi,te , te = sb1, sb2, . . . , sbT}, and the factors’ excess returns {(BIGbtF −
RbtF ), (HY
b
tF
− RbtF ), (GNMAbtF − RbtF ), t = ub1, ub2, . . . , ubT}, where sb1, sb2, . . . , sbT and ub1, ub2,
. . . , ubT are the time reorderings imposed by the bootstrap. We then construct time-series
of simulated fund returns for all funds using zero alphas:
Rbi,t−Rbf,tF = βˆ1,i(BIGbtF−Rbf,tF )+βˆ2,i(HY btF−Rbf,tF )+βˆ3,i(GNMAbtF−Rbf,tF )+²ˆbi,te (3.15)
The resulting simulated sample of fund returns has the same length, number of funds
in the cross-section, and number of return observations as our empirical sample.
We then perform the four persistence tests described in Section 3.2 on the simulated
sample, and store the following variables: the slope of the cross-sectional Fama and Mac-
Beth (1973) regression for regressions of 12-month alphas on their lagged values, bb; the
Spearman rank correlation coefficient for correlations between 12-month alphas and their
lagged values, ρb; the frequency of the past winner/future winner cell of a contingency table
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based on funds’ 12-month consecutive alphas, WW b; and the difference in post-ranking
alphas of the top and bottom decile for sorts on 36-month alphas, αbTMB. We run a total
of 1,000 bootstrap iterations.
Because we impose a zero alpha condition, we can develop a cross-section of alphas
arising entirely from sampling variation. If we find that only few bootstrap iterations yield
a cross-section of alpha estimates similar to those observed in our actual fund sample, such
a finding would reinforce the idea that our results indicate managerial skill and are not
attributable to any distributional features of the data.
Figure 3.1 presents the simulated distributions for each persistence test. We note
that the bootstraps apply to the entire fund sample. The simulated test results that are
based on data that by construction do not harbor skill support our intuition: the average
Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional coefficient and the Spearman rank correlation
are hardly different from zero; the frequency with which winner funds repeat superior
relative performance matches the expected frequency of 25 percent; and the post-ranking
performance differential between the top-ranked and bottom-ranked decile portfolios is
zero on average, and only 1 percent in the most extreme scenario. The extreme tail values
resulting from the bootstrap exercise show we can reject the idea that our evidence of
persistence in bond fund performance is a statistical artifact. Under the imposed condition
that managerial skill is nonexistent, the most extreme simulation outcomes (i.e., values in
the tails of the distributions in Figure 3.1) are not in the order of the empirical values we
obtain from the four persistence tests that are central to this study. Thus, the bootstrap
outcomes that we report permit a strong judgment about the size of our tests, indicating
that there is little reason to expect that our evidence is prone to data-driven inferences.
3.7 Conclusion
Despite the massive size of the bond retail industry, empirical evidence on the performance
persistence of actively managed bond mutual funds is surprisingly scarce. In this study
we provide a rigorous investigation into bond fund performance by using the entire fund
population in the United States over the period 1990–2003. The central question that
underlies our research asks if active bond fund performance in the past persists in the
future.
We find strong evidence of performance persistence in bond funds. We use a wide range
of common methods, all of which consistently show that past fund performance predicts
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future performance. Funds that report strong (weak) performance in the past repeat their
performance in the subsequent period. The influence of managerial skill on excess fund
returns is prevalent with both high-quality and high-yield bonds. We demonstrate that
simple bond fund selection strategies based on modern portfolio theory earn average returns
above those predicted by a wide range of benchmark models, which indicates that investors
in bond funds can enjoy hot-hands effects. A battery of robustness checks confirms that
our results are neither model-specific nor data-driven.
We conclude this study with one important note. Although our evidence of perfor-
mance persistence is strong, we believe that bond index funds remain valuable investment
vehicles. Since previous research has pointed out that on average, bond fund managerial
skill cannot outweigh fees and expenses, index funds are feasible, low-cost alternatives for
unsophisticated investors who lack the ability to exploit performance persistence. However,
sophisticated investors with sizable financial capacity, such as institutional investors, can
take advantage of predictable patterns in bond fund returns.
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Table 3.2: Persistence tests.
A. Cross-sectional regressions
1. Alphai,t, Alphai,t−1 2. Sharpei,t, Alphai,t−1
a b R2 a b R2
All funds -0.06 (-3.68) 0.17 (3.23) 0.05 0.28 (2.16) 0.24 (4.03) 0.06
Gov/Corp -0.05 (-4.52) 0.25 (3.36) 0.08 0.27 (2.06) 0.39 (4.72) 0.05
High yield -0.01 (-0.09) 0.12 (1.71) 0.06 0.44 (2.36) 0.12 (2.41) 0.10
Mortgage-backed -0.07 (-2.41) 0.35 (2.65) 0.24 0.28 (2.02) 0.39 (2.77) 0.16
B. Rank correlations
1. Alphai,t, Alphai,t−1 2. Sharpei,t, Alphai,t−1
rho rho
All funds 0.20 (4.99) 0.21 (3.98)
Gov/Corp 0.26 (7.88) 0.24 (5.94)
High yield 0.13 (2.51) 0.21 (3.91)
Mortgage-backed 0.37 (7.14) 0.23 (3.23)
C. Contingency tables
1. Alphai,t, Alphai,t−1 2. Sharpei,t, Alphai,t−1
LL LW WL WW χ2 LL LW WL WW χ2
All funds 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.30 524.68 0.29 0.21 0.21 0.29 347.95
Gov/Corp 0.31 0.19 0.19 0.31 577.05 0.29 0.21 0.21 0.29 311.50
High yield 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.27 18.49 0.29 0.21 0.21 0.29 48.17
Mortgage-backed 0.33 0.17 0.17 0.33 162.35 0.31 0.18 0.18 0.32 121.59
Each year, we investigate the relation between fund performance over the subsequent year and alpha
estimates over the preceding year. We measure fund performance over the subsequent year using alpha
(Panel A1, B1, and C1), and the Sharpe ratio (A2, B2, and C2). In Panel A we report on Fama and
MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. Panel B shows rank correlations. Panel C presents a two-by-
two contingency table, based on a measure of performance relative to the median fund: loser (past year)
/loser (subsequent year); loser/winner; winner/loser; and winner/winner. We estimate alphas by using a
three-factor model specification that includes a broad investment-grade bond index, a high yield index,
and a mortgage index. The sample is from 1990 to 2003. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Performance
persistence in tested based on a sample that includes, respectively, all funds, government/ corporate bond
funds, high yield funds, and mortgage-backed funds.
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Table 3.3: Three-factor rank portfolios.
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t BIG HY GNMA R2
A. All funds
D1 (TOP) 3.44% 0.96 0.35% 0.77 0.57 0.25 0.07 0.85
D2 2.24% 0.79 -0.29% -1.21 0.59 0.09 0.11 0.93
D3 2.13% 0.73 -0.42% -2.72 0.68 0.06 0.06 0.97
D4 1.88% 0.63 -0.71% -4.87 0.73 0.07 0.02 0.98
D5 1.90% 0.62 -0.75% -5.45 0.74 0.06 0.04 0.98
D6 1.95% 0.60 -0.81% -6.77 0.79 0.05 0.03 0.99
D7 1.71% 0.51 -1.15% -8.40 0.84 0.09 -0.05 0.98
D8 1.69% 0.49 -1.26% -8.94 0.90 0.12 -0.13 0.98
D9 1.49% 0.41 -1.74% -8.24 0.82 0.18 -0.05 0.97
D10 (BOTTOM) 0.94% 0.17 -3.12% -4.84 0.74 0.57 -0.31 0.87
B. Government/Investment grade
D1 (TOP) 2.99% 0.82 0.18% 0.49 0.97 0.04 -0.13 0.90
D2 1.88% 0.62 -0.57% -2.91 0.78 0.01 -0.00 0.96
D3 1.92% 0.62 -0.51% -3.73 0.83 0.00 -0.05 0.98
D4 2.03% 0.66 -0.39% -3.41 0.86 0.01 -0.09 0.99
D5 1.86% 0.56 -0.78% -5.40 0.88 0.01 -0.03 0.98
D6 1.88% 0.55 -0.81% -7.38 0.95 0.01 -0.10 0.99
D7 1.80% 0.51 -0.92% -6.75 1.00 0.01 -0.15 0.99
D8 1.94% 0.53 -0.88% -5.85 1.06 0.01 -0.18 0.98
D9 1.68% 0.44 -1.25% -7.73 1.09 0.02 -0.19 0.98
D10 (BOTTOM) 1.61% 0.35 -1.72% -4.72 1.42 0.06 -0.48 0.94
Each month, we sort all available bond funds into equally weighted decile portfolios based on their alpha
estimated over the preceding 36 months. We estimate alphas by using a three-factor model specification
that includes a broad investment-grade bond index (BIG), a high yield index (HY ), and a mortgage
index (GNMA). The sample is from 1990 to 2003. The table lists the deciles’ excess returns, Sharpe
ratios, alphas, and factor loadings over the post-ranking period. Returns, Sharpe ratios, and alphas are
annualized. Performance persistence in tested based on a sample that includes, respectively, all bond
funds (Panel A), government/ corporate bond funds (Panel B), high yield bond funds (Panel C), and
mortgage-backed bond funds (Panel D).
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Table 3.3 continued
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t BIG HY GNMA R2
C. High yield
D1 (TOP) 3.88% 0.62 0.12% 0.15 -0.22 0.77 0.31 0.88
D2 3.68% 0.55 -0.35% -0.44 -0.06 0.84 0.13 0.89
D3 2.81% 0.41 -1.49% -1.89 -0.16 0.86 0.30 0.91
D4 2.23% 0.32 -2.03% -2.75 -0.16 0.88 0.25 0.92
D5 2.45% 0.35 -1.64% -2.24 -0.03 0.87 0.06 0.91
D6 2.27% 0.31 -2.22% -2.55 -0.17 0.92 0.28 0.90
D7 2.41% 0.33 -1.87% -2.16 -0.14 0.92 0.17 0.90
D8 1.94% 0.26 -2.34% -2.60 -0.22 0.95 0.20 0.90
D9 1.27% 0.16 -2.94% -3.04 -0.20 0.96 0.14 0.86
D10 (BOTTOM) -0.15% -0.02 -4.56% -3.98 -0.17 0.98 0.16 0.81
D. Mortgage-backed
D1 (TOP) 2.09% 0.88 -0.12% -0.65 0.18 -0.00 0.60 0.95
D2 1.79% 0.71 -0.52% -2.80 0.22 -0.01 0.61 0.95
D3 1.65% 0.60 -0.91% -5.89 0.24 -0.01 0.67 0.97
D4 1.85% 0.66 -0.73% -4.90 0.25 -0.02 0.68 0.97
D5 1.83% 0.66 -0.73% -4.43 0.28 -0.01 0.64 0.97
D6 1.62% 0.60 -0.86% -5.57 0.26 -0.02 0.63 0.97
D7 1.31% 0.45 -1.29% -6.71 0.32 -0.02 0.61 0.96
D8 1.19% 0.40 -1.45% -8.12 0.36 -0.02 0.58 0.96
D9 1.15% 0.38 -1.45% -6.23 0.45 -0.02 0.47 0.94
D10 (BOTTOM) 1.01% 0.33 -1.58% -6.70 0.51 -0.02 0.40 0.94
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Table 3.4: Three-factor rank portfolios before expenses.
A. Pre-expense B. Post-expense
Expenses Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t
All funds
D1 (TOP) 0.82% 1.19 1.17% 2.60 0.96 0.35% 0.70
D2 0.76% 1.05 0.47% 1.99 0.79 -0.29% -1.21
D3 0.79% 1.00 0.37% 2.38 0.73 -0.42% -2.72
D4 0.84% 0.91 0.14% 0.95 0.63 -0.71% -4.87
D5 0.89% 0.91 0.15% 1.05 0.62 -0.75% -5.45
D6 0.96% 0.90 0.14% 1.18 0.60 -0.81% -6.77
D7 1.06% 0.84 -0.08% -0.61 0.51 -1.15% -8.40
D8 1.22% 0.85 -0.04% -0.30 0.49 -1.26% -8.94
D9 1.35% 0.79 -0.39% -1.84 0.41 -1.74% -8.24
D10 (BOTTOM) 1.40% 0.42 -1.73% -2.69 0.17 -3.12% -4.84
Each month, we sort all available bond funds into equally weighted decile portfolios based on their alpha
estimated over the preceding 36 months. We estimate alphas by using a three-factor model specification
that includes a broad investment-grade bond index, a high yield index, and a mortgage index. The sample
is from 1990 to 2003. We then examine the pre-expense returns of the rank portfolios, where pre-expense
returns are obtained every month by taking the sum of a fund’s monthly return and one-twelfth of the
yearly expense ratio reported by the fund in the respective year. The table lists the deciles’ average expense
ratios, Sharpe ratios and alphas over the post-ranking period. All values are annualized.
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Table 3.5: Three-factor MPT portfolios.
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t BIG HY GNMA R2
A. All funds
monthly 3.22% 1.43 1.27% 5.04 0.44 0.07 0.11 0.88
quarterly 3.08% 1.38 1.13% 4.68 0.43 0.06 0.13 0.89
yearly 2.53% 1.14 0.53% 2.20 0.38 0.07 0.19 0.89
B. No-load funds
monthly 3.45% 1.73 1.79% 8.55 0.44 0.04 0.04 0.89
quarterly 3.36% 1.70 1.72% 8.37 0.44 0.03 0.04 0.89
yearly 2.92% 1.55 1.33% 6.32 0.38 0.03 0.10 0.88
C. Government/Investment grade
monthly 3.03% 1.35 1.30% 6.12 0.57 0.01 -0.03 0.91
quarterly 2.97% 1.32 1.22% 5.67 0.55 0.01 0.00 0.90
yearly 2.66% 1.19 0.86% 3.74 0.50 0.02 0.06 0.90
D. High yield
monthly 4.02% 0.70 0.55% 0.74 -0.12 0.70 0.22 0.87
quarterly 3.78% 0.66 0.27% 0.35 -0.14 0.70 0.25 0.87
yearly 2.95% 0.48 -0.69% -0.81 -0.13 0.74 0.22 0.85
E. Mortgage-backed
monthly 2.17% 0.94 0.02% 0.09 0.07 -0.00 0.70 0.90
quarterly 2.10% 0.90 -0.08% -0.32 0.07 -0.00 0.71 0.90
yearly 2.24% 0.93 -0.02% -0.08 0.12 -0.00 0.69 0.92
Each month, we sort all available bond funds into equally weighted decile portfolios on their alpha estimated
over the preceding 36 months. We estimate alphas by using a three-factor model specification that includes
a broad investment-grade bond index (BIG), a high yield index (HY ), and a mortgage index (GNMA).
We then construct a portfolio from the top decile of funds, where the weights assigned to the funds in
that portfolio are based on modern portfolio theory described in Elton et al. (1996). We rebalance the
portfolio at monthly, quarterly, and yearly basis. We conduct our analysis on a sample that includes,
respectively, all bond funds (Panel A), no-load bond funds (Panel B), government/ corporate bond funds
(Panel C), high yield bond funds (Panel D), and mortgage-backed bond funds (Panel E). The table lists
the portfolios’ alphas and factor loadings over the post-ranking period. Alphas are annualized.
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Table 3.6: Alternative model specifications.
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
A. All funds
TM4FM 0.35% -0.29% -0.42% -0.71% -0.78% -0.83% -1.17% -1.27% -1.76% -3.19%
FS/FKH12FM 0.31% -0.41% -0.54% -0.78% -0.86% -0.90% -1.12% -1.22% -1.83% -2.74%
EGB5FM 0.12% -0.36% -0.15% -0.60% -0.64% -0.67% -1.04% -0.93% -1.43% -3.87%
PCA6FM 0.50% -0.26% -0.45% -0.72% -0.76% -0.81% -1.13% -1.22% -1.69% -2.83%
B. Government/Investment grade
TM4FM 0.22% -0.58% -0.49% -0.36% -0.80% -0.82% -0.94% -0.87% -1.24% -1.77%
FS/FKH12FM 0.27% -0.61% -0.59% -0.50% -0.82% -0.92% -1.08% -0.97% -1.36% -1.74%
EGB5FM -0.06% -0.50% -0.53% -0.33% -0.68% -0.66% -0.72% -0.74% -0.86% -2.16%
PCA6FM 0.36% -0.57% -0.56% -0.46% -0.81% -0.82% -0.92% -0.90% -1.30% -1.70%
C. High yield
TM4FM -0.00% -0.46% -1.65% -2.17% -1.79% -2.36% -2.05% -2.46% -3.11% -4.55%
FS/FKH12FM 0.34% -0.22% -1.08% -1.64% -1.53% -2.01% -1.81% -2.37% -2.68% -3.88%
EGB5FM 0.15% 0.36% -1.72% -1.24% -1.50% -2.41% -1.81% -2.56% -3.10% -3.59%
PCA6FM 0.21% -0.25% -1.35% -1.85% -1.34% -2.08% -1.70% -2.09% -2.53% -4.38%
D. Mortgage-backed
TM4FM -0.12% -0.55% -0.97% -0.79% -0.78% -0.87% -1.37% -1.44% -1.53% -1.61%
FS/FKH12FM -0.09% -0.51% -0.96% -0.75% -0.73% -0.95% -1.29% -1.49% -1.54% -1.78%
EGB5FM -0.49% -0.17% -0.66% -0.53% -0.29% -0.16% -0.50% -1.55% -0.80% -1.36%
PCA6FM -0.18% -0.52% -0.87% -0.70% -0.75% -0.89% -1.29% -1.47% -1.42% -1.62%
Each month, we sort all available bond funds into equally weighted decile portfolios based on their alpha
estimated over the preceding 36 months. We estimate alphas by using a three-factor model specification
that includes a broad investment-grade bond index, a high yield index, and a mortgage index. The sample
is from 1990 to 2003. The table lists the portfolios’ post-ranking alphas, which we estimate by using the
following model specifications: Treynor and Mazuy (1966) 4-factor model (TM4FM), Ferson and Schadt
(1996) 12-factor model (FS/FKH12FM), Elton et al. (1995) 5-factor model (EGB5FM), and a 6-factor
model based on PCA (PCA6FM).
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Figure 3.1: Bootstrap results.
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We generate a simulated sample of fund returns by using the bootstrap procedure we discuss in Section
3.5. We then perform the four persistence tests described in Section 3.2 on the simulated sample, and
store the following variables: (i) the slope of the cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression for
regressions of 12-month alphas on their lagged values; (ii) the Spearman rank correlation coefficient for
correlations between 12-month alphas and their lagged values; (iii) the frequency of the past winner/future
winner cell of a contingency table based on funds’ 12-month consecutive alphas; and (iv) the difference in
post-ranking alphas of the top and bottom decile for sorts on 36-month alphas. We run 1,000 bootstrap
iterations. The figure panels present the simulated distribution of these test statistics.
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Chapter 4
On the Use of Multi-Factor Models
to Evaluate Mutual Fund
Performance∗
4.1 Introduction
In the academic literature it is common practice to evaluate the performance of mutual
funds on the basis of multi-factor models (see e.g., Hendricks et al. (1997), Elton et al.
(1996), Carhart (1997), Bollen and Busse (2005)). Such models extend the Sharpe (1964)
and Lintner (1965) single-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with proxies for
specific investment styles (e.g., small cap, value, or momentum). Inclusion of these ad-
ditional factors is important to identify managerial skill, irrespective whether or not the
factors represent risks in the economy. For example, if factor exposures are not taken into
account, fund managers can generate nonzero alphas by simply following an anomalous
style (see e.g., Elton et al. (1993) and Carhart (1997)).
In this paper we evaluate the cross-sectional explanatory power of multi-factor models
to explain mutual fund returns and the consequences for evaluating mutual fund perfor-
mance. First, this allows us to identify to what extent professional money managers are
able to capture the value, size, and momentum premiums implied by the hypothetical
hedge portfolios that underly these factors. Second, we analyze to what extent the use
of these factor proxies systematically biases performance estimates of mutual funds. Our
main concern is that the factor proxies in the standard multi-factor approaches are based
on hypothetical stock portfolios, which do not incorporate transaction costs and trading
∗This chapter is based on the article by Huij and Verbeek (2006a).
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restrictions. Accordingly, the predicted factor premiums are likely to be over- or under-
estimated and the resulting performance estimates for funds with significant exposure to
these factors may be biased.
For example, consider two zero-alpha fund managers (i.e., managers with no skill) of
which the first one manages a fund with unit exposure to the market factor, and the second
one a fund with unit exposure to the value factor. Suppose that the market premium
is overestimated by 0.3 percent. It is easy to show that alpha estimates for the first
fund asymptotically converge to minus 0.3 percent. Now suppose that there is a positive
value premium, but that this premium is overestimated by 3 percent. This will cause
alpha estimates for the second fund to converge to minus 3 percent. Based on the alpha
estimates for both funds, one might falsely infer that the manager of the first fund is more
skilled. In fact, one might even falsely infer that some funds systematically outperform
the passive factors. To illustrate this point, consider a third zero-alpha fund manager.
However, suppose that this manager follows a growth strategy, and has an exposure of
minus one to the value factor. Now, because the employed value proxy projects a larger
return differential between growth and value funds than there actually is, the fund’s alpha
estimate converges to plus 3 percent. Thus, miscalculation of the factor premiums might
not only lead to false inferences about relative fund performance, but also about market
efficiency as a whole.
While miscalculation of the factor premiums is a general concern (i.e., even if fund
returns were fully described by a single-factor model, overestimation of the premium on
this factor will cause performance estimates to be biased), we argue that there are good
reasons to believe that the resulting biases are more important for multi-factor approaches.
Because the transaction costs involved with tracking the market index are as low as 30 basis
points per year, it is unlikely that the resulting biases in CAPM performance estimates
are economically significant. However, the costs that are involved with mimicking the
hypothetical hedge portfolios used with multi-factor approaches are many times larger.
Several studies indicate that there is a large dispersion in transaction costs for different
investment styles (Keim and Madhaven, 1997), and that the size, value, and momentum
anomalies are concentrated in small cap stocks (see e.g., Loughran (1997), Hong et al.
(2000), and Post and Vliet (2005)), or stocks with higher transaction costs (see e.g., Stoll
and Whaley (1983), Ali et al. (2003), Lesmond et al. (2004), and Houge and Loughran
(2006)). Another reason to believe that the factor premiums earned by fund managers are
different from the ones projected by the factors’ proxies is that fund managers face certain
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trading restrictions such as short sales constraints and position limits when implementing
style strategies. For example, most mutual fund managers are required to hold a reasonably
diversified portfolio, and are restricted not to sell short. While a strategy of tracking
the market involves long positions only, a size or value strategy may involve significant
short positions. Thus, it is unlikely that the anomalous returns are in the same order of
magnitude as those projected by the hypothetical hedge portfolios used in multi-factor
approaches.
The main questions we address in this study are the following: to what extent are fund
managers able to exploit the anomalies reported in the literature? Do the proxies that
are used with multi-factor approaches systematically over- or underestimate the premiums
fund managers actually earn by following the anomalous styles? And if so, how does this
affect the performance estimates of mutual funds based on multi-factor models. Answering
these questions allows us to determine the economic significance of the small-cap, value
and momentum anomalies, by considering the investment performance of open-end mutual
funds that try to exploit them. Moreover, we can determine the impact of a particular form
of benchmark misspecification upon mutual fund performance estimates.1 To answer these
questions we employ the mutual funds database of the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) and analyze monthly mutual fund returns over the period 1963–2003.
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, we document a
clear value premium and a momentum effect in the cross-section of fund returns, but do not
find evidence of a small firm-effect. However, while funds with a value-oriented style earn
returns higher than predicted by the single-factor CAPM, their premium is significantly
smaller than projected by the Fama and French (1993) value proxy HML that is employed
with most multi-factor approaches. A fund with unit exposure to the value factor actually
earns an abnormal return of 2 percent per annum, while the value proxy HML predicts
a premium of more than 5 percent per annum. Similarly, funds that hold stocks that did
well over the past year, earn returns that are higher than predicted by the CAPM, but
the return differential between past winners and losers is much larger than predicted by
the commonly employed momentum proxy WML. While the momentum proxy WML
predicts a return differential of 11 percent per year between past winners and losers, we
observe a differential of more than 19 percent on an annual basis.
Our second set of results concerns the implications of these findings for the evalua-
1Other studies that investigate the implications of benchmark misspecification for performance evalu-
ation are Roll (1978), Lehman and Modest (1987), Grinblatt and Titman (1994), and Coles et al. (2006).
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tion of mutual fund performance. Because of the miscalculation of the premiums of the
hypothetical hedge portfolios, standard three- and four-factor alphas for value funds are
systematically biased downwards, while those for growth funds are biased upwards. Fur-
ther, the performance of past loser funds is underestimated, while that of winner funds
is overestimated. We also demonstrate that these results cannot be explained by time-
varying market betas. Finally, our results indicate that factor proxies based on mutual
fund returns rather than stock returns provide better benchmarks to evaluate professional
money managers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the data
and methodology, Section 4.3 tests the cross-sectional explanatory power of the factor
models, Section 4.4 examines the robustness of our results to time-varying betas, Section
4.5 presents the results using factor proxies based on fund returns, and finally Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Data Sources and Construction of Style Portfolios
Data on returns of mutual funds are extracted from the 2003 CRSPMutual Fund Survivorship-
bias Free Database. This database covers monthly total returns of more than 21,400 open-
end mutual funds over the period 1962–2003. Of these funds, about 7,000 are dead. We
follow a procedure similar to Pastor and Stambaugh (2002a,b) and use the additional in-
formation CRSP provides on fund classifications, expenses, and load data to construct a
sample of US equity funds. We exclude funds with no classification, expense, or load data
in the annual summary at the end of each previous year. Additionally, we examine fund
classifications at the end of each previous year, and exclude flexible funds, bond funds,
mortgage-backed funds, multi-manager funds, money market funds, balanced funds, funds
that invest in precious metals, and international funds. From the remaining funds, we
select funds that are classified as small/cap growth, growth, growth & income, income, or
sector fund. The selection of these types of funds is consistent with the literature, see e.g.,
Carhart (1997) and Bollen and Busse (2005). Finally, we drop funds with less than 12
consecutive returns over the entire sample period. For a comprehensive documentation on
the data extraction procedure, we refer to Huij and Verbeek (2007). In total, our sample
covers 7,852 funds over the period 1963–2003. Since CRSP basically includes all funds
that existed during this period, our data are free of the survivorship-bias as documented
by Brown et al. (1992) and Brown and Goetzmann (1995). As we require funds to have an
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annual summary available at the end of each previous year to be included in our sample,
the first return observation is over January 1963. All returns are reported net of operating
expenses.
We build quantile portfolios of funds based on the funds’ styles. As explained by Fama
and MacBeth (1973), using such an approach we reduce the “errors-in-variables” problem
in the estimated factor exposures. More specifically, the style portfolios are constructed in
the following way. Each month, all available funds are sorted into 10, 20, or 30 mutually
exclusive portfolios based on one of the following characteristics of their stock holdings:
(i) market beta, (ii) exposure to the size factor, (iii) exposure to the value factor, and (iv)
past return. Funds’ market betas are obtained by running the CAPM regressions for all
available funds using ordinary least squares (OLS) with a rolling window over the preceding
36 months:
ri,t = αi + βiRMRFt + ²i,t, (4.1)
where ri,t is the excess return of fund i in month t, RMRFt is the excess return on the
market portfolio in month t, αi is Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 1968), βi is the market beta of
fund i, and ²i,t is the residual return of fund i in month t. Funds’ exposures to the size and
value factor are obtained by estimating the Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) (3FM)
using OLS with a rolling window over the preceding 36 months:
ri,t = ai + β1iRMRFt + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + ²i,t, (4.2)
where SMBt and HMLt are the returns on factor mimicking portfolios for market equity
(Small Minus Big) and book-to-market-equity (High Minus Low) in month t. The bench-
mark returns on RMRF , SMB, and HML are obtained from Kenneth French’s data
library. As a proxy for the risk-free rate, the one-month Treasury bill rate from Ibbotson
and Associates is used. Momentum portfolios are based on the funds’ average return over
the past 12 months consistent with most of the literature.
With sorts on market beta, market equity, and book-to-market-equity, the top quantile
contains the funds with the highest estimated exposure to the relevant factor (e.g., β1i, β2i,
and β3i). For example, if funds are sorted into deciles based on their SMB loadings, the
top decile contains the 10 percent of funds with the highest small cap exposure, and the
bottom decile contains the 10 percent of funds with the highest large cap exposure. If the
sorts are based the funds’ HML loadings, the top decile contains the 10 percent of funds
with the highest value exposure, and the bottom decile the 10 percent of funds with the
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highest growth exposure. For momentum portfolios, the top quantile contains the funds
with the highest average return over the past year.
After sorting the funds into quantile portfolios, the equally weighted returns over the
subsequent (out-of-sample) month are calculated for all portfolios. The portfolio weights
are readjusted if a fund disappears from our sample after ranking. The first three years
of our dataset (January 1963 to December 1965) are used to initialize the style portfolios.
Thus, the style portfolio returns cover the period January 1966 to December 2003.
4.3 Empirical Results
4.3.1 To what extent are fund managers able to exploit the
anomalies reported in the literature?
The first question we address in this study is whether the returns of the style portfolios
are fully described by a linear function of their market betas. Our first series of results
involve scatter plots of the style portfolios’ expected returns on their market betas. For
all style portfolios, we compute average excess returns over the entire sample period, and
plot these values on the portfolios’ post-ranking market betas that are estimated using the
CAPM in Eq. (4.1). These beta estimates are also based on the entire sample period.
The resulting scatter plots are presented in Figure 4.1. Since our results are robust to
the number of portfolios, we concentrate on the 20-portfolio results. The solid line in the
graphs draws the Security Market Line (SML) predicted by the CAPM, and the dashed line
draws the empirical relation between average excess return and market beta by fitting a
regression line to the displayed data points. For all sorts, we clearly observe the celebrated
anomalies in the literature: from the scatter plot for quantile portfolios of funds based
on market beta, it appears that the risk-return relation is flatter than the Sharpe-Lintner
CAPM predicts, i.e., funds that hold stocks with high (low) betas earn returns that are
too low (high) given their betas. We also observe evidence of the small firm-effect as
documented by Banz (1981), Reinganum (1981), and Brav et al. (2005). The empirical
SML is steeper than the CAPM prediction. Funds that have high exposure to large cap
stocks (data points to the left in the plot) earn excess returns that are too low given their
market betas, while funds with high exposure to small cap stocks (data points to the right
in the plot) earn excess returns that are too high. Portfolios resulting from sorts on book-
to-market-equity also display a large variation in excess returns that is not explained by
differences in market beta. Funds following a value oriented style (data points to the left
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in the plot) have a substantially lower market beta than funds with a growth style (data
points to the right in the plot), but earn higher excess returns. Finally, most prominently
we observe the momentum effect. Funds that hold stocks that did well over the past year
earn abnormal positive returns in the near future, while funds that hold stocks that did
poorly earn abnormal negative returns.
Next, we perform time-series regressions in the spirit of Black et al. (1972), and run
CAPM regressions as in Eq. (4.1) for all style portfolios over the entire post-ranking period
using OLS. The parameter estimates and R-squared values for sorts into 10 style portfolios
are reported in Table 4.1. Additionally, Figure 4.2 presents the style portfolios’ alphas
resulting from running the CAPM regressions for sorts into 20 portfolios. Again both for
sorts on beta, market equity, book-to-market-equity, and price momentum our results are
consistent with the style anomalies in the literature. The portfolios’ alphas increase with
the quantile ranks when funds are sorted on their market betas. For sorts on market equity,
we observe evidence of the small-firm effect. In a similar fashion, alphas decrease with the
quantile ranks when funds are sorted on book-to-market-equity and price momentum. On
a yearly basis, the spread in alpha between the top and bottom deciles is about 1.3 to 2.4
percent for sorts on market beta, market equity, and book-to-market-equity. For sorts on
momentum, this spread even mounts to more than 11 percent.
Finally, we employ the pooled time-series-cross-sectional methodology of Gibbons et al.
(1989) to test whether the style portfolios’ alphas are jointly equal to zero, and whether the
portfolios’ returns are fully described by a linear function of their market betas. Formally,
the condition that we test for is given by:
E(ri) = βiE(rm), (4.3)
where E(ri) is the expected return on portfolio i in excess of the risk-free rate, E(rm)
is the expected return on the market portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate, and βi =
cov(ri, rm)/var(rm). We compute the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken statistic (Gibbons et al.
(1989)) as:
GRS ≡
(
T −N − 1
N
)
αˆ′
[(
1 +
rm
σˆm
)2
Σˆ
]−1
αˆ, (4.4)
where αˆ is a N by 1 vector of estimated alphas, Σˆ is an N by N matrix that holds the
unbiased estimate of the residual variance-covariance matrix, rm is the sample mean of
the excess return on the market portfolio, and σˆ2m is an unbiased estimate of the variance
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of the excess return on the market portfolio. Assuming that the errors are independently
and normally distributed, uncorrelated with the returns on the market portfolio, the GRS
statistic follows an F -distribution withN degrees of freedom in the numerator and T−N−1
degrees in the denominator under the null of zero alphas. Apart from the GRS statistic,
we also compute the following test statistic to test if all alphas are jointly equal to zero:
T
[(
1 +
rm
σˆm
)2]−1
αˆ′Σˆ−1αˆ, (4.5)
This test statistic does not require normality of the error terms. Assuming homoscedasticity
this test statistic obeys an asymptotic χ2-distribution with N degrees of freedom under
the null of zero alphas. The results are listed in Table 4.2. Although it seems that the
empirical SML for sorts on market beta is flatter than the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM predicts,
this deviation is statistically insignificant at any conventional significance level. There is
also no strong evidence supporting the small-firm effect; only for the 20-portfolio data set
the GRS test statistic indicates a significant deviation from the CAPM prediction. On
the other hand, the CAPM appears unable to explain the returns on the style portfolios
based on book-to-market and momentum. Whether we use 10, 20, or 30 portfolios, the
resulting p-values tell a consistent story. Funds that hold value stocks have higher alphas
than funds holding growth stocks, and funds that hold winners have higher alphas than
funds holding losers. Neither phenomenon is explained by differences in market betas.
4.3.2 Do the factor proxies systematically miscalculate the
premiums fund managers actually earn?
In this section, we estimate the factor premiums fund managers actually earn, and compare
these values to the returns predicted by the hypothetical stock portfolios RMRF , SMB,
HML and WML. Here, WML (Winner Minus Loser) is the proxy for the momentum ef-
fect documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) that is used with the four-factor Carhart
(1997) model (4FM)2
ri,t = ai + β1iRMRFt + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + β4iWMLt + ²i,t. (4.6)
We perform cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions, and estimate Eq. (4.1),
Eq. (4.2) and Eq. (4.6) for the style portfolios using a rolling window, and solve for the
2The authors would like to thank Mark Carhart for generously providing the data on the momentum
factor used in Carhart (1997).
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expected returns for funds with unit exposure to RMRF , SMB, HML, and WML, as
a function of the estimated betas from the time-series regressions. For example, for the
4FM:
rβ1,t
rβ2,t
rβ3,t
rβ4,t
 ≡


βˆ′1,t−1
βˆ′2,t−1
βˆ′3,t−1
βˆ′4,t−1
[βˆ1,t−1βˆ2,t−1βˆ3,t−1βˆ4,t−1]

−1 
βˆ′1,t−1
βˆ′2,t−1
βˆ′3,t−1
βˆ′4,t−1
 rt (4.7)
where rt is a N by 1 vector of excess returns on the style portfolios at time t, βˆ1,t−1, βˆ2,t−1,
βˆ3,t−1, and βˆ4,t−1 are N by 1 vectors of the style portfolios’ exposures to RMRF , SMB,
HML, and WML, estimated using a 36-month rolling window that ends at t − 1, and
rβ1,t, rβ2,t, rβ3,t, and rβ4,t are the implied excess returns for funds with unit exposure to
RMRF , SMB, HML, and WML, respectively. The analysis is performed on 30 quantile
portfolios based on the factor exposure for which we want to obtain the premium. This
ensures that the style portfolios exhibit a large cross-sectional spread in exposure to the
factor for which we estimate the premium. For example, to obtain an estimate of the
size premium we perform the cross-sectional regressions on 30 quantile portfolios of funds
based on the funds’ exposures to market equity, and to obtain an estimate of the value
premium we perform the regressions on 30 quantiles based on exposures to book-to-market-
equity. The style portfolios returns cover the period January 1966 to December 2003. The
first 36 months of this period (January 1966 to December 1968) are used to initialize the
procedure, so we obtain returns on the unit-beta style portfolios over the period January
1969 to December 2003.
First, we determine the excess returns for funds with unit exposure to RMRF as
a function of the estimated betas from the CAPM regression Eq. (4.1) for 30 quantile
portfolios sorted on market beta. We find a time-series average of 0.37 percent per month
for rβ1,t (t-value of 1.59). The average excess return of the hypothetical stock portfolio
RMRF over the same period is 0.42 percent per month (t-value of 1.83). The average
difference between both portfolios is about 60 basis points on a yearly basis, and statistically
insignificant (t-value of 1.16). We can thus conclude that fund managers earn a premium
for exposure to the market that is statistically and economically not much different from
the return projected by the hypothetical stock portfolio RMRF .
Second, we determine the excess returns for funds with unit exposure to SMB and
HML as a function of the estimated betas from 3FM regression as in Eq. (4.2) for 30
quantile portfolios based on market equity and book-to-market-equity, respectively. We
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find a time-series average of 0.11 percent per month for rβ2,t (t-value of 0.62), which is only
slightly lower than the size premium based on SMB of 0.13 percent per month (t-value
of 0.78). However, the average return of 0.16 percent per month (t-value of 0.97) for rβ3,t
is substantially lower than the return of 0.43 percent per month (t-value of 2.83) that
is projected by HML. While the hypothetical hedge portfolio HML indicates that the
value premium is more than 5 percent on a yearly basis, rβ3,t indicates that fund managers
with unit exposure to HML earn a return of only 2 percent per year. The t-value of the
difference between rβ3,t and HML is 2.86. These results indicate that fund managers that
follow a value oriented style earn returns that are too high given their market betas, but
that the abnormal returns are smaller than projected by the hypothetical hedge portfolio
HML.
Finally, we solve for the expected returns for a fund with unit exposure to WML as
a function of the estimated betas in Eq. (4.6) for 30 quantile portfolios based on price
momentum. We find an average value of 1.64 percent per month for rβ4,t (t-value of
4.13), while WML indicates that the momentum effect is only 0.94 percent per month
(t-value of 3.72). The t-value of the difference between rβ4,t and WML is -1.98. These
results indicate that the actual return differential between past winners and losers is larger
than projected by the hypothetical hedge portfolio WML. The observation that price
momentum for mutual funds is stronger than predicted by the proxy that is used with
multi-factor approaches has also been documented by Wermers (2003) who studies mutual
fund portfolio holdings. The author argues that this phenomenon might be caused by
flow-related buying/selling of fund managers and the resulting price impact of the trades.
Another way to correct for transaction costs and trading restrictions when estimating
the factor premiums is to look at the net returns of index funds that closely track the
hypothetical stock portfolios. Baks et al. (2001) propose to take the low-cost index funds
from the Vanguard mutual fund family as investable alternatives for RMRF , SMB, and
HML.3 We extract return data from CRSP for the index funds offered by Vanguard in the
overall market, small cap value, small cap neutral, small cap growth, large cap value, large
cap neutral, and large cap growth categories. First, we perform a simple linear regression
of the excess returns of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund on RMRF . The
resulting return series covers the fund’s inception date May 1992 to December 2003. The
estimated intercept in this regression of 0.0007 percent is consistent with our earlier finding
3As pointed out by Baks et al. (2001), there are no low-cost index alternatives available for WML,
since momentum strategies have high turnover by nature.
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that fund managers earn a premium for exposure to the market that basically is the same
as the return projected by RMRF . Next, we build portfolios of the index funds to obtain
investable alternatives for SMB and HML. We take the return differential between the
average returns of the funds in the small cap and the large cap categories for SMB, and
the return differential between the average returns of the value and growth categories for
HML. The resulting return series cover the period December 1992 to December 2003. We
perform simple linear regressions of the portfolios’ returns on SMB and HML. For the
regression on SMB, the estimated intercept is -0.06 percent, and for HML the intercept
is -0.25 percent. These results are very similar to those obtained from the cross-sectional
regressions, and indicate the actual size premium is very similar to the return projected
by SMB, while the hypothetical hedge portfolio HML overestimates the value premium
by about 3 percent per year.
4.3.3 Multi-factor approaches to evaluate mutual fund
performance
So far, we clearly observed a value premium and a momentum effect in the cross-section
of fund returns. However, the premiums that fund managers actually earn for exposure to
these factors are different from the returns projected by the usual proxies that are used
with multi-factor approaches. The second objective of this study is to investigate how this
miscalculation of the factor premiums affects the cross-sectional explanatory power of the
3FM and the 4FM we introduced earlier. To investigate this issue, we consider the style
portfolios’ alphas resulting from the 3FM in Eq. (4.2) and the 4FM in Eq. (4.6). Table 4.3
lists the three- and four-factor alpha estimates for all style portfolios. For sorts on market
beta, book-to-market-equity, and momentum, the alphas still point to distinctive patterns
from one decile rank to another. More interestingly, for beta and book-to-market-equity
sorts, we now observe a perverse pattern: funds with low beta stocks appear to have lower
alphas than those with high beta stocks, and growth funds appear to have higher alphas
than value funds. For sorts on momentum, three-factor alphas exhibit the same pattern as
CAPM-alphas, and are in the same order of magnitude. In economic terms, the spreads
between the top and bottom deciles are substantial. On a yearly basis, the spread in alpha
between the top and bottom decile for sorts on book-to-market-equity is about 3.6 percent,
while this spread even mounts up to more than 12 percent for sorts on momentum. When
we consider the 4FM results, we basically perceive the same patterns for sorts on market
beta and book-to-market-equity. For sorts on momentum, past losers still underperform
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past winners, but the spread between the top and bottom deciles is smaller than for the
3FM results. However, this spread is still more than 3.5 percent per year. While past
winners have positive alphas, these deviations are only marginally significant. For losers,
however, the returns predicted by the 4FM are substantially higher than those generated
by the fund managers.
To test whether the alphas are jointly equal to zero we perform multi-variate extensions
to the test statistics we introduced previously:
GRS ≡
(
T −N −K
N
)(
1 + µˆ′Ωˆ−1µˆ
)−1
αˆ′Σˆ−1αˆ ∼ F (N,N − T −K) (4.8)
and
T
(
1 + µˆ′Ωˆ−1µˆ
)−1
αˆ′Σˆ−1αˆ ∼ χ2N , (4.9)
where µˆ is a K by 1 vector of sample means of the style portfolios’ excess returns, Ωˆ is
an K by K matrix that holds the unbiased estimate of the factor portfolios covariance
matrix, and K is the number of benchmark factors that are employed in the factor model.
The resulting test statistics and the accompanying p-values are presented in Table 4.4. We
first consider the results for the 3FM. For sorts on market beta and market equity the
null of zero alphas is not rejected in all cases, except for sorts in 20 portfolios based on
market equity. For sorts into 30 portfolios, the results are mixed. However, for sorts on
book-to-market-equity and momentum the null is clearly rejected. When we consider the
4FM results, the results are not much different: the null of zero alphas is rejected for sorts
on book-to-market-equity for all analyses, and for sorts into 10 and 20 quantiles for sorts
on momentum.
Apparently, both the 3FM and the 4FM are unable to explain the cross-section of fund
returns for sorts on book-to-market-equity and momentum. The observation that the 3FM
is unable to explain the returns of style portfolios sorted on momentum is not unexpected,
since the 3FM makes no attempt to control for this effect. However, both the 3FM and
the 4FM explicitly attempt to correct for the value premium. The observed perverse
patterns in the style portfolios’ alphas for sorts on book-to-market-equity is consistent
with our finding that the premium that fund managers actually earn for following a value
oriented style is smaller than the return projected by the hypothetical hedge portfolio
HML. Also, the return differential between past winners and losers that is unexplained
by the 4FM is consistent with our previous finding that the hypothetical hedge portfolio
WML underestimates the momentum effect for mutual funds.
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Overall, our results permit a strong judgment about the empirical performance of the
multi-factor approaches, indicating that the 3FM and the 4FM do not adequately control
for the reported anomalies. An important implication of these findings is that the usual
three- and four factor-alphas are systematically biased. In particular, performance esti-
mates for value funds and past losers are biased downwards, while those for growth funds
and past winners are biased upwards.
4.4 Time-varying market betas and
conditioning variables
In this section, we demonstrate that our findings cannot be explained by time-varying
market betas. As in Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Ferson and Harvey (1999), we estimate
the style portfolios’ alphas using a conditional CAPM, thereby allowing market betas to
vary over time conditional on a set of predetermined variables:
rit = αi + β1iRMRFt +B
′
1i[zt−1RMRFt] + εit, (4.10)
where zt−1 denotes a vector holding the lagged values of the information variables, and
vector B′ji captures the response of fund i’s exposure to benchmark j to this information.
We employ the following information variables: (1) the lagged level of the one-month
Treasury bill yield, (2) the lagged dividend yield of the S&P500, (3) a lagged measure
of the slope of the term structure, and (4) a lagged default spread in the corporate bond
market. The dividend yield is defined as the dividend per share as a percentage of the share
price over the past 12 months for the index. The term spread is defined as a constant-
maturity 10-year Treasury bond yield minus the one-month Treasury bill yield, while the
default spread is defined as Moody’s BAA-rated corporate bond yield minus the AAA-rated
corporate bond yield. Dividend yield data on the S&P500 are obtained from Thompson
Financial, and the bond yield data are from the webpage of the Federal Reserve Bank. The
resulting factor model includes 5 scaled factors, and an intercept. In addition, we employ
a conditional version of the 3FM and the 4FM that augment the conditional CAPM with
factors for size, value, and momentum:
rit = αi + β1iRMRFt +B
′
1i[zt−1RMRFt] + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + εit (4.11)
and
rit = αi + β1iRMRFt +B
′
1i[zt−1RMRFt] + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt+
β4iWMLt + εit.
(4.12)
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These factor models include 7 and 8 scaled factors, respectively, and an intercept. We
estimate the style portfolios’ alphas using the three conditional models over the entire
post-ranking period using OLS and test whether the alphas are jointly equal to zero. The
results for sorts into decile portfolios are presented in Table 4.5.
The alpha estimates for the conditional models are very similar to those for the uncon-
ditional models. The null hypothesis of zero alphas is rejected for sorts on market equity,
book-to-market-equity, and momentum. For the conditional CAPM, we observe the same
pattern as for unconditional CAPM regressions: funds that follow a value (growth) oriented
style earn returns that are too high (low) given their betas, and funds that hold stocks
that did well (poorly) over the past year earn abnormal positive (negative) returns in the
near future. The inclusion of the Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) and Carhart (1997)
factors leads to the same perverse patterns we observed for the unconditional multi-factor
models. Performance estimates for value funds and past losers are biased downwards,
while those for growth funds and past winners are biased upwards. In economic terms, the
spreads between alphas of the top and bottom deciles are of the same order of magnitude
as those reported earlier for the unconditional models. Overall, our results indicate that
observed anomalies cannot be explained by conditional models that allow for time-varying
market betas.
4.5 Results using factor proxies based on fund returns
Finally, we construct factor proxies based on mutual fund returns. The first factor, that
acts as some sort of broad market proxy, is set to the average return for all available funds
at each period in time. The factor proxies for size, value, and momentum, are constructed
as follows. Each month, we estimate the 3FM in Eq. (4.2) for all available funds using
OLS with a rolling window over the preceding 36 months. Our size proxy is defined as the
average return of all funds with β2,i above the size breakpoint minus the average return of
all funds with β2,i equal or below the breakpoint, our value proxy as the average return
of all funds with β3,i above the value breakpoint minus the average return of all funds
with β3,i equal or below the breakpoint, and our momentum proxy as the average return
of all funds with 12-month returns above the momentum breakpoint minus the average
return of all funds below the breakpoint. The size breakpoint is set to the median loading
on SML, the book-to-market-equity breakpoint to the median loading on HML, and the
momentum breakpoint to the median fund return over the past 12 months. To ensure that
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the results are robust to our choice of the breakpoints, we additionally construct factors
where the breakpoints are set to the 33rd and 67th percentile loading on SML and HML,
and the 33rd and 67th percentile fund return over the past 12 months. While the resulting
proxies for size, value, and momentum are non-investable, we argue that if the observed
biases in the multi-factor performance estimates are indeed due to miscalculation of the
factor premiums, these proxies might yield better results, because they are based on net
fund returns, and therefore incorporate transaction costs and trading restrictions.
We now compute the style portfolios’ alphas resulting from 3FM and 4FM specifications
using factor proxies based on fund returns, and test if the resulting alphas are jointly equal
to zero using the multivariate test statistics Eq. (4.8) and Eq. (4.9). The resulting alphas
and test statistics for the decile style portfolios are displayed in Table 4.6. When we
consider the results for sorts on book-to-market-equity, the perverse pattern in the deciles’
alphas has disappeared. In fact, we do not observe a pattern at all. The alphas are also
small from an economic point of view. Furthermore, the tests indicate that the null of
zero alphas cannot be rejected for any reasonable level of significance. These results hold
irrespective of how we define the factors’ breakpoints. Finally, we consider the results for
sorts on momentum. The observation that the 3FM is unable to explain the returns of
style portfolios sorted on momentum is not unexpected, since the 3FM makes no attempt
to control for this effect. However, the 4FM model appears to be able to cope with the
momentum effect, as the corresponding alphas are not significantly different from zero.
Again, the results hold irrespective of how we define the factors’ breakpoints. Our findings
indicate that factor proxies based on mutual fund returns rather than stock returns provide
better benchmarks to evaluate professional money managers.
4.6 Conclusion
A large number of studies employ multi-factor models to evaluate mutual fund perfor-
mance. This paper provides evidence that market betas by themselves do not suffice to
describe the cross-section of fund returns. We use the pooled time-series-cross-sectional
test methodology of Gibbons et al. (1989) to test whether CAPM alphas of style portfolios
of funds based on (i) market beta, (ii) market equity, (iii) book-to-market-equity, and (iv)
price momentum are jointly equal to zero. We reject the null of zero alphas for sorts on
book-to-market-equity and momentum. Funds with a value (growth) oriented style, and
funds that hold stocks that did well (poorly) over the past year, earn returns that are
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higher (lower) than predicted by the CAPM. The funds’ alphas are up to more than 6
percent per year. Our findings indicate that the value-premium and the momentum effect
reported in the literature are economically significant, and persist beyond transaction costs
and trading restrictions.
However, the premiums that fund managers actually earn for exposure to these factors
are different from the returns projected by the typical proxies that are used with the
multi-factor approaches. The value premium in the cross-section of fund returns is smaller
than predicted by the hypothetical hedge portfolio HML. Further, the return differential
between past winners and losers is much larger than predicted by the hypothetical hedge
portfolio WML.
This miscalculation of the factor premiums affects the cross-sectional explanatory power
of multi-factor models to evaluate mutual fund performance. We find that the usual three-
and four-factor alphas do not adequately control for the anomalies. In particular, multi-
factor performance estimates for value funds and past losers are biased downwards, while
those for growth funds and past winners are biased upwards. These results are robust to
time-varying betas.
One alternative that does not suffer from these biases is based on the use of a four-
factor model where the factors are constructed using mutual fund returns rather than stock
returns. Resulting alphas from this model do not exhibit systematic patterns and appear
to provide unbiased estimates of a fund manager’s performance.
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4.7 Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Single-factor CAPM regressions.
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t RMRF R2
Sorts on market beta
D1 6.00% 0.24 -1.13% -0.66 1.40 0.82
D2 5.62% 0.28 -0.47% -0.41 1.20 0.88
D3 4.92% 0.27 -0.75% -0.87 1.11 0.92
D4 4.85% 0.29 -0.45% -0.81 1.04 0.96
D5 4.65% 0.29 -0.40% -0.66 0.99 0.95
D6 4.24% 0.28 -0.52% -1.30 0.93 0.97
D7 4.78% 0.33 0.22% 0.42 0.89 0.95
D8 4.47% 0.32 0.18% 0.33 0.84 0.94
D9 4.11% 0.32 0.23% 0.37 0.76 0.91
D10 2.92% 0.30 0.18% 0.24 0.54 0.78
Sorts on market equity
D1 6.10% 0.28 0.01% 0.00 1.20 0.79
D2 6.00% 0.31 0.40% 0.31 1.10 0.84
D3 5.73% 0.32 0.39% 0.42 1.05 0.90
D4 5.08% 0.31 0.05% 0.07 0.99 0.93
D5 4.75% 0.31 -0.09% -0.17 0.95 0.96
D6 4.38% 0.29 -0.27% -0.51 0.91 0.95
D7 4.05% 0.28 -0.53% -1.25 0.90 0.97
D8 3.88% 0.27 -0.55% -1.36 0.87 0.97
D9 3.39% 0.24 -1.07% -2.57 0.87 0.97
D10 3.17% 0.21 -1.35% -1.76 0.89 0.90
Data on returns of mutual funds are extracted from the 2003 CRSP Mutual Fund Survivorship-bias Free
Database. In total, our sample cover 7,852 US equity funds over the period 1963–2003. Funds are sorted
into 10 quantile portfolios based on the following characteristics of their stock holdings: (i) market beta,
(ii) market equity, (iii) book-to-market-equity, and (iv) price momentum. For the resulting style portfolios,
we run single-factor CAPM regressions. The table lists the portfolios’ post-ranking returns, Sharpe ratios,
CAPM parameter estimates, and R-squared values. All values are annualized.
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Table 4.1 continued
Return Sharpe Alpha Alpha-t RMRF R2
Sorts on book-to-market equity
D1 5.55% 0.39 1.57% 1.46 0.78 0.78
D2 5.57% 0.40 1.44% 1.75 0.81 0.87
D3 4.89% 0.35 0.62% 0.87 0.84 0.90
D4 4.25% 0.29 -0.25% -0.46 0.88 0.94
D5 4.19% 0.28 -0.58% -1.23 0.94 0.96
D6 4.13% 0.26 -0.82% -1.61 0.97 0.96
D7 4.12% 0.25 -1.08% -1.84 1.02 0.95
D8 3.93% 0.22 -1.50% -2.05 1.07 0.93
D9 4.24% 0.22 -1.52% -1.61 1.13 0.91
D10 5.78% 0.25 -0.85% -0.55 1.30 0.83
Sorts on momentum
D1 11.19% 0.58 5.66% 3.26 1.03 0.68
D2 8.91% 0.52 3.51% 3.17 1.00 0.84
D3 7.07% 0.45 1.86% 2.52 0.97 0.91
D4 5.64% 0.37 0.45% 0.82 0.96 0.95
D5 4.58% 0.30 -0.59% -1.18 0.96 0.96
D6 4.36% 0.29 -0.77% -1.54 0.95 0.96
D7 3.52% 0.23 -1.59% -3.07 0.95 0.95
D8 2.47% 0.16 -2.74% -3.97 0.97 0.92
D9 1.47% 0.09 -3.76% -4.41 0.97 0.89
D10 -0.93% -0.05 -6.09% -4.41 0.96 0.75
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Table 4.2: Univariate test results for zero alphas.
χ2 p-value GRS p-value
N = 10
beta 6.79 0.74 0.67 0.76
ME 11.14 0.35 1.09 0.37
BE/ME 21.14 0.02 2.07 0.03
momentum 27.22 0.00 2.67 0.00
N = 20
beta 22.27 0.33 1.07 0.38
ME 37.62 0.01 1.80 0.02
BE/ME 42.37 0.00 2.03 0.01
momentum 39.09 0.01 1.87 0.01
N = 30
beta 23.94 0.77 0.75 0.83
ME 40.33 0.10 1.26 0.17
BE/ME 51.27 0.01 1.60 0.03
momentum 42.96 0.06 1.34 0.11
Data on returns of mutual funds are extracted from the 2003 CRSP Mutual Fund Survivorship-bias Free
Database. In total, our sample cover 7,852 US equity funds over the period 1963–2003. Funds are sorted
into 10, 20, and 30 quantile portfolios based on the following characteristics of their stock holdings: (i)
market beta, (ii) market equity, (iii) book-to-market-equity, and (iv) price momentum. For the resulting
style portfolios, we run single-factor CAPM regressions, and test whether the estimated alphas are jointly
equal to zero. The table lists the results of pooled time-series-cross-sectional tests in the spirit of Gibbons
et al. (1989). p-values below the significance level of 10 percent are highlighted.
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Table 4.4: Multivariate test results for zero alphas.
A. Fama and French 3FM B. Carhart 4FM
χ2 p-value GRS p-value χ2 p-value GRS p-value
N = 10
beta 10.87 0.37 1.06 0.39 13.87 0.18 1.34 0.20
ME 13.10 0.22 1.27 0.24 11.26 0.34 1.09 0.37
BE/ME 20.07 0.03 1.95 0.04 27.09 0.00 2.63 0.01
momentum 32.19 0.00 3.13 0.00 19.32 0.04 1.87 0.05
N = 20
beta 25.28 0.19 1.20 0.25 31.09 0.05 1.47 0.09
ME 39.06 0.01 1.85 0.01 34.87 0.02 1.65 0.04
BE/ME 43.11 0.00 2.05 0.01 57.85 0.00 2.74 0.00
momentum 44.29 0.00 2.10 0.00 30.37 0.06 1.44 0.10
N = 30
beta 27.66 0.59 0.86 0.68 35.10 0.24 1.08 0.35
ME 41.23 0.08 1.27 0.16 37.57 0.16 1.16 0.26
BE/ME 46.23 0.03 1.43 0.07 51.07 0.01 1.58 0.03
momentum 47.72 0.02 1.48 0.05 33.84 0.29 1.04 0.41
Data on returns of mutual funds are extracted from the 2003 CRSP Mutual Fund Survivorship-bias Free
Database. In total, our sample cover 7,852 US equity funds over the period 1963–2003. Funds are sorted
into 10, 20, and 30 quantile portfolios based on the following characteristics of their stock holdings: (i)
market beta, (ii) market equity, (iii) book-to-market-equity, and (iv) price momentum. For the resulting
style portfolios, we run 3FM and 4FM regressions, and test whether the estimated alphas are jointly equal
to zero. The table lists the results of pooled time-series-cross-sectional tests in the spirit of Gibbons et al.
(1989). p-values below the significance level of 10 percent are highlighted.
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Figure 4.1: Mutual funds’ average excess returns vs market betas.
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(d) momentum
Data on returns of mutual funds are extracted from the 2003 CRSP Mutual Fund Survivorship-bias Free
Database. In total, our sample cover 7,852 US equity funds over the period 1963–2003. Funds are sorted
into 20 quantile portfolios based on the following characteristics of their stock holdings: (i) market beta,
(ii) market equity, (iii) book-to-market-equity, and (iv) price momentum. For the resulting style portfolios,
we compute average excess returns, and plot these values on the portfolios’ market betas that are estimated
using single-factor CAPM regressions. The solid line in the graphs draws the SML predicted by the CAPM,
and the dashed line draws the empirical relation between expected excess return and market beta. All
values are annualized.
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Figure 4.2: Single-factor CAPM alphas.
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(d) momentum
Data on returns of mutual funds are extracted from the 2003 CRSP Mutual Fund Survivorship-bias Free
Database. In total, our sample cover 7,852 US equity funds over the period 1963–2003. Funds are sorted
into 20 quantile portfolios based on the following characteristics of their stock holdings: (i) market beta, (ii)
market equity, (iii) book-to-market-equity, and (iv) price momentum. For the resulting style portfolios, we
run single-factor CAPM regressions. The graphs list the style portfolios’ alphas. All values are annualized.
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Chapter 5
Spillover Effects of Marketing in
Mutual Fund Families∗
5.1 Introduction
When we consider the mutual fund industry over the past decade, one of the most no-
table developments is the enormous growth of funds that are operated by fund families.
While almost 20 percent of all US equity funds were offered as stand-alone in 1992, this
figure rapidly declined to less than 4 percent by the end of 2002. Plausible reasons for
this phenomenon are the competitive advantages that family membership brings along,
such as economies of scale. In addition, recent studies document substantial spillover ef-
fects between funds in a family. For example, several authors report spillovers in fund
performance.
Past performance is one of the most important determinants of investors’ cash flows
to funds (see e.g., Gruber (1996), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1999),
and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002)). Funds with strong track records are rewarded with
large cash flows into the funds, while losers are not disciplined with equally large outflows.
However, Ivkovic (2001) and Nanda et al. (2004) report that cash flows are not only affected
by a fund’s own performance, but also by the performance of other funds in the family.
Stellar performance of a fund generates substantial spillovers in the sense that cash inflows
to other funds in the family are above and beyond what one would expect given the funds’
own performance. On the other hand, poor performance of a fund does not seem to result in
abnormal cash outflows from its family members. Consistent with these findings, Khorana
and Servaes (2005) find that the presence of a star fund in a family has a positive effect on
∗This chapter is based on the article by Huij and Verbeek (2006b).
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the family’s market share. Other spillover effects have been documented by Zhao (2004),
who finds evidence that fund families that signal superior performance by closing a star
fund to new investments enjoy higher cash inflows into the rest of the family.
There are several possible explanations for this behavior: investors might believe that
the performance of an individual fund conveys information about the quality of the family
to which the fund belongs, e.g., quality of research, or monitoring activities of fund man-
agers. Another reason is that funds with extreme performance typically receive more media
attention, thereby making the family to which the fund belongs more visible to investors
(Sirri and Tufano, 1998).
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1993) and Nanda et al. (2004) argue that fund families are
well aware of these spillover effects, and anticipate investor behavior to maximize cash flows
into their funds. Families that manage many funds with large cross-sectional dispersion in
performance are more likely to generate a star, and attract larger cash flows in the funds.
Moreover, Nanda et al. (2004) assert that this mechanism especially induces lower ability
families to pursue this type of strategy.
In this study we investigate the presence of spillover effects of marketing in fund fami-
lies. It is abundantly clear that fund management companies consider marketing to be an
important method to attract new investors. In the sample we use in this study, US equity
funds spent more than 9 billion dollars on marketing and distribution activities in 2003;
an amount that is more than 0.4 percent of their total net assets under management over
the year. For comparison, all operating expenses summed together (including management
fees) amount to less than one percent of total net assets under management.1 Several au-
thors confirm that marketing is an effective method for funds to garner new money. Jain
and Wu (2000) find that funds that are advertised in Barron’s or Money magazine attract
significantly larger cash flows in comparison to other funds, even though these funds do not
exhibit superior performance. Sirri and Tufano (1998) document that funds with higher
fees (and presumably higher marketing expenses) receive larger cash inflows as a response
to their performance than funds with lower fees. Consistent with these findings, Barber
et al. (2005) report a positive relation between funds’ marketing expenses and subsequent
inflows, especially when these expenses are less salient to investors. More recently, a few
studies have examined the impact of marketing on cash flows at the aggregate family-
level. Gallaher et al. (2006) report that fund families with the highest levels of advertising
1As a measure of funds’ marketing and distribution expenses we take the funds’ reported 12b1 fees plus
one-seventh of the funds’ front-end load fees.
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receive greater cash inflows, but the authors do not find that advertising affects the flow-
performance relation at the family-level. Further, Khorana and Servaes (2005) examine
the relation between marketing expenses and family market share, and find that there is a
positive relation for small families.
However, none of these studies has investigated the impact of fund marketing on in-
vestor flows to other funds in the family. For example, do high-marketing funds generate
spillovers, and enhance cash inflows to low-marketing funds in the family? To investigate
the presence of such intrafamily marketing spillovers, we employ a regression-based method-
ology investigating cash flows of US equity funds that are operated within a fund family. In
particular, we test whether the flow-performance relationship is affected by marketing and
distribution expenses at the individual fund and fund family level. Analyzing data over the
period 1992–2003, we address the following questions. First, do high-marketing funds have
a stronger flow-performance relation than low-marketing funds, and how is this affected by
fund age and size? Second, do cash flows respond differently to past performance when a
fund is operated in a family that has high-marketing expenses?
The main conclusions of our study can be summarized as follows. First, we find that
funds with high marketing expenses draw substantially larger inflows as a response to their
performance. More specifically, cash inflows following positive returns are almost twice as
large for high-marketing funds compared to low-marketing funds. On the other hand, on
the other hand, cash outflows following negative returns are only marginally larger for high-
marketing funds compared to low-marketing funds. These results provide further evidence
that mutual fund marketing is very effective in making good performance more visible to
investors. Second, we find that small and young funds with low marketing expenses that
are operated by a family with high marketing expenses have substantially larger inflows
after positive returns than otherwise similar funds that are operated by a family with low
marketing expenses. Furthermore, these funds appear to have smaller outflows following
negative returns. These results indicate that high-marketing families provide favorable
conditions to incubate new funds. Given the findings of Khorana and Servaes (2005) that
families that start more funds have higher market share, one might expect high-marketing
families to have a considerable competitive advantage over low-marketing families.
One way to interpret the spillovers is that they are a by-product of individual fund
marketing whereby the entire family is made more visible to investors. An alternative
explanation of this observation is that funds with low marketing expenses are directly
subsidized by family members with high marketing expenses. A family could pay for
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marketing of a particular fund through expenses allocated to other funds. We develop
and perform a set of tests to evaluate the alternative hypotheses. The results of all tests
support the subsidization hypothesis and suggest that at least part of the spillovers can
be attributed to families favoring some funds by transferring marketing exposure across
member funds. These results suggest that conflicts of interest between investors and fund
families have been exacerbated by competition in the mutual fund industry.
5.2 Data
5.2.1 Sources and fund selection
Our primary data are from the 2003 Mutual Fund Survivorship-bias Free Database com-
piled by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This database covers returns,
supplemental data, and fund classifications on all US open-end mutual funds, including
defunct funds. Since CRSP basically includes all funds that existed during this period,
our data are free of survivorship-bias as documented by Brown et al. (1992) and Brown
and Goetzmann (1995). We extract data on returns, total net assets, family membership,
and marketing and distribution expenses for all diversified US equity funds over the period
January 1992 to December 2003. The return data come in monthly frequency. Data on the
funds’ total net assets, family membership, and marketing and distribution expenses come
in yearly frequency. We follow a procedure similar to Pastor and Stambaugh (2002b,a)
and Huij and Verbeek (2007) and use the additional information CRSP provides on fund
classifications, expenses, and load data to construct a sample of diversified US equity funds.
We exclude funds with no classification, expense, or load data in the annual summary at
the end of each previous year. Additionally, we examine fund classifications at the end of
each previous year, and exclude flexible funds, bond funds, mortgage-backed funds, multi-
manager funds, money market funds, balanced funds, funds that invest in precious metals,
and international funds. From the remaining funds, we select funds that are classified as
small/cap growth, growth, growth & income, or income fund. Finally, we drop funds with
less than two calendar years of consecutive returns over the entire sample period.
5.2.2 Measurement of performance, investor flows, and
marketing and distribution expenses
For the main tests in our analyses, we investigate the impact of mutual fund marketing
on the relation between investor flows and past performance. The definitions of most
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variables (i.e., investor flows and performance), and the regression methodology we use to
investigate the flow-performance relation are standard in this stream of literature. The
main innovation of our study is that we investigate the interaction of fund marketing with
cash flows to other funds in the family. In particular, we investigate whether high-marketing
funds generate spillovers, and enhance cash inflows to low-marketing funds in the family.
Below we describe how we measure fund performance, investor flows, and marketing and
distribution expenses.
Consistent with most of the literature, we take each fund’s cumulative total return over
year t as a measure for fund performance:
CTRi,t = [(1 + ri,t,1) · (1 + ri,t,2) · . . . · (1 + ri,t,12)]− 1, (5.1)
where ri,t,j is fund i’s total return (change in net asset value plus distribution) over month
j in year t .
To compute the dollar flow of fund i in year t, we follow the approach advocated by
among others Sirri and Tufano (1998) , Zheng (1999), and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002):
DFi,t = [TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1 · (1 + CTRi,t)], (5.2)
where TNAi,t denotes the total net assets under management of fund i at the end of year
t. We then normalize the dollar flows by the funds’ total net assets under management to
obtain a measure for the funds’ percentage flows, i.e., Fi,t = DFi,t/TNAi,t−1. We remove
observations of fund flows below -90 percent and above 1,000 percent. As pointed out by
Bollen (2006), these observations are likely to be the results of misplacement of the decimal
point. The resulting sample holds 2,200 funds in the average year, ranging from 714 funds
in 1993 to 4,199 funds in 2002. In total, the sample covers 22,004 fund-years.
Marketing and distribution expenses are measured by the funds’ front-end load fees
and 12b1 fees. Front-end load fees are upfront sales commissions paid by investors when
entering a fund, and are used to cover marketing related costs such as compensation for
broker-dealer sales professionals, advertising, and other sales-promotion activities. While
12b1 fees are used for virtually the same purposes, these fees are paid periodically by the
funds out of their assets, rather than directly by the investors. Barber et al. (2005) argue
that 12b1 fees could therefore be expected to be less salient than front-end load fees, and
more effective to attract new investors. Further, given the results of Nanda et al. (2006)
that 12b1 funds cater a more myopic investor clientele, investors in these type of funds are
likely to respond more strongly to marketing and distribution activities. Another difference
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between front-end load fees and 12b1 fees is that 12b1 fees are explicitly earmarked for
marketing and distribution activities. For example, amounts spent under 12b1 plans and
the reasons for these expenses must be be approved by the funds’ directors. Shareholders
must also approve increases in a fund’s 12b1 fee. As a measure of fund i’s total marketing
expenses in year t (TXi,t) we take the fund’s reported 12b1 fee (12B1i,t) plus one-seventh
of the fund’s front-end load fee (LOADi,t). Consistent with most of the literature, we
hereby assume that the average holding period of a load-fund is seven years, see. e.g., Sirri
and Tufano (1998), Barber et al. (2005), and Khorana and Servaes (2005).
Next, we compute performance, investor flows, and marketing and distribution expenses
at the aggregate family level. We measure the performance of family f in year t as the
value-weighted average cumulative total return of all funds in the family:
CTRf,t =
∑
iCTRi,t · TNAi,t∑
i TNAi,t
, (5.3)
where the summation is over all funds in family f . Percentage flows to family f in year t
are computed as the dollar flows of all funds in the family as a percentage of the family’s
lagged total net asset under management:
Ff,t =
∑
iDFi,t∑
i TNAi,t−1
. (5.4)
Finally, we compute the average front-end load fee charged by family f for each dollar
under management over year t as
LOADf,t =
∑
i LOADi,t · TNAi,t∑
i TNAi,t
. (5.5)
Similarly, we compute the average 12b1-fee charged by family f for each dollar under
management over year t (12B1f,t). As a measure of the total marketing expenses of family
f over year t (TXf,t), we take 12B1f,t plus one-seventh of LOADf,t.
The relation between investor flows and performance, and the impact of mutual fund
marketing on this relation, is modeled using the regression framework described in next
section.
5.2.3 Growth of fund families and marketing and distribution
expenses
The two most notable developments in the mutual fund industry over the past decade are
the growth of fund families, and the enormous increase in the the dollar amount spend
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on marketing and distribution activities. In Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 we portray both
developments. Figure 5.1 presents the number of diversified US equity funds in our sample
over the period 1993 to 2003. From the 714 funds that were available in 1993, 141 funds
were offered as stand-alone fund. While the number of stand-alone funds remains more or
less constant over time, the total number of funds increases to 4,199 in 2002. Thus, while
about 20 percent of the funds in 1993 were offered as stand-alone fund, this figure rapidly
declined to less than 4 percent by the end of 2002. In Figure 5.2 we present a graph with
the number of equity fund families (i.e., families that consist of at least two diversified US
equity funds) and the average number of funds per family in our sample over the period
1993 to 2003. Where the number of equity fund families increased from 139 in 1993 to
283 in 2002, the average number of fund per family increased from 5.14 in 1993 to 14.84
in 2002.
Figure 5.3 presents an estimate of the dollar amount spent on mutual fund marketing
and distribution over the period 1993 to 2003. In addition, the graph presents marketing
and distribution expenses as a percentage of total net assets under management. Several
interesting patterns show up. First, we observe an enormous increase in the dollar amount
spent on marketing and distribution; while slightly more than $1.6 billion was spent on
marketing and distribution activities in 1993, this amount increased to more than $9.2
billion in 2002. Second, it appears that the portion of marketing and distribution activities
that is financed by 12b1 fees has grown substantially over time. In 1993, less than 25
percent of the marketing and distribution activities were financed by 12b1 fees. However,
in 2002 this number was almost 50 percent. Finally, the dollar amount spent on marketing
and distribution activities has five folded, whereas marketing and distribution expenses as
percentage of total net assets have decreased over time. While 0.51 percent on total-net-
assets under management was spent on marketing in 1993, this number decreased to 0.42
percent in 2002.
5.3 The impact of fund marketing on the flow-
performance relation
In our first analysis, we investigate whether high-marketing funds experience differential in-
and outflows in response to their performance versus low-marketing funds. We concentrate
on family-operated funds (i.e., funds that have at least one family member), and drop
all stand-alone funds. The resulting sample comprises 2,054 funds in the average year,
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ranging from 573 funds in 1993 to 4,043 funds in 2002. In total, the sample covers 20,542
fund-years.
While there is no consensus in the literature on how to specify the fund flow-performance
relation, most researchers employ a non-linear model specification.2 Sirri and Tufano (1998)
perform piecewise linear regressions of investor flows on the funds’ fractional ranks based
on one-year raw returns; Barber et al. (2005) include squared returns in their regression
of investor flows on funds’ returns; and Bollen (2006) employs an interaction variable to
capture potential asymmetries in the relation between investor flows and fund returns. We
run regressions in spirit similar to Bollen (2006) and estimate the following model using
ordinary-least-squares (OLS):
Fi,t+1 = (b0 + b1 ·HIGHTXi,t + b2 · Ii,t + b3 ·HIGHTXi,t · Ii,t) · CTRi,t+
a0,t + a1,t ·HIGHTXi,t + ²i,t,
(5.6)
where HIGHTXi,t is a dummy variable that indicates whether fund i is a high-marketing
fund over year t. The dummy equals one if the fund’s marketing and distribution expenses
are greater than the median, and zero otherwise. Further, Ii,t is an indicator variable
that equals one if fund i’s return over year t is negative, and zero otherwise. The regres-
sion model includes year dummies to capture year-specific effects. As explained by Bollen
(2006), the coefficients in this regression model can be interpreted as follows:
b0: Percentage flow to low-marketing funds for every one percent increase
in prior year return when returns are positive
b0 + b1: Percentage flow to high-marketing funds for every one percent increase
in prior year return when returns are positive
b0 + b2: Percentage flow to low-marketing funds for every one percent increase
in prior year return when returns are negative
b0+b1+b2+b3: Percentage flow to high-marketing funds for every one percent increase
in prior year return when returns are negative
To ensure that the results are not driven by small or young funds it is recommended
to control for fund size and age in model Eq. (5.6). Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Barber
et al. (2005) include the natural logarithms of the funds’ lagged total net assets and age
2While most authors report a convex relation between fund flows and past performance (see e.g., Sirri
and Tufano (1998) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999)), some recent evidence indicates that the relation has
become more linear during the nineties compared to the previous two decades (Sigurdsson, 2004).
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as control variables; Barber et al. (2005) and Bollen (2006) perform their analyses on sub-
groups of funds based on their size and age. Following these studies, we employ a model
specification that extends our base model Eq. (5.6) with the natural logarithms of the
funds’ total net assets under management (ln(TNAi,t)) and age (ln(AGEi,t)):
Fi,t+1 = (b0 + b1 ·HIGHTXi,t + b2 · Ii,t + b3 ·HIGHTXi,t · Ii,t) · CTRi,t+
b4 · ln(TNAt) + b5 · ln(AGEt) + a0,t + a1,t ·HIGHTXi,t + ²i,t,
(5.7)
In addition, we run regressions Eq. (5.6) and Eq. (5.7) on the following subgroups of the
funds: (i) funds with at least $15 million of total-net-assets under management, (ii) funds
with at least $100 million of total net assets under management, (iii) funds that are at
least 3 years old, and (iv) funds that are at least 5 years old. The results are presented in
Table 5.1.
We first consider the results for the entire sample of funds. The coefficient estimate
for CTRi,t is positive and highly significant, which indicates a strong relation between
positive returns and future cash flows for low-marketing funds. The results in column
B indicate that inflows to low-marketing funds increase with 1.05 percent for every one
percent increase in prior year return when the return is positive.
Further, the coefficient estimate for HIGHTXi,t ·CTRi,t indicates that the differential
inflows to high-marketing funds as a response to positive returns are significantly different
from zero. The estimate in column B of 0.94 indicates that for every one percent increase
in prior year return, inflows to high-marketing funds increase with 1.99 percent (1.05
percent plus 0.94 percent) when returns are positive. Thus, it appears that cash inflows
following positive returns are almost twice as large for high-marketing funds compared to
low-marketing funds.
In addition, we investigate investors’ response to negative returns. The coefficient
estimates for CTRi,t · Ii,t and HIGHTXi,t · Ii,t · CTRi,t point to an asymmetric flow-
performance relation for both low- and high-marketing funds. The estimates in column
B indicate that outflows following negative returns increase by 0.96 percent (1.05 percent
minus 0.09 percent) for every one percent decrease in prior year return for low-marketing
funds, and by 1.18 percent (1.05 percent plus 0.94 percent minus 0.09 percent minus 0.72
percent) for high-marketing funds. Finally, the negative coefficient estimates for ln(TNAi,t)
and ln(AGEi,t) indicate that small and young funds experience larger inflows than large
and mature funds.
In Figure 5.4, we give a graphical representation of the estimated flow-performance
relation for high- and low-marketing funds. The solid line draws the estimated relation
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between fund flow and lagged returns for high-marketing funds, and the dashed line draws
this relation for low-marketing funds. The flows to high-marketing funds after positive
returns are almost twice as large. While high-marketing funds also seem to experience
somewhat larger outflows after negative returns, the outflows are substantially smaller
than the inflows due to marketing.
When we consider the results for the subgroups of funds based on their total net assets
or age in Table 5.1, we consistently observe that high-marketing funds have a much stronger
flow-performance relation than low-marketing funds after positive returns. On the other
hand, high-marketing funds also have somewhat larger outflows after negative returns.
However, the outflows are substantially smaller than the inflows due to marketing.
In the analyses above, the models Eq. (5.6) and Eq. (5.7) are estimated using a
pooled regression framework as in Bollen (2006). We also experiment with a cross-sectional
regression framework, where we estimate regression Eq. (5.7) year-by-year for all funds,
and average the regression coefficients using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach.3
The results are in Table 5.2, and are qualitatively very similar to those using the pooled
regression framework. Given the relatively small number of years in our sample, and given
that the number of available funds at the end of the sample period is several times larger
than at the beginning, we believe that the pooled framework is preferred to the cross-
sectional framework in this specific situation. Throughout the remainder of this study, we
therefore employ pooled regressions.
In summary, our results indicate a direct positive relation between lagged fund perfor-
mance and investor flows. This flow-performance relation is asymmetric in the sense that
inflows after positive performance are larger than outflows after negative performance.
More importantly, high-marketing funds attract substantially larger inflows as a response
to their performance than do low-marketing funds. Our results provide strong evidence
that mutual fund marketing is very effective in making positive returns more visible to
investors. An additional interesting finding is that it appears that almost all asymmetry in
the flow-performance relation reported in the literature is found for funds that have above
median marketing and distribution expenses. When the relation between fund performance
and investor flows is investigated for low-marketing funds, the relation is almost linear.
3With the cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions, we replace the year dummies with a
constant.
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5.4 Spillover effects of marketing in mutual fund
families
Because all funds in our sample are family-operated, marketing expenses at the family level
may also have an impact on the flow-performance relation of a given fund. To investigate
this issue, we examine whether there is an interaction between the flow-performance rela-
tion of funds with low marketing expenses and membership of a family with high marketing
expenses. To this end, we estimate the following regression for low-marketing funds in our
sample (i.e., funds with total marketing expenses below the median):
Fi,t+1 = (b0 + b1 ·HIGHTX Fi,t + b2 · Ii,t + b3 ·HIGHTX Fi,t · Ii,t) · CTRi,t+
a0,t + a1,t ·HIGHTX Fi,t + ²i,t,
(5.8)
where HIGHTX Fi,t is a dummy variable indicating whether fund i is member of a high-
marketing family over year t. The dummy equals one if the fund is member of a family with
marketing and distribution expenses that are greater than the median, and zero otherwise.
In addition, we employ a model specification that extends regression model Eq. (5.8) with
the natural logarithms of the funds’ total net assets under management and age. We also
perform subgroup analyses as in the previous section, and estimate the regressions for the
following subsamples of funds: (i) low-marketing funds with at least $15 million of total
net assets under management, (ii) low-marketing funds with at least $100 million of total
net assets under management, (iii) low-marketing funds that are at least 3 years old, and
(iv) low-marketing funds that are at least 5 years old. The regression results are in Table
5.3.
The coefficient estimates for HIGHTX Fi,t · CTRi,t and HIGHTX Fi,t · Ii,t · CTRi,t
capture the differential flows to low-marketing funds that are member of a high-marketing
family versus low-marketing funds that are member of a low-marketing family. The results
for the entire sample of low-marketing funds in columns A and B indicate significant posi-
tive differential inflows after positive returns, and significant negative differential outflows
after negative returns. Low-marketing funds that are member of a high-marketing family
have substantially larger inflows after positive returns than otherwise similar funds that
are operated by a low-marketing family. The results in column B indicate that inflows
to low-marketing funds that are operated by a high-marketing family increase with 1.17
percent (0.97 percent plus 0.20 percent) for every one percent increase in prior year re-
turn when the return is positive, while inflows to low-marketing funds that are operated
by a low-marketing family increase with only 0.97 percent. The difference is statistically
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significant.
Further, low-marketing funds that are operated by a high-marketing family appear to
experience lower outflows after negative performance: while low-marketing funds that are
not member of a high-marketing family lose 0.87 percent (0.96 percent minus 0.09 percent)
of their assets under management for every one percent decrease in prior year return, funds
that are member of a high-marketing family lose only 0.73 percent (0.96 percent plus 0.18
percent minus 0.09 percent minus 0.32 percent) of their assets under management.
However, for the subgroups that exclude small and young funds, we do not observe
such spillovers. In fact, we observe some sort of cannibalization effects: large and mature
funds with low marketing expenses that are member of a high-marketing family appear
to have lower inflows after positive returns than otherwise similar funds that are member
of a low-marketing family. We do not observe differential outflows after negative returns
for these groups of funds. Apparently, membership of a high-marketing family is only
beneficial to low-marketing funds that are relatively small and young. This effect could be
due to these types of funds having larger search costs (see e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998)).
Nonetheless, our results indicate that high-marketing families provide favorable conditions
to incubate new funds. Given the findings of Khorana and Servaes (2005) that families
that start more funds have higher market share, one might expect high-marketing families
to have a considerable competitive advantage over low-marketing families.
5.5 Interpreting the spillovers: hypothesis
development
One of the most notable observations in the previous section is that high-marketing funds
appear to generate spillovers and enhance cash inflows to smaller and younger funds in the
family that have low marketing expenses themselves. In the remainder of the paper we
take a closer look at this phenomenon.
One interpretation is that the observed spillovers are a by-product of individual fund
marketing and distribution whereby the entire family is made more visible to investors,
and search costs for small and young funds are lowered. However, a critical assumption
underlying this interpretation is that funds’ allocated marketing and distribution expenses
are directly proportional to the funds’ exposure in the media and broker-dealer channels.
An alternative explanation for the observed spillovers is that funds with low marketing
expenses are directly subsidized by family members with high marketing expenses. A
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family could pay for advertising and distribution activities of a particular fund through
expenses allocated to other funds. There is some anecdotical evidence that lends support
to this interpretation. For example, a large number of the funds that are advertised do not
charge front-end load fees or 12b1 fees themselves. Further, Gallaher et al. (2006) refer
to conversations they had with mutual fund family executives, in which the executives
indicated that the intent of mutual fund marketing is often not a particular fund, but the
fund family itself. Investors who call in on an advertisement of a certain fund may be
counseled to invest in other funds of the family. Besides this anecdotical evidence, several
academic studies also indicate that families play favorites with their funds. For example,
Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) and Gaspar et al. (2006) report that families strategically
transfer performance across member funds to favor those more likely to increase overall
family profits. Cici et al. (2006) even find that institutional managers who engage in side-
by-side management of mutual funds and hedge funds, improve the performance of hedge
funds at the expense of mutual fund investors. These findings give rise to the notion that
the observed spillovers might be related to cross-fund subsidizations.
We develop and perform a set of tests to evaluate the two alternative hypotheses, i.e.,
spillovers as a by-product of individual fund marketing and distribution versus spillovers
resulting from favoritism. A direct approach to test the subsidization hypothesis would
be to investigate whether there are any discrepancies between funds’ allocated marketing
and distribution expenses and their actual expenditures on marketing and distribution
activities. However, while data on funds’ allocated marketing and distribution expenses
are readily available because of legal requirements, data on funds’ actual marketing and
distribution expenditures are only very limitedly available.4 Because of these data limita-
tions, we employ an indirect approach to investigate whether the observed spillovers are
related to intrafamily subsidizations. With this approach, we sort funds into two mutually
exclusive groups, where the funds in the first group are member of a family that has strong
incentives to engage in subsidization, and the funds in the second group are not. We then
test whether there are differences in the observed spillovers between both groups.
The more families finance their marketing and distribution activities by front-end load
fees, the stronger their incentives are to pay for advertising and distribution activities of
a particular fund through expenses allocated to other funds. Families that finance their
4While Competitive Media Research (CMR) distributes data on mutual funds’ actual advertising ex-
penditures, we are not aware of any information service that provides an extensive database on the entire
spectrum of mutual fund marketing and distribution activities, including sales-promotion activities and
compensation for broker-dealer sales professionals.
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marketing and distribution activities by 12b1 fees are restricted to engage in significant
subsidization because 12b1 fees are explicitly earmarked to cover marketing related costs
of the funds that charge the fees. Amounts spent under 12b1 plans and the reasons for
these expenses must be approved by a vote of the funds’ directors. Shareholders must also
approve increases in a fund’s 12b1 fee. Because the regulations for charging, spending,
and reporting front-end load fees are less strict, fund management companies have fewer
restrictions in appropriating them. For example, while funds that are closed to new in-
vestors are not allowed to charge 12b1 fees, funds that neither advertise, nor use brokers
are allowed to consistently charge load fees.5
On the other hand, if the spillovers are a by-product of individual fund marketing and
distribution, we expect them to be more prevalent in families that finance their market-
ing and distribution activities by 12b1 fees: several authors document that marketing is
more effective when financed by 12b1 fees because these fees are less salient to investors
than front-end load fees (see e.g., Barber et al. (2005)). Further, as mentioned earlier,
12b1 families cater a more myopic investor clientele (i.e., investors with shorter investment
horizons that are more sensitive to past performance, see Nanda et al. (2006)) which is
expected to respond more strongly to marketing and distribution activities. Consequently,
if the subsidization hypothesis is true, the spillovers are more prevalent in families with
high front-end load fees than in families with high 12b1 fees. Otherwise, if the spillovers
are a by-product of individual fund marketing and distribution, the spillovers are more
prevalent in families with high 12b1 fees than in families with high front-end load fees.
Hence, we formulate the first testable implication of the subsidization hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Spillovers are more prevalent in families with high front-end load fees
than in families with high 12b1 fees.
Further, since families have fewer restrictions to divert a fund’s front-end load fees to
subsidize other funds’ marketing and distribution activities than 12b1 fees, we expect any
subsidies to be largely financed by front-end load fees. Therefore, if the subsidization
hypothesis is true, front-end load fees are not fully spent on marketing and distribution
activities of the load funds themselves. Thus, our second hypothesis is:
5Closed funds are allowed to spread marketing and distribution expenses over several years, and may
charge 12b-1 fees to fulfill obligations for past distribution efforts.
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Hypothesis 2: Funds with high front-end load fees have a weaker flow-performance rela-
tion than funds with high 12b1 fees.
Finally, if the subsidization hypothesis is true, there should be a motive for families to
subsidize the marketing and distribution of a particular fund through expenses allocated
to other funds. Given the observation that a family’s overall profits are a direct function
of their assets under management, and investors’ tendency to disproportionably put their
money into particular funds (i.e., young funds, funds with stellar performance, or funds
that follow the current “hot” style (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Cooper et al., 2005)),
families that strategically increase the marketing exposure of some funds at the expense of
others are expected to have a stronger flow-performance relation than families that do not
pursue such a subsidization strategy. Therefore, our third hypothesis reads:
Hypothesis 3: Families with high front-end load fees have a stronger flow-performance
relation than families with high 12b1 fees.
We test these hypotheses using the empirical framework described in the following sec-
tion.
5.6 Interpreting the spillovers: empirical framework
and results
5.6.1 Differential flows to low-marketing funds that are member
of a high-load and a high-12b1 family
Our first hypothesis states that if the observed spillovers are because of intrafamily subsi-
dizations, they are more prevalent in families with high front-end load fees than in families
with high 12b1 fees. To test this hypothesis, we split our sample of low-marketing funds
that are member of a high-marketing family into two mutually exclusive groups: low-
marketing funds that are member of a high-load family, and low-marketing funds that are
member of a high-12b1 family. High-load families are defined as high-marketing families
with front-end load fees greater than the median, and high-12b1 families are defined as
high-marketing families with front-end load fees less than or equal to the median. We then
test whether there are differences in spillovers between both groups.
First, we investigate spillovers in high-load families, and estimate the following re-
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gression model for low-marketing funds that are member of either a high-load or a low-
marketing family:
Fi,t+1 = (b0 + b1 ·HIGHLOAD Fi,t + b2 · Ii,t + b3 ·HIGHLOAD Fi,t · Ii,t) · CTRi,t+
a0,t + a1,t ·HIGHLOAD Fi,t + ²i,t,
(5.9)
where HIGHLOAD Fi,t is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i is member of a high-
load family over year t, and zero otherwise. The coefficient estimates forHIGHLOAD Fi,t·
CTRi,t and HIGHLOAD Fi,t · Ii,t ·CTRi,t capture the differential flows to low-marketing
funds that are member of a high-load family compared to low-marketing funds that are
member of a low-marketing family. We also employ a model specification that extends
regression models Eq. (5.9) with the natural logarithms of the funds’ lagged total net
assets under management and age. The results are in columns A and B of Table 5.4.
The significant positive coefficient estimates for HIGHLOAD Fi,t · CTRi,t indicate the
presence of substantial spillovers in high-load families. The results in column B indicate
that inflows to low-marketing funds that are member of a high-load family increase with
1.43 percent (0.97 percent plus 0.46 percent) for every one percent increase in prior year
return when the return is positive, whereas inflows to low-marketing funds that are member
of a low-marketing family increase with only 0.97 percent. Further, the significant negative
coefficient estimates for HIGHLOAD Fi,t ·Ii,t ·CTRi,t indicate that low-marketing funds in
high-load families experience lower outflows after negative performance than low-marketing
funds that are member of a low-marketing family.
Next, we investigate spillovers in high-12b1 families, and estimate the following re-
gression model for low-marketing funds that are member of either a high-12b1 or a low-
marketing family:
Fi,t+1 = (b0 + b1 ·HIGH12B1 Fi,t + b2 · Ii,t + b3 ·HIGH12B1 Fi,t · Ii,t) · CTRi,t+
a0,t + a1,t ·HIGH12B1 Fi,t + ²i,t,
(5.10)
where HIGH12B1 Fi,t is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i is member of a high-
12b1 family over year t, and zero otherwise. We additionally employ a model specification
that augments model Eq. (5.10) with the natural logarithms of the funds’ lagged total
net assets under management and age. The results of these regressions are in columns C
and D. Surprisingly, we observe no spillovers whatsoever in high-12b1 families. In fact, the
significant negative coefficient estimates for HIGH12B1 Fi,t · CTRi,t and the significant
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positive coefficients estimates for HIGH12B1 Fi,t · Ii,t ·CTRi,t indicate cannibalization of
low-marketing funds in high-12b1 families.
Finally, to test whether the observed differences in spillovers between high-load and
high-12b1 families are statistically significant, we estimate regression Eq. (5.9) for low-
marketing funds that are member of either a high-load or a high-12b1 family. The results
are presented in column E. The significant positive coefficient estimate forHIGHLOAD Fi,t·
CTRi,t and the negative estimate for HIGHLOAD Fi,t · Ii,t · CTRi,t indicate that the
spillovers are more prevalent in high-load families, and lend support for the subsidization
hypothesis. We also run a model specification that extends regression Eq. (5.9) with the
natural logarithms of the funds’ lagged total net assets under management and age. The
results of this regression in column F confirm our previous findings.
We also perform subgroup analyses, and estimate the regressions for (i) low-marketing
funds with at least $15 million of total net assets under management; (ii) low-marketing
funds with at least $100 million of total net assets under management; (iii) low-marketing
funds that are at least 3 years old; and (iv) low-marketing funds that are at least 5 years
old. The regression results are in Table 5.5 and 5.6. The spillovers in high-load families
are observed for all subgroups except for low-marketing funds that are at least 5 years old.
Further, the cannibalization of low-marketing funds that are member of a high-12b1 family
can be observed across all subgroups of funds.
Overall, the results in this subsection are consistently in favor of Hypothesis 1, and lend
support to the notion that the observed spillovers are related to intrafamily subsidizations
and favoritism.
5.6.2 Differential flows to high-load and high-12b1 funds
We now turn to the examination of our second hypothesis. Under the subsidization hypoth-
esis, we expect that funds with high front-end load fees have a weaker flow-performance
relation than funds with high 12b1 fees. To test this hypothesis, we split our sample of high-
marketing funds into two mutually exclusive groups: high-load funds (i.e., high-marketing
funds that have front-end load fees greater than the median), and high-12b1 funds (i.e.,
high-marketing funds that have front-end load fees less than or equal to the median). We
then investigate whether there are differences in the flow-performance relation between
both groups.
To this end, we estimate the following regression for high-load funds and low-marketing
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funds:
Fi,t+1 = (b0 + b1 ·HIGHLOADi,t + b2 · Ii,t + b3 ·HIGHLOADi,t · Ii,t) · CTRi,t+
a0,t + a1,t ·HIGHLOADi,t + ²i,t,
(5.11)
and the following regression for high-12b1 funds and low-marketing funds:
Fi,t+1 = (b0 + b1 ·HIGH12B1i,t + b2 · Ii,t + b3 ·HIGH12B1i,t · Ii,t) · CTRi,t+
a0,t + a1,t ·HIGH12B1i,t + ²i,t,
(5.12)
where HIGHLOADi,t is a dummy variable that indicates if fund i is a high-load fund over
year t, and HIGH12B1i,t is a dummy variable that indicates if fund i is a high-12b1 fund
over year t. We also run regressions that augment regression models Eq. (5.11) and Eq.
(5.12) with the natural logarithms of the funds’ lagged total net assets under management
and age. The results of these regressions are in columns A to D in Table 5.7.
The significantly positive coefficient estimates for HIGHLOADi,t ·CTRi,t and HIGH-
12B1i,t ·CTRi,t indicate that both high-load and high-12b1 funds have differential inflows
after positive returns versus low-marketing funds. However, the differential inflows to high-
12b1 funds are larger. For example, when we consider the results in column B and D, we
observe that inflows to high-load funds increase with 1.76 percent (1.05 percent plus 0.71
percent) for every one percent increase in return when returns are positive, while the inflows
to high-12b1 funds increase with 2.21 percent (1.05 percent plus 1.17 percent). Further, the
significant negative coefficient estimates forHIGHLOADi,t·Ii,t·CTRi,t andHIGH12B1i,t·
Ii,t ·CTRi,t indicate that both high-load and high-12b1 funds have differential outflows after
negative returns.
To test whether the observed differences in the flow-performance relation between high-
load and high-12b1 funds are statistically significant, we estimate regression Eq. (5.11)
for high-load and high-12b1 funds. In these regressions, the coefficient estimates for
HIGHLOADi,t ·CTRi,t and HIGHLOADi,t · Ii,t ·CTRi,t capture the differential flows to
high-load funds versus high-12b1 funds. The results are in columns E and F, and clearly in-
dicate that the flow-performance relation for high-12b1 funds is stronger than for high-load
funds. This finding lends further support to the subsidization hypothesis.
5.6.3 Differential flows to high-marketing families
Finally, we move on to our third hypothesis which states that families with high front-end
load fees have a stronger flow-performance relation than families with high 12b1 fees. We
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use a similar approach as in the previous subsections to test this hypothesis, and split our
sample of high-marketing families into two mutually exclusive groups of high-load families
and high-12b1 families, and test whether there are any differences in the flow-performance
relation between both groups.
However, before we perform this test, we first investigate whether high-marketing fam-
ilies have a differential flow-performance relation versus low-marketing families. To this
end, we estimate the following regression model:
Ff,t+1 = (b0 + b1 · TOP50TXf,t + b2 · If,t + b3 · TOP50TXf,t · If,t) · CTRf,t+
a0,t + a1,t · TOP50TXf,t + ²f,t,
(5.13)
where TOP50TXf,t is a dummy variable that equals one if the family’s marketing and
distribution expenses are greater than the median over year t, and zero otherwise. Further,
If,t is an indicator variable that equals one if family f ’s return over year t is negative, and
zero otherwise. Additionally, we employ a regression specification that extends Eq. (5.13)
with family f ’s total net assets under management (ln(TNAf,t)) and average fund age
(ln(AGEf,t). The results of these regressions in columns A and B of Table 5.8 indicate
that high-marketing families do not appear to have a stronger flow-performance relation
than low-marketing families. In fact, the negative coefficient estimates for TOP50TXf,t ·
CTRf,t indicate that low-marketing families have larger inflows following positive returns,
and the positive coefficient estimates for TOP50TXf,t · If,t · CTRf,t indicate that low-
marketing families have lower outflows after negative returns. Given the results of Gallaher
et al. (2006) that marketing only works for top-advertising families, we re-estimate the
regressions where we replace TOP50TXf,t with a dummy variable that equals one if the
family’s marketing and distribution expenses are greater than the 3rd quartile over year t,
and zero otherwise (TOP25TXf,t). The results of these regressions are in columns C and
D. Now we find clear evidence that families with the highest marketing and distribution
expenses have a stronger flow performance relation. For example, when we consider the
results in column D, it appears that inflows to low-marketing families (bottom 75 percent)
increase with 0.68 percent for every one percent increase in prior year return when the
return is positive, while inflows to high-marketing families (top 25 percent) increase with
1.56 percent (0.68 percent plus 0.88 percent).
This bring us to Hypothesis 3. First, we split our sample of high-marketing families
(top 25 percent) into two mutually exclusive groups: high-load families (i.e., high-marketing
families that have front-end load fees greater than the 3rd quartile), and high-12b1 fam-
ilies (i.e., high-marketing families that have front-end load fees less than or equal to the
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3rd quartile.). We then estimate the following regression for high-load families and low-
marketing families:
Ff,t+1 = (b0 + b1 · TOP25LOADf,t + b2 · If,t + b3 · TOP25LOADf,t · Ii,t) · CTRf,t+
a0,t + a1,t · TOP25LOADf,t + ²f,t,
(5.14)
and the following regression for high-12b1 families and low-marketing families:
Ff,t+1 = (b0 + b1 · TOP2512B1f,t + b2 · If,t + b3 · TOP2512b1f,t · Ii,t) · CTRf,t+
a0,t + a1,t · TOP2512B1f,t + ²f,t,
(5.15)
where TOP25LOADf,t is a dummy variable that equals one if family f is a high-load family
over year t, and zero otherwise, and TOP2512B1f,t is a dummy variable that equals one
if family f is a high-12b1 family over year t, and zero otherwise. In addition, we employ
augmented specifications that include the families’ total net assets under management and
average fund age. The results are in columns E to H. It appears that only the high-load
families have a stronger flow performance relation. To test the statistical significance of
the difference in the flow-performance relation between high-load and high-12b1 families,
we estimate regression Eq. (5.14) and the augmented specification for high-load families
and high-12b1 families. The results in column I and J indicate that high-load families
have larger inflows following positive returns than high-12b1 families, and provide further
evidence supporting the subsidization hypothesis.
5.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the impact of mutual fund marketing and distribution activ-
ities on other funds in the family. We find that high-marketing funds generate spillovers,
and enhance cash inflows to low-marketing funds in the same family. Small and young
low-marketing funds that are operated by a family with high marketing expenses have
substantially larger inflows after positive returns than otherwise similar funds that are
operated by a family with low marketing expenses.
One interpretation of these results is that the observed spillovers are a by-product of
individual fund marketing whereby the entire family is made more visible to investors,
and search costs for small and young funds are lowered. A critical assumption underlying
this interpretation is that funds’ allocated marketing and distribution expenses are directly
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proportional to the funds’ exposure in the media and broker-dealer channels. An alternative
explanation of this observation is that funds with low marketing expenses are directly
subsidized by family members with high marketing expenses. A family could pay for
advertising and distribution activities of a certain fund through expenses allocated to other
funds. We develop and perform a set of tests to evaluate the alternative hypotheses. The
body of evidence in this paper supports the subsidization hypothesis, and suggests that at
least a part of the spillovers can be attributed to favoritism towards particular funds.
While it is conceivable that fund families engage in cross-subsidization, these results are
remarkable. As argued by Khorana and Servaes (2005), given the low entry barriers of the
mutual fund industry and the large number of participants, one might expect that conflicts
of interest between investors and investment companies are mitigated by competition.
However, our finding that families that play favorites with their funds and pay for the
marketing of a particular fund through expenses allocated to other funds suggests that
conflicts of interest between investors and fund families have actually been exacerbated by
competition in the mutual fund industry.
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Table 5.4: Differential flows to low-marketing funds that are member of a high-load and a
high-12b1 family.
Low-marketing funds Low-marketing funds Low-marketing funds
that are member of that are member of that are member of
a high-load vs a high-12b1 vs a high-load vs
a low-marketing a low-marketing a high-12b1
family family family
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
CTR 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.83 0.86
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HIGHLOAD F ∗ CTR 0.44 0.46 – – 0.56 0.58
(0.00) (0.00) – – (0.00) (0.00)
HIGH12B1 F ∗ CTR – – -0.13 -0.13 – –
– – (0.00) (0.00) – –
I ∗ CTR -0.09 0.02 -0.09 0.02 0.51 0.60
(0.03) (0.66) (0.05) (0.67) (0.11) (0.04)
HIGHLOAD F ∗ I ∗ CTR -0.75 -0.76 – – -1.35 -1.39
(0.00) (0.00) – – (0.00) (0.00)
12B1 F ∗ I ∗ CTR – – 0.59 0.65 - -
– – (0.11) (0.06) – –
ln(TNA) – -7.20 – -6.55 – -8.89
– (0.00) – (0.00) – (0.00)
ln(AGE) – -12.62 – -14.51 – -7.81
– (0.00) – (0.00) – (0.03)
N 10,029 10,029 6,925 6,925 4,570 4,570
Adj.Rsq 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.12
The sample covers diversified US equity funds over the period January 1992 to December 2003. The table
reports the OLS coefficient estimates of separate regressions using fund i’s percentage flow over year t+1
(Fi,t+1) as dependent variable. The independent variables include fund i’s return over year t (CTRi,t); an
interaction term that is the product of a dummy variable that equals one if fund i is member of a high-
load family times fund i’s return over year t (HIGHLOAD Fi,t ∗CTRi,t); an interaction term that is the
product of a dummy variable that equals one if fund i is member of a high-12b1 family times fund i’s return
over year t (HIGH12B1 Fi,t∗CTRi,t); an interaction term that is the product of a dummy that equals one
if fund i’s return is negative times fund i’s return over year t (Ii,t ∗CTRi,t); an interaction term that is the
product of a dummy variable that equals one if fund i is member of a high-load family times a dummy that
equals one if fund i’s return is negative times fund i’s return over year t (HIGHLOAD Fi,t ∗Ii,t ∗CTRi,t);
an interaction term that is the product of a dummy variable that equals one if fund i is member of a
high-12b1 family times a dummy that equals one if fund i’s return is negative times fund i’s return over
year t (HIGH12b1 Fi,t ∗ Ii,t ∗ CTRi,t); and the natural logarithms of fund i’s TNA and age (ln(TNAi,t)
and ln(AGEi,t)). The regressions in columns A and B are performed on low-marketing funds that are
member of either a high-load or a low-marketing family. The regressions in columns C and D are performed
on low-marketing funds that are member of either a high-12b1 or a low-marketing family. The regressions
in columns E and F are performed on low-marketing funds that are member of a high-marketing family.
p-values are given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 5.7: Flows to high-load vs high-12b1 funds.
High-load vs High-12b1 vs High-load vs
low-marketing funds low-marketing funds high-12b1-funds
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
CTR 1.03 1.05 1.03 1.05 2.08 2.22
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HIGHLOAD ∗ CTR 0.69 0.71 – – -0.36 -0.45
(0.00) (0.00) – – (0.00) (0.00)
HIGH12B1 ∗ CTR – – 1.05 1.17 – –
– – (0.00) (0.00) – –
I ∗ CTR -0.20 -0.10 -0.20 -0.08 -0.51 -0.78
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HIGHLOAD ∗ I ∗ CTR -0.66 -0.79 – – -0.35 -0.11
(0.00) (0.00) – – (0.00) (0.28)
HIGH12B1 ∗ I ∗ CTR – – -0.31 -0.69 – –
– – (0.00) (0.00) – –
ln(TNA) – -7.33 – -7.89 – -8.44
– (0.00) – (0.00) – (0.00)
ln(AGE) – -11.64 – -14.69 – -13.60
– (0.00) – (0.00) – (0.00)
N 15,859 15,859 15,445 15,445 9,780 9,780
Adj.Rsq 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.20
The sample covers diversified US equity funds over the period January 1992 to December 2003. The
table reports the OLS coefficient estimates of separate regressions using fund i’s percentage flow over
year t + 1 (Fi,t+1) as dependent variable. The independent variables include fund i’s return over year
t (CTRi,t); an interaction term that is the product of a dummy variable that equals one if fund i is a
high-load fund times fund i’s return over year t (HIGHLOADi,t ∗CTRi,t); an interaction term that is the
product of a dummy variable that equals one if fund i is a high-12b1 fund times fund i’s return over year t
(HIGH12B1i,t ∗ CTRi,t); an interaction term that is the product of a dummy that equals one if fund i’s
return is negative times fund i’s return over year t (Ii,t ∗CTRi,t); an interaction term that is the product
of a dummy variable that equals one if fund i is a high-load fund times a dummy that equals one if fund
i’s return is negative times fund i’s return over year t (HIGHLOADi,t ∗ Ii,t ∗CTRi,t); an interaction term
that is the product of a dummy variable that equals one if fund i is a high-12b1 fund times a dummy that
equals one if fund i’s return is negative times fund i’s return over year t (HIGH12B1i,t ∗Ii,t ∗CTRi,t); and
the natural logarithms of fund i’s TNA and age (ln(TNAi,t) and ln(AGEi,t)). The regressions in column
A are performed on high-load and low-marketing funds. The regressions in column B are performed on
high-12b1 and low-marketing funds. The regressions in column C are performed on high-marketing funds.
p-values are given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
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Figure 5.1: Number of diversified US equity funds.
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The figure presents a graph with the number of diversified US equity funds in our sample over the period
1993 to 2003.
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Figure 5.2: Number of fund families and average number of funds per family.
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The figure presents a graph with the number of fund families and the number of average funds per family
in our sample over the period 1993 to 2003.
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Figure 5.3: Expenditures on mutual fund marketing.
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The figure presents an estimate of the dollar amount spent on mutual fund marketing over the period 1993
to 2003. In addition, the graph presents marketing and distribution expenses as a percentage of total net
assets under management.
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Figure 5.4: Flow-performance relation for high- and low-marketing funds.
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The figure gives a graphical representation of the estimated flow-performance relation for high- and low-
marketing funds. The solid line draws the estimated relation between fund flow and lagged returns for
high-marketing funds, and the dashed line draws this relation for low-marketing funds.
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Chapter 6
Summary and concluding comments
In this dissertation we bundle four empirical studies that provide new insights into the
mutual fund industry and mutual fund performance.
In the first paper, we investigate the performance of equity mutual funds. Using
monthly return data of more than 6,400 US equity mutual funds we investigate short-
run performance persistence over the period 1984–2003. We sort funds into rank portfolios
based on past performance, and evaluate the portfolios’ out-of-sample performance. To
cope with short ranking periods, we employ an empirical Bayes approach to measure past
performance more efficiently. Our main finding is that when funds are sorted into decile
portfolios based on 12-month ranking periods, the top decile of funds earns a statistically
significant, abnormal return of 0.26 percent per month. This effect persists beyond load
fees, and is mainly concentrated in relatively young, small cap/growth funds.
In the second paper, we investigate persistence in the performance of bond mutual
funds. Our sample covers 3,549 bond mutual funds from 1990 to 2003. We show that
bond funds that display strong (weak) performance over a past period continue to do
so in future periods. The out-of-sample difference in risk-adjusted return between the
top and bottom decile of funds ranked on their alphas over the past 36 months exceeds
3.5 percent per year. We demonstrate that a strategy based on past fund returns earns
an economically and statistically significant abnormal return, suggesting that bond fund
investors can exploit the observed persistence. Our results are robust to a wide range of
model specifications and bootstrapped test statistics.
In the third paper, we test the cross-sectional explanatory power of multi-factor models
to explain mutual fund returns and the consequences for evaluating mutual fund perfor-
mance. This paper shows that multi-factor performance estimates for mutual funds suffer
from systematic biases as a result of miscalculation of the factor premiums. Because the
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employed factor proxies are based on hypothetical stock portfolios, and do not incorporate
transaction costs and trading restrictions, the predicted factor premiums are either over-
or underestimated. We find that funds with a value oriented style earn a premium that
is smaller than projected by the Fama and French (1993) value proxy, while the return
differential between past winners and losers is larger than projected by the Carhart (1997)
momentum proxy. As a result, the use of three- or four-factor alphas leads to systemat-
ically too pessimistic performance estimates for value funds compared to growth funds,
and, similarly, performance estimates for past winner funds tend to be overestimated. We
suggest that factor proxies based on mutual fund returns rather than stock returns provide
better benchmarks to evaluate professional money managers.
Finally, the fourth paper investigates the presence of spillover effects of marketing in
mutual fund families. We find that funds with high marketing expenses generate spillovers,
and enhance cash inflows to family members with low marketing expenses. In particular,
low-marketing funds that are operated by a family with high marketing expenses have
substantially larger inflows after positive returns than otherwise similar funds that are
operated by a family with low marketing expenses. Furthermore, these funds appear to
have smaller outflows following negative returns. One way to interpret the spillovers is
that they are a by-product of individual fund marketing whereby the entire family is made
more visible to investors. An alternative explanation of this observation is that funds with
low marketing expenses are directly subsidized by family members with high marketing
expenses. We develop and perform a set of tests to evaluate these two alternative hypothe-
ses. The results of all tests support the subsidization hypothesis, and suggest that at least
part of the spillovers can be attributed to favoritism. These results suggest that conflicts
of interest between investors and fund families have been exacerbated by competition in
the mutual fund industry.
A number of important lessons can be learned from these studies.
(1) Some mutual fund managers are able to systematically outperform a strategy that
invests in passive indexes. This “hot hands” phenomenon is not unique to equity mutual
funds, and can be observed for bond mutual funds as well. Even though our evidence of
performance persistence is strong, we argue that index funds remain valuable investment
vehicles for unsophisticated investors who lack the ability to exploit performance persis-
tence. However, sophisticated investors with sizable financial capacity, such as institutional
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investors, can take advantage of predictable patterns in mutual fund returns.
(2) The usual three- and four-factor alphas do not adequately control for the value and
momentum anomalies when evaluating the performance of equity mutual funds. One al-
ternative that does not suffer from these biases is based on the use of a four-factor model
where the factors are constructed using mutual fund returns rather than stock returns. An-
other (yet unexplored) approach would involve non-parametric measures to evaluate fund
performance. We believe this approach is a promising path ahead for academic research
on mutual funds.
(3) Cash inflows following positive returns are almost twice as large for high-marketing
funds compared to low-marketing funds. On the other hand, cash outflows following nega-
tive returns are only marginally larger for high-marketing funds compared to low-marketing
funds. These results indicate that mutual fund marketing is very effective in making good
performance more visible to investors.
(4) It seems that mutual fund families play favorites with their funds by strategically
transferring marketing exposure across member funds. Investors should be aware that
load fees are not explicitly earmarked for marketing and can be appropriated to other uses.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Inleiding
Met een vermogen van meer dan 17.8 biljoen (1012) dollar onder beheer vormen beleggings-
fondsen wellicht het grootste onderdeel van de financie¨le industrie wereldwijd.1 Het is dan
ook niet verrassend dat reeds vele studies zijn verricht om te onderzoeken in hoeverre beleg-
gingsfondsen voorzien in de behoeften van investeerders. Dit proefschrift is een bundeling
van een viertal empirische studies welke nieuwe inzichten bieden in de beleggingsindustrie
en de prestaties van beleggingsfondsen. Om de exacte contributies van deze studies aan te
duiden, zullen we eerst de institutionele context van de beleggingsindustrie in vogelvlucht
beschrijven en een overzicht geven van de belangrijkste ontwikkelingen in de academische
literatuur.
Beleggingsfondsen zijn geregistreerde investeringsmaatschappijen die kapitaal van in-
vesteerders bundelen en dit collectief investeren in aandelen, obligaties, geldmarkt instru-
menten en andere effecten. Investeerders kunnen participeren in een beleggingsfonds door
een aandeel te kopen dat uitgegeven wordt door het fonds zelf, of dat verhandeld wordt op
de publieke markt. Beleggingsfondsen bestaan al geruime tijd. Om precies te zijn, vindt het
eerste beleggingsfonds Eendracht Maakt Magt haar oorsprong in Amsterdam. (“Eendracht
maakt macht” was de lijfspreuk van de Republiek der Zeven Verenigde Nederlanden in de
18e eeuw.) Hoewel de beleggingsindustrie in de loop der tijden vele veranderingen heeft
ondergaan, zijn de redenen voor investeerders om vandaag de dag in beleggingsfondsen
te beleggen niet anders dan in de 18e eeuw. Als belangrijkste argument om in een be-
leggingsfonds te beleggen, wordt dikwijls de mogelijkheid tot “diversificatie” aangevoerd.
Opmerkelijk genoeg werd dit argument reeds in de prospectussen van de eerste beleggings-
fondsen genoemd.
1Deze schatting is verkregen van het Investment Company Institute (ICI, 2006).
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Het idee achter diversificatie is dat verliezen op bepaalde investeringen gecompenseerd
kunnen worden door winsten die op andere investeringen worden behaald. Theoretisch
gezien kan een investeerder de hoogste graad van diversificatie behalen door een porte-
feuille aan te houden met daarin alle verhandelbare effecten (deze portefeuille wordt door-
gaans de marktportefeuille genoemd). Echter, een investeerder die een dergelijke porte-
feuille probeert aan te houden, wordt geconfronteerd met een aantal praktische problemen.
Allereerst is een groot vermogen nodig om voldoende effecten te kopen en een redelijke
graad van diversificatie te behalen. Daarnaast zijn investeringsbudgetten dikwijls niet op
te delen in een geheel aantal effecten, waardoor het niet mogelijk is om het budget volledig
te investeren. Een ander probleem wordt gevormd door de transactiekosten die gemoeid zijn
met het beheren van een dergelijke portefeuille. Transactiekosten zijn over het algemeen
opgebouwd uit een vast en een variabel gedeelte en daardoor hoger voor een portefeuille
die meer verschillende effecten bevat. Als gevolg hiervan kan diversificatie erg kostbaar
zijn voor een investeerder met een beperkt budget en niet opwegen tegen de kosten die
ermee gemoeid zijn. De hier genoemde problemen hebben voornamelijk betrekking op het
beperkte investeringsbudget van individuele investeerders. Omdat beleggingsfondsen ka-
pitaal bundelen, kunnen zij investeerders door middel van schaalvoordelen een hoge graad
van diversificatie bieden tegen relatief lage kosten.
Een andere interessante overeenkomst, die we waarnemen als we prospectussen van
beleggingsfondsen van vandaag de dag vergelijken met die uit vroegere tijden, is dat be-
leggingsfondsen “professioneel vermogensbeheer” aanbieden. Onder professioneel vermo-
gensbeheer wordt hier de bekwaamheid van vermogensbeheerders verstaan waarmee zij de
meest winstgevende effecten selecteren, en het gunstigste tijdstip kiezen om effecten te
kopen of verkopen. Niet geheel onverwacht vragen fondsbeheerders een vergoeding voor
deze diensten; een andere karakteristiek van beleggingsfondsen die niet is veranderd in de
loop der tijd.
Hoewel de voordelen van diversificatie en professioneel vermogensbeheer al geruime tijd
door investeerders worden erkend, zijn pas in het begin van de 60er jaren van de vorige
eeuw de eerste uitvoerige studies verricht om te onderzoeken in hoeverre beleggingsfondsen
werkelijk voorzien in de behoeften van investeerders door deze diensten aan te bieden. De
opkomst van deze literatuurstroming is voorafgegaan door een doorbraak in het onder-
zoek naar de prijsvorming van effecten, de toenemende mate waarin data beschikbaar zijn
geworden en technologische vernieuwingen. Hieronder geven we een korte beschrijving van
deze ontwikkelingen.
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Economische theorie over de prijsvorming van effecten stelt dat investeerders een ver-
goeding vragen voor de tijd die zij moeten wachten tot het moment dat hun investe-
ringen geld opleveren (i.e., de risicovrije rente), en een vergoeding voor de risico’s of
de onzekerheden die hiermee gemoeid zijn (i.e., de risico premie). Hoewel het logisch
lijkt dat investeerders een hoger rendement eisen op investeringen die meer risico met
zich mee brengen, hebben academici ondervonden dat het absoluut geen triviale taak is
om het concept “risico” precies te formuleren. Sterker nog, Sharpe (1964) en Lintner
(1965) zijn beloond met de Nobel prijs voor Economie voor het door hen ontwikkelde
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) dat de relatie tussen risico en rendement beschrijft.
Dit model bleek zowel vanuit een theoretisch als een empirisch perspectief succesvol te zijn
in het verklaren van rendementen op effecten.
Het CAPM stelt dat financie¨le markten investeerders alleen belonen voor het dragen van
noodzakelijk risico. Zoals we eerder hebben uitgelegd, kunnen investeerders een aanzienlijk
deel van het risico dat zij dragen, elimineren door een gediversificeerde portefeuille aan te
houden. Echter, aan een bepaald deel van het risico kan men niet ontkomen door middel van
diversificatie. Dit gedeelte wordt marktrisico of systematisch risico genoemd. Het CAPM
voorspelt dat naarmate effecten gevoeliger zijn voor marktbewegingen, investeerders een
hoger rendement eisen op deze effecten.
De laatste decennia is een groot aantal studies uitgevoerd om te onderzoeken in hoeverre
het CAPM in staat is om de rendementen op effecten te beschrijven (op aandelen in het
bijzonder). Hoewel sommige onderzoekers melden dat het CAPM hiertoe goed in staat
is, rapporteren andere onderzoekers dat het CAPM belangrijke factoren over het hoofd
ziet. Zo lijken aandelen met een kleine marktkapitalisatie en een lage waardering (i.e.,
waarde-aandelen) rendementen op te leveren die systematisch hoger zijn dan door het
CAPM voorspeld wordt (zie bijvoorbeeld Banz (1981) en Fama en French (1992)). Als
gevolg hiervan worden bij het evalueren van de prestaties van beleggingsfondsen dikwijls
multi-factormodellen gebruikt, die het CAPM uitbreiden met additionele factoren om te
corrigeren voor deze anomaliee¨n.
Hoewel het buiten het bestek van dit manuscript valt om een complete beschrijving
te geven van de ontwikkelingen in het onderzoek naar de prijsvorming van effecten, is het
van cruciaal belang om de relatie tussen risico en verwacht rendement te begrijpen om de
prestaties van beleggingsfondsen te evalueren: hoge rendementen hoeven geen bewijs te
zijn voor bekwaamheid van een vermogensbeheerder. Deze kunnen namelijk net zo goed
een premie zijn voor het nemen van hoge risico’s. De ontwikkelingen in het onderzoek naar
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de prijsvorming van effecten hebben het mogelijk gemaakt om vast te stellen welk deel van
het rendement dat een beleggingsfonds behaalt, kan worden toegekend aan bekwaamheid
van de vermogensbeheerder en welk deel aan het nemen van risico’s of aan andere factoren.
Een andere belangrijke ontwikkeling die het onderzoek naar de prestaties van beleg-
gingsfondsen heeft gestimuleerd, is de toenemende mate waarin data beschikbaar zijn
geworden. In de nasleep van Zwarte Donderdag in 1929 toen de aandelenbeurs van New
York ten onder ging, besloot de volksvertegenwoordiging van de Verenigde Staten om een
aantal wetsvoorstellen in het leven te roepen om financie¨le markten beter te reguleren en
investeerders te beschermen. Onder deze wetten was de Investment Company Act van
1940. Deze verordening wordt uitgevoerd door de Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) en verplicht bedrijven (beleggingsfondsen inbegrepen) om financie¨le informatie te
openbaren. Commercie¨le dataleveranciers zijn begonnen deze gegevens te verzamelen en
hebben uitgebreide databanken opgezet die toegankelijk zijn voor wetenschappers.2
Tenslotte zijn technologische vernieuwingen gedurende de laatste decennia van cruciaal
belang geweest voor de ontwikkeling van het onderzoek naar beleggingsfondsen. De op-
komst van computers, digitale opslagmedia en nieuwe inzichten in rekenmethoden hebben
het onderzoekers mogelijk gemaakt om complexe analyses uit te voeren.
Onderzoek naar de prestaties van beleggingsfondsen
De centrale onderzoeksvragen in de academische literatuur over de prestaties van be-
leggingsfondsen hebben voornamelijk betrekking op de mate waarin beleggingsfondsen
voorzien in de behoeften van investeerders door ze diversificatie en professioneel vermo-
gensbeheer aan te bieden.
De meeste academische studies laten zien dat beleggingsfondsen goed werk verrichten
wat het aanbieden van diversificatie betreft. Een veelgebruikte manier om de graad van
diversificatie van een beleggingsfonds te beoordelen, is door het totale risico van het fonds
op te delen in een systematisch gedeelte (i.e., risico dat niet weggediversificeerd kan wor-
den) en een niet-systematisch gedeelte (i.e., risico dat wel weggediversificeerd kan worden).
Hoe groter het gedeelte van systematisch risico, hoe hoger de graad van diversificatie die
investeerders wordt aangeboden en vice versa. Vrijwel alle studies rapporteren dat het
grootste gedeelte van het risico van beleggingsfondsen systematisch is. Om de lezer een
2De grootste dataleveranciers zijn momenteel het Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) en
Morningstar.
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wat concreter beeld te geven van de verhouding tussen systematisch en niet-systematisch
risico bij beleggingsfondsen, berekenen we welk gedeelte van het risico van beleggingsfond-
sen systematisch van aard is.3 De resultaten van deze analyse laten zien dat gemiddeld 82
procent van de variantie in de rendementen van beleggingsfondsen verklaard wordt door
systematisch risico. Het eerste kwartiel van het gedeelte van de variantie in de rendementen
van beleggingsfondsen dat verklaard wordt door systematisch risico is 80 procent, en het
derde kwartiel is 92 procent. Minder dan 6 procent van de beleggingsfondsen draagt meer
niet-systematisch dan systematisch risico. Op basis van deze uitkomsten zou men inder-
daad kunnen stellen dat beleggingsfondsen investeerders een hoge graad van diversificatie
bieden.
Echter, wanneer we de literatuur over de toegevoegde waarde van professioneel ver-
mogensbeheer beschouwen, is het niet zo dat empirisch bewijs eenduidig aantoont dat
vermogensbeheerders bekwaam zijn in het selecteren van de meest winstgevende effecten
en het kiezen van het gunstigste tijdstip om effecten te kopen of verkopen. Sterker nog, er is
bewijs dat aantoont dat de meeste vermogensbeheerders niet in staat zijn hun kosten terug
te verdienen door actieve beleggingsstrategiee¨n te volgen. Een veelgebruikte manier om
de bekwaamheid van vermogensbeheerders te onderzoeken, is door te toetsen in hoeverre
rendementen van beleggingsfondsen persistent zijn. Met andere woorden, door te toetsen
of sommige beleggingsfondsen systematisch beter presteren dan andere fondsen (inclusief
passief beheerde indexfondsen waarvan de belangrijkste doelstelling is om investeerders
een zo hoog mogelijke graad van diversificatie te bieden tegen zo laag mogelijke kosten).
Hoewel sommige onderzoekers persistentie vinden in de rendementen van beleggingsfond-
sen, laten andere onderzoekers zien dat deze resultaten verklaard worden doordat bepaalde
factoren over het hoofd worden gezien (zie bijvoorbeeld Carhart (1997)). Wanneer reke-
ning gehouden wordt met deze factoren, is vrijwel geen persistentie meer waarneembaar.
De enige persistentie die overblijft, is gelegen in de voortdurende slechte prestaties van
beleggingsfondsen met hoge kosten. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat er weinig bewijs is
om aan te nemen dat vermogensbeheerders bekwaam zijn in het selecteren van de meest
winstgevende effecten, en het kiezen van het gunstigste tijdstip om effecten te kopen of
verkopen. Investeerders lijken het beste af te zijn door te beleggen in passief beheerde
3De steekproef die we gebruiken beslaat 5.275 aandelenfondsen in de Verenigde Staten over de periode
1963–2003 en wordt beschreven in de studie “On the Use of Multi-Factor Models to Evaluate Mutual Fund
Performance”. Fondsen met minder dan 36 opeenvolgende observaties van maandelijkse rendementen over
de gehele tijdsperiode zijn uitgesloten van de analyse. Als maatstaf voor systematisch risico gebruiken we
de vier factoren van Carhart (1997).
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indexfondsen.
Korte-termijnpersistentie in de rendementen van
aandelenfondsen
In de eerste studie van deze bundel onderzoeken we in hoeverre rendementen van aandelen-
fondsen in de Verenigde Staten op korte termijn persistent zijn. De aanleiding om persis-
tentie op korte termijn te onderzoeken, is het theoretische werk van Berk en Green (2004),
waarin beargumenteerd wordt dat het gebrek aan bewijs voor persistentie op lange ter-
mijn niet noodzakelijk impliceert dat vermogensbeheerders niet bekwaam zijn. Bovendien
vinden Bollen en Busse (2005) korte-termijnpersistentie in de rendementen van aandelen-
fondsen wanneer zij gebruik maken van dagelijkse data. (In het overgrote merendeel van
de studies in deze literatuurstroming wordt gebruik gemaakt van maandelijkse data.) Wij
onderzoeken een drietal vragen met betrekking tot korte-termijnpersistentie. Allereerst,
is deze vorm van voorspelbaarheid ook waarneembaar in een grote steekproef van be-
leggingsfondsen over een langere (en meer recente) tijdsperiode? Ten tweede, is dit effect
economisch significant? Ten derde, is er variatie waarneembaar in korte-termijnpersistentie
tussen verschillende groepen beleggingsfondsen? Om deze punten te onderzoeken, maken
we gebruik van een grote databank met maandelijkse rendementen van aandelenfondsen
en een Bayesiaanse schattingsmethodiek om op basis van slechts een beperkt aantal obser-
vaties de prestaties van beleggingsfondsen te evalueren.
Onze resultaten ondersteunen de opvatting dat prestaties van aandelenfondsen uit het
verleden een voorspellende waarde hebben voor hun toekomstige prestaties. Wanneer
we aandelenfondsen rangschikken op basis van hun prestaties over de afgelopen 36 tot
12 maanden, dan zien we dat de 10 procent best presterende fondsen de maand daarna
een aanzienlijk hoger rendement behalen dan de 10 procent slechtst presterende fondsen.
Hierbij houden we rekening met factoren als marktkapitalisatie, waardering en momen-
tum. Bovendien stelt de Bayesiaanse schattingsmethodiek ons in staat de door Bollen
en Busse (2005) gedocumenteerde korte-termijnpersistentie in de prestaties van de best
presterende fondsen vast te leggen door gebruik te maken van maandelijkse data over
een veel grotere steekproef van aandelenfondsen. Wanneer we gebruik maken van tradi-
tionele schattingsmethodieken zijn we niet in staat deze relatie vast te leggen. Daarnaast
zijn we door het grote aantal fondsen in onze data en de beperkte eisen, die opgelegd
worden door de Bayesiaanse methode, in staat om persistentie te onderzoeken onder ver-
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schillende groepen van beleggingsfondsen. Allereerst onderzoeken we in hoeverre korte-
termijnpersistentie gerelateerd is aan de transactiekosten die investeerders moeten betalen
wanneer ze een beleggingsfonds kopen of verkopen. Wanneer we alleen aandelenfondsen in
beschouwing nemen, die geen transactiekosten in rekening brengen, dan is de persistentie
zelfs duidelijker waarneembaar dan wanneer we de gehele steekproef in beschouwing nemen.
Blijkbaar wordt de korte-termijnpersistentie niet teniet gedaan door transactiekosten die
gemoeid zijn met het investeren in de best presterende fondsen. Daarnaast vinden we dat
persistentie voornamelijk waarneembaar is bij beleggingsfondsen die beleggen in aandelen
met een kleine marktkapitalisatie en een hoge waardering (i.e., groei-aandelen).
De prestaties van obligatiefondsen
In de tweede studie van deze bundel onderzoeken we persistentie in de rendementen van
obligatiefondsen. Ondanks de omvang van de markt voor actief beheerde obligatiefondsen
is er verrassend weinig bekend over de prestaties van deze fondsen. Omdat het onderzoek
naar obligatiefondsen nog niet ver ontwikkeld is, vult deze studie verschillende hiaten
in de literatuur op. Allereerst is dit naar ons weten de eerste studie die het volledige
universum van meer dan 3.500 obligatiefondsen uit de CRSP databank over de periode
1990-2003 bestudeert. De omvang van de steekproef stelt ons in staat het hoofd te bieden
aan verscheidene econometrische problemen. Ten tweede, eerdere studies naar de prestaties
van obligatiefondsen maken gebruik van slechts een klein deel van de beschikbare methoden
om persistentie te toetsen. We laten zien dat al deze methoden een consistent beeld geven
van de prestaties van obligatiefondsen. Hierdoor biedt ons onderzoek nieuwe inzichten
in langlopende discussies over de toegevoegde waarde van professioneel vermogensbeheer
bij obligatiefondsen. In tegenstelling tot eerdere studies vinden we sterk bewijs dat het
mogelijk is om op basis van rendementen uit het verleden een groep obligatiefondsen aan
te wijzen, die systematisch een passieve beleggingsstrategie verslaat.
Een kritische blik op het gebruik van multi-
factormodellen
De derde studie levert een bijdrage aan de bestaande literatuur door te onderzoeken in
hoeverre multi-factormodellen in staat zijn de rendementen van beleggingsfondsen te ver-
klaren. Er wordt een tweetal veelgebruikte multi-factormodellen onderzocht, te weten
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het drie-factormodel van Fama en French (1993, 1995, 1996) en het vier-factormodel van
Carhart (1997). De voornaamste reden om deze studie te verrichten, is ons vermoe-
den dat prestatiemetingen door deze modellen verkeerde schattingen opleveren. Multi-
factormodellen maken namelijk gebruik van rendementen op hypothetische aandelenporte-
feuilles als referentiepunt en houden geen rekening met transactiekosten en handelsrestric-
ties. Als gevolg hiervan zouden prestatiemetingen van bepaalde fondsen een onjuist beeld
kunnen weergeven van hun werkelijke prestaties.
Onze resultaten tonen aan dat prestatiemetingen door multi-factormodellen inderdaad
verkeerde schattingen opleveren. We vinden dat de prestaties van fondsen met een waar-
destijl (i.e., fondsen die beleggen in aandelen met een lage waardering) systematisch on-
derschat worden ten opzichte van de prestaties van fondsen met een groeistijl (i.e., fondsen
die beleggen in aandelen met een hoge waardering). Daarnaast vinden we dat de prestaties
van fondsen met hoge rendementen in het verleden systematisch overschat worden ten
opzichte van de prestaties van fondsen met lage rendementen in het verleden. We stellen
een alternatieve methode voor, waarbij gebruik gemaakt wordt van de rendementen van
andere beleggingsfondsen als referentiepunt. We laten zien dat deze methode een beter
beeld geeft van de prestaties van beleggingsfondsen.
Marketing van fondsgroepen
Het laatste onderzoek draagt bij aan de literatuur over reacties van investeerders op de
prestaties van beleggingsfondsen. De meeste onderzoekers rapporteren dat investeerders
hun geld voornamelijk beleggen in fondsen met de hoogste rendementen in het verleden.
Het lijkt erop dat vermogensbeheerders zich hier goed van bewust zijn en op dit gedrag
anticiperen door bepaalde strategiee¨n te volgen. Zo documenteren Brown et al. (1996) dat
beleggingsfondsen hun risicoprofiel manipuleren om de kans te vergroten om tot de best
presterende fondsen te behoren. Andere strategiee¨n die in de literatuur genoemd worden,
zijn marketing activiteiten en het organiseren in fondsgroepen. Deze laatste strategie is
gebaseerd op de waarneming dat geldstromen naar beleggingsfondsen niet alleen afhankelijk
zijn van de prestaties van de fondsen zelf, maar ook van de prestaties van andere fondsen
binnen de fondsgroep. Als een bepaald fonds het namelijk goed doet, profiteren andere
fondsen binnen de fondsgroep er ook van.
In de vierde studie onderzoeken wij in hoeverre marketing activiteiten van bepaalde
fondsen een positieve invloed hebben op geldstromen naar andere fondsen binnen de fonds-
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groep. Is het bijvoorbeeld zo dat fondsen, die veel aan marketing uitgeven, geldstromen
genereren naar fondsen binnen de fondsgroep die dat niet doen? We vinden dat kleine
en jongere beleggingsfondsen, die zelf weinig aan marketing uitgeven, maar onderdeel zijn
van een fondsgroep die als geheel wel veel aan marketing uitgeeft, aanzienlijk grotere geld-
stromen ontvangen dan vergelijkbare fondsen die geen onderdeel zijn van een dergelijke
fondsgroep. Deze resultaten zouden als een neveneffect van marketing ge¨ınterpreteerd
kunnen worden, waardoor de fondsgroep als geheel zichtbaarder wordt gemaakt. Echter,
deze verklaring veronderstelt dat de marketingkosten die fondsen bij investeerders in re-
kening brengen, e´e´n-op-e´e´n gerelateerd zijn aan de aandacht die de fondsen krijgen in de
media en de verkoopkanalen. Een alternatieve verklaring voor deze resultaten is dat be-
leggingsfondsen met lage marketinguitgaven gesubsidieerd worden. Met andere woorden,
een fondsgroep zou kunnen betalen voor de marketing activiteiten van een bepaald fonds,
terwijl ze de kosten hiervan bij andere fondsen in rekening brengt. We ontwikkelen en
toetsen een aantal hypothesen om deze verschillende verklaringen te evalueren. Onze re-
sultaten wijzen uit dat fondsgroepen bepaalde beleggingsfondsen inderdaad systematisch
bevoordelen ten koste van andere fondsen.
Conclusies en aanbevelingen
In zijn geheel beschouwd, kent dit proefschrift een viertal belangrijke conclusies.
(1) Op basis van rendementen uit het verleden is het mogelijk een groep beleggingsfondsen
aan te wijzen, die systematisch een passieve beleggingsstrategie verslaat. Dit geldt zowel
voor aandelenfondsen, als voor obligatiefondsen. Hoewel de prestaties van beleggingsfond-
sen duidelijk persistent zijn, willen we er op wijzen dat alleen professionele en vermogende
partijen gebruik kunnen maken van deze voorspelbaarheid. Voor de meeste investeerders
blijven passief beheerde indexfondsen een waardevolle belegging.
(2) Zowel het drie-factormodel van Fama en French als het vier-factormodel van Carhart
overschatten (onderschatten) de prestaties van aandelenfondsen met een groeistijl (waar-
destijl). Om de prestaties van beleggingsfondsen te evalueren, kan men beter de rende-
menten van andere beleggingsfondsen als referentiepunt gebruiken. Een andere (nog niet
onderzochte) methode is het gebruik van niet-parametrische prestatiemaatstaven. Een der-
gelijke benaderingswijze biedt een interessant uitgangspunt voor vervolgonderzoek naar de
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prestaties van beleggingsfondsen.
(3) Aandelenfondsen die veel aan marketing uitgeven, ontvangen aanzienlijk grotere geld-
stromen na goede prestaties dan fondsen die weinig aan marketing uitgeven. Deze resul-
taten tonen aan dat marketing een effectieve manier is om goede prestaties van beleggings-
fondsen zichtbaar te maken voor investeerders.
(4) Het lijkt erop dat fondsgroepen systematisch de marketingkosten van bepaalde be-
leggingsfondsen bij andere fondsen binnen de fondsgroep in rekening brengen. Investeerders
zouden zich ervan bewust moeten zijn dat marketingkosten voor andere doeleinden aangewend
kunnen worden dan waarvoor ze eigenlijk bestemd zijn.
177
Bibliography
Mutual fund factbook 2006. Technical report, Investment Company Institute (ICI), 2006.
A. Ali, L. Hwang, and M. A. Trombley. Arbitrage risk and the book-to-market anomaly.
Journal of Financial Economics, 69:355–373, 2003.
K. P. Baks, A. Metrick, and J. Wachter. Should investors avoid all actively managed
mutual funds? A study in Bayesian performance evaluation. Journal of Finance, 56:
45–85, 2001.
R. W. Banz. The relationship between return and market value of common stocks. Journal
of Financial Economics, 9:3–18., 1981.
B. M. Barber, T. Odean, and L. Zheng. Out of sight, out of mind: The effects of expenses
on mutual fund flows. Journal of Business, 78:2095–2120, 2005.
J. B. Berk and R. C. Green. Mutual fund flows and performance in rational markets.
Journal of Political Economy, 112:1269–1295, 2004.
F. Black, M. C. Jensen, and M. Scholes. The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical
Tests. Praeger, New York, 1972.
C. R. Blake, E. J. Elton, and M. J. Gruber. The performance of bond mutual funds.
Journal of Business, 66:371–403, 1993.
R. C. Blattberg and E. I. George. Shrinkage estimation of price and promotional elasticities:
Seemingly unrelated equations. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 86:304–
315, 1991.
M. E. Blume. On the assesment of risk. Journal of Finance, 26:1–10, 1971.
N. P. B. Bollen. Mutual fund attributes and investor behavior. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming, 2006.
173
178
174 BIBLIOGRAPHY
N. P. B. Bollen and J. A. Busse. Short-term persistence in mutual fund performance.
Review of Financial Studies, 18:569–597, 2005.
A. Brav, R. Lehavy, and R. Michaely. Using expectations to test asset pricing models.
Financial Management, 34:31–64, 2005.
K. C. Brown, W. Harlow, and L. T. Starks. Of tournaments and temptations: An analysis
of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry. Journal of Finance, 51:85–110,
1996.
S. J. Brown, W. N. Goetzman, and J. Park. Careers and survival: Competition and risk
in the hedge fund and CTA industry. Journal of Finance, 56:1869–1886, 2001.
S. J. Brown and W. Goetzmann. Performance persistence. Journal of Finance, 50:679–698,
1995.
S. J. Brown, W. Goetzmann, R. G. Ibbotson, and S. A. Ross. Survivorship bias in perfor-
mance studies. Review of Financial Studies, 5:553–580, 1992.
J. A. Busse and P. J. Irvine. Bayesian alphas and mutual fund persistence. Journal of
Finance, 61:2251–2288, 2006.
M. Carhart. On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance, 52:57–82,
1997.
G. Casella and E. I. George. Explaining the Gibbs sampler. The American Statistician,
46:167–174, 1992.
Y. Chen, W. Ferson, and H. Peters. The timing ability of fixed income mutual funds.
Working paper Boston College, 2005.
J. Chevalier and G. Ellison. Risk taking by mutual funds as a response to incentives.
Journal of Political Economy, 105:1167–1200, 1997.
J. Chevalier and G. Ellison. Career concerns for mutual funds managers. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 114:389–432, 1999.
G. Cici, S. Gibson, and R. Moussawia. For better or worse? Mutual funds in side-by-side
management relationships with hedge funds. Working paper The Wharton School, 2006.
179
175
J. L. Coles, N. D. Daniel, and F. Nardari. Does the choice of model or benchmark af-
fect inference in measuring mutual fund performance? Working paper Arizona State
University, 2006.
M. J. Cooper, H. Gulen, and R. P. Rau. Changing names with style: Mutual fund name
changes and their effects on fund flows. Journal of Finance, 60:2825–2858, 2005.
W. F. M. de Bondt and R. Thaler. Does the stock market overreact? Journal of Finance,
40:793–805, 1985.
D. Del Guercio and P. Tkac. The determinants of the flows of funds of managed portfolios:
Mutual funds versus pension funds. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 37:
523–557, 2002.
M. L. Detzler. The performance of global bond mutual funds. Journal of Banking and
Finance, 23:1195–1217, 1999.
F. X. Diebold and R. S. Mariano. Comparing predictive accuracy. Journal of Business
and Economic Statistics, 13:253–263, 1995.
E. J. Elton, M. J. Gruber, and C. R. Blake. Fundamental economic variables, expected
returns, and bond fund performance. Journal of Finance, 40:1229–1256, 1995.
E. J. Elton, M. J. Gruber, and C. R. Blake. The persistence of risk-adjusted mutual fund
performance. Journal of Business, 69:133–157, 1996.
E. J. Elton, M. J. Gruber, and C. R. Blake. A first look at the accuracy of the CRSP
mutual fund database and a comparison of the CRSP and morningstar mutual fund
databases. Journal of Finance, 56:2415–2429, 2001.
E. J. Elton, M. J. Gruber, S. J. Brown, and W. N. Goetzmann. Modern Portfolio Theory
and Investment Analysis. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003.
E. J. Elton, M. J. Gruber, S. Das, and M. Illavka. Efficiency with costly information: A
reinterpretation of evidence from managed portfolios. Review of Financial Studies, 6:
1–22, 1993.
E. F. Fama and K. R. French. The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of
Finance, 47:427–465, 1992.
180
176 BIBLIOGRAPHY
E. F. Fama and K. R. French. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds.
Journal of Financial Economics, 33:3–56, 1993.
E. F. Fama and K. R. French. Size and book-to-market factors in earnings and returns.
Journal of Finance, 50:131–155, 1995.
E. F. Fama and K. R. French. Multifactor explanations of asset pricing anomalies. Journal
of Finance, 1:55–84, 1996.
E. F. Fama and J. D. MacBeth. Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests. Journal
of Political Economy, 81:607–636, 1973.
W. E. Ferson and C. R. Harvey. Conditioning variables and the cross-section of stock
returns. Journal of Finance, 54:1325–1360, 1999.
W. E. Ferson, T. Henry, and D. Kisgen. Evaluating government bond fund performance
with stochastic discount factors. Review of Financial Studies, 19:423–456, 2006.
W. E. Ferson and R. W. Schadt. Measuring fund strategy and performance in changing
economic conditions. Journal of Finance, 51:425–461, 1996.
S. Gallaher, R. Kaniel, and L. Starks. Madison avenue meets wall street: Mutual fund
families, competition, and advertising. Working paper University of Texas, 2006.
J. M. Gaspar, M. Massa, and P. Matos. Favoritism in mutual fund families? Evidence on
strategic cross-fund subsidization. Journal of Finance, 61:73–104, 2006.
W. R. Gebhardt, S. Hvidkjaer, and B. Swaminathan. The cross-section of expected corpo-
rate bond returns: Betas or characteristics? Journal of Financial Economics, 75:85–114,
2005.
M. R. Gibbons, S. A. Ross, and J. Shanken. A test of efficiency of a given portfolio.
Econometrica, 57:1121–1152, 1989.
W. N. Goetzman and R. G. Ibbotson. Do winners repeat? Journal of Portfolio Manage-
ment, 20:9–18, 1994.
W. N. Goetzmann and R. G. Ibbotson. Games mutual fund companies play: Strategic
response to investor beliefs in the mutual fund industry. Working paper Yale School of
Management, 1993.
181
177
M. Grinblatt and S. Titman. A study of monthly mutual fund returns and performance
evaluation techniques. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 29:419–444, 1994.
M. J. Gruber. Another puzzle: The growth in actively managed mutual funds. Journal of
Finance, 51:783–810, 1996.
I. Guedj and J. Papastaikoudi. Can mutual fund families affect the performance of their
funds? Working paper McCombs School of Business, 2005.
N. Gultekin and R. Rogalski. Government bond returns, measurement of interest rate risk,
and the arbitrage pricing theory. Journal of Finance, 40:43–61, 1995.
C. R. Harvey and A. Siddique. Conditional skewness in asset pricing tests. Journal of
Finance, 55:1263–1294, 2000.
D. Hendricks, J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser. Hot hands in mutual funds: Short-run persis-
tence of relative performance, 1974-1988. Journal of Finance, 48:93–130, 1993.
D. Hendricks, J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser. The J-shape of performance persistence given
survivorship bias. Review of Economics and Statistics, 79:161–166, 1997.
R. D. Hendricksson and R. C. Merton. On market timing and investm,ent performance.
statistical procedures for evaluating forecasting skills. Journal of Business, 54:513–533,
1981.
H. Hong, T. Lim, and J. C. Stein. Bad news travels slowly: Size, analyst coverage, and
the profitability of momentum strategies. Journal of Finance, 55:265–295, 2000.
T. Houge and T. Loughran. Do investors capture the value premium? Financial Manage-
ment, 35:5–19, 2006.
J. Huij and J. Derwall. Hot hands in bond funds. Working paper RSM Erasmus University,
2006.
J. Huij and M. Verbeek. On the use of multi-factor models to evaluate mutual fund
performance. Working paper RSM Erasmus University, 2006a.
J. Huij and M. Verbeek. Spillover effects of marketing in mutual fund families. Working
paper RSM Erasmus University, 2006b.
182
178 BIBLIOGRAPHY
J. Huij and M. Verbeek. Cross-sectional learning and short-run persistence in mutual fund
performance. Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming, 2007.
Z. Ivkovic. Is blood thicker than water: Spillovers in mutual fund families. working paper
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2001.
P. C. Jain and J. S. Wu. Thruth in mutual fund advertising: Evidence on future perfor-
mance and fund flow. Journal of Finance, 55:937–958, 2000.
N. Jegadeesh and S. Titman. Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implications
for stock market efficiency. Journal of Finance, 48:65–91, 1993.
M. C. Jensen. The performance of mutual funds in the period 1945-1964. Journal of
Finance, 23:389–416, 1968.
C. S. Jones and J. Shanken. Mutual fund performance with learning across funds. Journal
of Financial Economics, 78:507–522, 2005.
R. N. Kahn. Bond performance analysis: A multi-factor approach. Journal of Portfolio
Management, 18:40–47, 1991.
R. N. Kahn and A. Rudd. Does historical performance predict future performance? Fi-
nancial Analysts Journal, 51:43–52, 1995.
D. B. Keim and A. Madhaven. Transactions costs and investment style: An inter-exchange
analysis of institutional equity trades. Journal of Financial Economics, 46:265–292, 1997.
A. Khorana and H. Servaes. Conflicts of interest and competition in the mutual fund
industry. Working paper London Business School, 2005.
P. Knez, R. Litterman, and J. Scheinkman. Explorations into factors explaining money
market returns. Journal of Finance, 49:1861–1882, 1994.
R. Kosowski, N. Y. Naik, and M. Teo. Do hedge funds deliver alpha? A bayesian and
bootstrap analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming, 2007.
R. Kosowski, A. Timmermann, R. Wermers, and H. White. Can mutual fund “stars” really
pick stocks? New evidence from a bootstrap analysis. Journal of Finance, 61:2551–2596,
2006.
183
179
B. N. Lehman and D. M. Modest. Mutual fund performance evaluation: A comparison of
benchmarks and benchmark comparisons. Journal of Finance, 42:233–265, 1987.
D. A. Lesmond, M. J. Schill, and C. Zhou. The illusory nature of momentum profits.
Journal of Financial Economics, 71:349–380, 2004.
J. Lintner. The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments in stock
portfolios and capital budgets. Review of Economics and Statistics, 47:13–37, 1965.
R. Litterman and J. Scheinkman. Common factors affecting bond returns. Journal of
Fixed Income, 1:54–61, 1991.
T. Loughran. Book-to-market across firm size, exchange, and seasonality: Is there an
effect? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32:249–268, 1997.
G. S. Maddala, R. P. Trost, H. Li, and F. Joutz. Estimation of short-run and long-run
elasticities of energy demand from panel data using shrinkage estimators. Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics, 15:90–100, 1997.
B. Malkiel. Returns from investing in equity funds 1971 to 1991. Journal of Finance, 50:
549–572, 1995.
R. C. Merton. An intertemporal capital asset pricing model. Econometrica, 41:867–887,
1973.
M. R. Morey. Should you carry the load? A comprehensive analysis of load and no-load
mutual fund out-of-sample performance. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27:1245–1271,
2003.
V. Nanda, J. Wang, and L. Zheng. The ABCs of mutual funds: On the introduction of
multiple share classes. Working paper University of Michigan, 2006.
V. Nanda, J. Z. Wang, and L. Zheng. Famility values and the star phenomenon: Strategies
of mutual fund families. Review of Financial Studies, 17:667–697, 2004.
L. Pastor and R. F. Stambaugh. Investing in equity mutual funds. Journal of Financial
Economics, 63:351–380, 2002a.
L. Pastor and R. F. Stambaugh. Mutual fund performance and seemingly unrelated assets.
Journal of Financial Economics, 63:315–349, 2002b.
184
180 BIBLIOGRAPHY
T. Post and W. V. Vliet. Do multiple factors help or hurt? Working paper Erasmus
University Institute of Management, 2005.
R. Reinganum. Misspecification of capital asset pricing: Empirical anomalies based on
earnings yields and market values. Journal of Financial Economics, 9:19–46, 1981.
R. Roll. Ambiguity when performance is measured by the securities market line. Journal
of Finance, 33:1051–1069, 1978.
S. A. Ross. The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing. Journal of Economic Theory, 13:
341–360, 1976.
K. G. Rouwenhorst. The origins of mutual funds. Working paper Yale School of Manage-
ment, 2004.
W. F. Sharpe. Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of
risk. Journal of Finance, 19:425–442, 1964.
K. Sigurdsson. The effect of new money inflows on the flow-performance relationship in
the U.S. mutual fund industry. Working paper London Business School, 2004.
E. R. Sirri and P. Tufano. Costly search and mutual fund flows. Journal of Finance, 53:
1589–1622, 1998.
S. Stern. Simulation-Based Inference in Econometrics. The University of Cambridge Press,
2000.
H. R. Stoll and R. E. Whaley. Transactions costs and the small firm effect. Journal of
Financial Economics, 12:57–79, 1983.
J. R. ter Horst, T. E. Nijman, and M. Verbeek. Eliminating look-ahead bias in evaluating
persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Empirical Finance, 8:345–373, 2001.
J. L. Treynor and K. Mazuy. Can mutual funds outguess the market? Harvard Business
Review, 44:131–136, 1966.
O. A. Vasicek. A note on using cross-sectional information in bayesian estimation of security
betas. Journal of Finance, 28:1233–1239, 1973.
185
181
R. Wermers. Is money really “smart”? New evidence on the relation between mutual
fund flows, manager behavior, and performance persistence. Working paper University
of Maryland, 2003.
X. Zhao. Why are some mutual funds closed to new investors? Journal of Banking and
Finance, 28:1867–1887, 2004.
L. Zheng. Is money smart? a study of mutual fund investors’ fund selection ability. Journal
of Finance, 54:901–933, 1999.
186
187
Biography
Joop Huij was born in Amsterdam on August 11, 1979. He attended the Marnix Gym-
nasium in Rotterdam, at which he obtained a Gymnasium diploma (Dutch classical pre-
university education) in 1997. From 1997 to 2002 Joop studied at Erasmus University
Rotterdam. In 2002 he received his Master’s degree in Informatics & Economics with
appellation cum laude. In November 2002 he joined the Department of Financial Manage-
ment of RSM Erasmus University as a PhD Candidate. His PhD trajectory was supported
by the Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM). He presented his research at
several international conferences and seminars, including the 2003 OxMetrics Conference
in London, the 2005 Eastern Finance Association meeting in Norfolk, the 2005 Financial
Management Association meeting in Chicago, and the 2006 European Finance Association
meeting in Zurich. The article version of the Chapter “Cross-sectional Learning and Short-
run Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance” of his dissertation is accepted for publication
in the Journal of Banking & Finance. During his PhD trajectory Joop visited London Busi-
ness School and Vanderbilt University’s Owen Graduate School of Management. Joop’s
teaching experience include Bachelor and Master courses in the (International) Business
Administration programme as well as supervision of Bachelor and Master theses at RSM
Erasmus University. Currently, Joop holds a position as Assistant Professor of Finance at
RSM Erasmus university. His research interests include mutual funds, alternative invest-
ments, and empirical asset pricing.
183
188
189
ERIM Ph.D. Series
Research in Management
Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)
ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
1. Meer, J.R. van der, Operational Control of Internal Transport
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster, Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker
ISBN: 90-5892-004-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/859
2. Fleischmann, M., Quantitative Models for Reverse Logistics
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker
ISBN: 90-5892-7-117, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1044
3. Romero Morales, D., Optimization Problems in Supply Chain Management
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, dr. H.E. Romeijn
ISBN: 90-5892-078-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/865
4. Roodbergen, K.J., Layout and Routing Methods for Warehouses
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster, Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen
ISBN: 90-5892-005-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/861
6. Chen, Y., Labour flexibility in China’s companies: an empirical study
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. A. Buitendam, Prof.dr. B. Krug
ISBN: 90-5892-012-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/307
7. Heugens, P.M.A.R., Strategic Issues Management: Implications for Corporate
Performance
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch, Prof.dr. C.B.M. van Riel
ISBN: 90-5892-009-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/358
8. Spekle´, R.F., Beyond Generics; A closer look at Hybrid and Hierarchical
Governance
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. M.A. van Hoepen RA
ISBN: 90-5892-011-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/357
185
190
186 ERIM Ph.D. Series Research in Management
9. Puvanasvari Ratnasingam, P., Interorganizational Trust in Business to Business
E-Commerce
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. K. Kumar, Prof.dr. H.G. van Dissel
ISBN: 90-5892-017-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/356
10. Mol, M.M., Outsourcing, Supplier-relations and Internationalisation: Global
Source Strategy as a Chinese puzzle
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder
ISBN: 90-5892-014-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/355
11. Wolters, M.J.J., The Business of Modularity and the Modularity of Business
Promotor(es): Prof.mr.dr. P.H.M. Vervest, Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck
ISBN: 90-5892-020-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/920
12. Oosterhout, J. van, The Quest for Legitimacy; On Authority and Responsibility
in Governance
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. T. van Willigenburg, Prof.mr. H.R. van Gunsteren
ISBN: 90-5892-022-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/362
13. Koppius, O.R., Information Architecture and Electronic Market Performance
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. P.H.M. Vervest, Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck
ISBN: 90-5892-023-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/921
14. Vis, I.F.A., Planning and Control Concepts for Material Handling Systems
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster, Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker
ISBN: 90-5892-021-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/866
15. Bijman, W.J.J., Essays on Agricultural Co-operatives; Governance Structure in
Fruit and Vegetable Chains
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. G.W.J. Hendrikse
ISBN: 90-5892-024-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/867
16. Teunter, L.H., Analysis of Sales Promotion Effects on Household Purchase
Behavior
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga, Prof.dr. T. Kloek
ISBN: 90-5892-029-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/868
17. Loef, J., Incongruity between Ads and Consumer Expectations of Advertising
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. W.F. van Raaij, Prof.dr. G. Antonides
ISBN: 90-5892-028-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/869
18. Ganzaroli, A., Creating Trust between Local and Global Systems
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. K. Kumar, Prof.dr. R.M. Lee
ISBN: 90-5892-031-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/361
19. Fenema, P.C. van, Coordination and Control of Globally Distributed Software
Projects
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. K. Kumar
ISBN: 90-5892-030-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/360
191
187
20. Delporte–Vermeiren, D.J.E., Improving the flexibility and profitability of
ICT-enabled business networks: an assessment method and tool.
Promotor(es): Prof.mr.dr. P.H.M. Vervest, Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck
ISBN: 90-5892-040-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/359
21. Wijk, R.A.J.L. van, Organizing Knowledge in Internal Networks. A Multilevel
Study
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch
ISBN: 90-5892-039-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/347
22. Peeters, L.W.P., Cyclic Railway Timetable Optimization
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon, Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen
ISBN: 90-5892-042-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/429
23. Jong, C. de, Dealing with Derivatives: Studies on the role, informational content
and pricing of financial derivatives
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. C.G. Koedijk
ISBN: 90-5892-043-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1043
24. Waal, T. de, Processing of Erroneous and Unsafe Data
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker
ISBN: 90-5892-045-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/870
25. Hooghiemstra, R., The Construction of Reality
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. L.G. van der Tas RA, Prof.dr. A.Th.H. Pruyn
ISBN: 90-5892-047-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/871
26. Dijksterhuis, M., Organizational dynamics of cognition and action in the
changing Dutch and U.S. banking industries
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. F.A.J. van den Bosch, Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda
ISBN: 90-5892-048-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1037
27. Fok, D., Advanced Econometric Marketing Models
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. P.H.B.F. Franses
ISBN: 90-5892-049-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1035
28. Wielemaker, M.W., Managing Initiatives. A Synthesis of the Conditioning and
Knowledge-Creating View
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, Prof.dr. C.W.F. Baden-Fuller
ISBN: 90-5892-050-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1036
29. Berghe, D.A.F., Working Across Borders: Multinational Enterprises and the
Internationalization of Employment
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, Prof.dr. E.J.J. Schenk
ISBN: 90-5892-05-34, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1041
30. Miltenburg, P.R., Effects of modular sourcing on manufacturing flexibility in the
automotive industry. A study among German OEMs
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. J. Paauwe, Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur
ISBN: 90-5892-052-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1039
192
188 ERIM Ph.D. Series Research in Management
31. Graaf, G., Tractable Morality. Customer discourses of bankers, veterinarians
and charity workers
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. F. Leijnse, Prof.dr. T. van Willigenburg
ISBN: 90-5892-051-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1038
32. Gilsing, V.A., Exploration, Exploitation and Co-evolution in Innovation
Networks
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. B. Nooteboom, Prof.dr. J.P.M. Groenewegen
ISBN: 90-5892-05-42, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1040
33. Flier, B., Strategic Renewal of European Financial Incumbents
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. F. van den Bosch, Prof.dr. H. Volberda
ISBN: 90-5892-055-0 , http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1071
34. Langen, P.W. de, The Performance of Seaport Clusters
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. B. Nooteboom, Prof.dr. H.W.H. Welters
ISBN: 90-5892-056-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1133
35. Brito, M.P. de, Managing Reverse Logistics or Reversing Logistics Management?
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster
ISBN: 90-5892-058-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1132
36. Appelman, J.H., Governance of Global Interorganizational Tourism Networks;
Changing Forms of Co-ordination between the Travel Agency and Aviation
Sector
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. F.M. Go, Prof.dr. B. Nooteboom
ISBN: 90-5892-060-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1199
37. Popova, V.N., Knowledge Discovery and Monotonicity
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. A. de Bruin
ISBN: 90-5892-061-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1201
38. Muller, A.R., The Rise of Regionalism: Core Company Strategies Under The
Second Wave of Integration
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder
ISBN: 90-5892-062-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1272
39. Berens, G. A.J.M., Corporate Branding: The Development of Corporate
Associations and their Influence on Stakeholder Reactions
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. C.B.M. van Riel
ISBN: 90-5892-065-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1273
40. Six, F.E., Trust and Trouble: Building Interpersonal Trust Within Organizations
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. B. Nooteboom, Prof.dr. A.M. Sorge
ISBN: 90-5892-064-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1271
41. Slager, A.M.H., Banking across Borders
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. D.M.N. van Wensveen, Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder
ISBN: 90-5892-066-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1301
193
189
42. Mandele, L.M., van der, Leadership and the Inflection Point: A Longitudinal
Perspective
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur
ISBN: 90-5892-067-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1302
43. Kippers, J., Empirical Studies on Cash Payments
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses
ISBN: 90-5892-069-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1520
44. Daniˇsevska´, P., Empirical Studies on Financial Intermediation and Corporate
Policies
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. C.G. Koedijk
ISBN: 90-5892-070-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1518
45. Mulder, A., Government Dilemmas in the Private Provision of Public Goods
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder
ISBN: 90-5892- 071-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1790
46. Hermans, J.M., ICT in Information Services, Use and deployment of the Dutch
securities trade, 1860-1970
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. F.H.A. Janszen
ISBN: 90-5892-072-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1793
47. Liang, G., New Competition; Foreign Direct Investment And Industrial
Development In China
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder
ISBN: 90-5892-073-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1795
48. Schweizer, T.S., An Individual Psychology of Novelty-Seeking, Creativity and
Innovation
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder
ISBN: 90-5892-07-71, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1818
49. Vliet, P. van, Downside Risk and Empirical Asset Pricing
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. G.T. Post
ISBN: 90-5892-07-55, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1819
50. Valck, K. de, Virtual Communities of Consumption: Networks of Consumer
Knowledge and Companionship
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. G.H. van Bruggen, Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga
ISBN: 90-5892-078-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6663
51. Le-Anh, t., Intelligent Control of Vehicle-Based Internal Transport Systems
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster, Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker
ISBN: 90-5892-079-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6554
52. Pouchkarev, I., Performance Evaluation of Constrained Portfolios
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. J. Spronk, dr. W.G.P.M. Hallerbach
ISBN: 90-5892-083-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6731
194
190 ERIM Ph.D. Series Research in Management
53. Maeseneire, W., de, Essays on Firm Valuation and Value Appropriation
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. J.T.J. Smit
ISBN: 90-5892-082-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6768
54. Verheul, I., Is there a (fe)male approach? Understanding gender differences in
entrepreneurship
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik
ISBN: 90-5892-080-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/2005
55. Jansen, J.J.P., Ambidextrous Organizations
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. Van den Bosch, Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda
ISBN: 90-5892-081-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6774
56. Assen, M.F. van, Empirical Studies in Discrete Parts Manufacturing Management
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. S.L. van de Velde, Prof.dr. W.H.M. Zijm
ISBN: 90-5892-085-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6767
57. Keizer, A.B., The Changing Logic of Japanese Employment Practices, A
Firm-Level Analysis of Four Industries
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. J.A. Stam, Prof.dr. J.P.M. Groenewegen
ISBN: 90-5892-087-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6667
58. Moerman, G.A., Empirical Asset Pricing and Banking in the Euro Area
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. C.G. Koedijk
ISBN: 90-5892-090-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6666
59. Kotlarsky, J., Management of Globally Distributed Component-Based Software
Development Projects
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. K. Kumar
ISBN: 90-5892-088-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6772
60. Boer, N.I., Knowledge Sharing within Organizations: A situated and relational
Perspective
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. K. Kumar
ISBN: 90-5892-086-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6770
61. Pak. K., Revenue Management: New Features and Models
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker
ISBN: 90-5892-092-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6771
62. Vromans, M.J.C.M., Reliability of Railway Systems
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. L. Kroon, Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen
ISBN: 90-5892-089-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6773
63. Brohm, M., Polycentric order in Organizations: a Dialogue between Michael
Polanyi and IT-consultants on knowledge, morality, and organization
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. G.W.J. Hendrikse, Prof.dr. H.K. Letiche
ISBN: 90-5892-095-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6911
195
191
64. Le-Duc, T., Design and Control of Efficient Order Picking Processes
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster
ISBN: 90-5892-094-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6910
65. Boer, C.A., Distributed Simulation in Industry
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. A. de Bruin, Prof.dr.ir. A. Verbraeck
ISBN: 90-5892-093-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6925
66. Kuilman, J., The Re-emergence of foreign banks in Shanghai: An Ecological
Analysis
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. B. Krug
ISBN: 90-5892-096-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6926
67. Hartigh, E. den, Increasing Returns and Firm Performance: An Empirical Study
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur
ISBN: 90-5892-097-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6939
68. Hagemeijer, R.E., The Unmasking of the Other
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. S.J. Magala, Prof.dr. H.K. Letiche
ISBN: 90-5892-097-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6963
69. Govers, R., Virtual Tourism Destination Image: Global Identities Constructed,
Perceived and Experienced
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. F.M. Go, Prof.dr. K. Kumar
ISBN: 90-5892-107-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6981
70. Mentink, A.A, Essays on Corporate Bonds
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. A.C.F. Vorst
ISBN: 90-5892-100-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7121
71. Pietersz, R., Pricing Models for Bermudan-style Interest Rate Derivatives
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. A.A.J. Pelsser, Prof.dr. A.C.F. Vorst
ISBN: 90-5892-099-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7122
72. Vries - van Ketel, E. de, How Assortment Variety Affects Assortment
Attractiveness: A Consumer Perspective
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. G.H. van Bruggen, Prof.dr.ir. A. Smidts
ISBN: 90-5892-101-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7193
73. Lentink, R.M., Algorithmic Decision Support for Shunt Planning
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon, Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen
ISBN: 90-5892-104-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7328
74. Sloot, L., Understanding Consumer Reactions to Assortment Unavailability
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur, Prof.dr. E. Peelen, Prof.dr. P.C. Verhoef
ISBN: 90-5892-102-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7438
75. Vlaar, P.W.L, Making Sense of Formalization in Interorganizational
Relationships: Beyond Coordination and Control
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. van den Bosch, Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda
ISBN: 90-5892-103-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7326
196
192 ERIM Ph.D. Series Research in Management
76. Smit, W., Market Information Sharing in Channel Relationships Its Nature,
Antecedents, and Consequences
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur, Prof.dr.ir. G.H. van Bruggen, Prof.dr.ir. B.
Wierenga
ISBN: 90-5892-106-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7327
77. Iastrebova, K., Managers’ Information Overload: The Impact of Coping
Strategies on Decision-Making Performance
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. H.G. van Dissel
ISBN: 90-5892-111-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/
78. Pilar London˜o, M. del, Institutional Arrangements that Affect Free Trade
Agreements: Economic Rationality Versus Interest Groups
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. H.E. Haralambides, Prof.dr. J.F. Francois
ISBN: 90-5892-108-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7578
79. Mom, T.J.M., Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation Activities: The Influence
of Organizational Factors and Knowledge Inflows
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. van den Bosch, Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda
ISBN: 90-5892-116-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1765
80. Alvarez, H.L., Distributed Collaborative Learning Communities Enabled by
Information Communication Technology
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. K. Kumar
ISBN: 90-5892-112-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7830
81. Wennekers, A.R.M., Entrepreneurship at country level: Economic and
non-economic determinants
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik
ISBN: 90-5892-115-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7982
82. Blindenbach-Driessen, F., Innovation Management in Project-Based Firms
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. S.L. van de Velde
ISBN: 90-5892-110-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7828
83. Kole, E., On Crises, Crashes and Comovements
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. C.G. Koedijk, Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek
ISBN: 90-5892-114-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7829
84. Iwaarden, J.D. van, Changing Quality Controls: The Effects of Iincreasing
Product Variety and Shortening Product Life Cycles
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. B.G. Dale, Prof.dr. A.R.T. Williams
ISBN: 90-5892-117-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7992
85. Gutkowska, A.B., Essays on the Dynamic Portfolio Choice
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. A.C.F. Vorst
ISBN: 90-5892-118-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7994
197
193
86. Sonnenberg, M., The Signalling Effect of HRM on Psychological Contracts of
Employees: A Multi-level Perspective
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. J. Paauwe
ISBN: 90-5892-119-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7995
87. Berghman, L.A., Strategic Innovation Capacity: A Mixed Method Study on
Deliberate Strategic Learning Mechanisms
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. P. Mattyssens
ISBN: 90-5892-120-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7991
88. Rinsum, M. van, Performance Measurement and Managerial Time Orientation
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. F.G.H. Hartmann
ISBN: 90-5892-121-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7993
89. Tims, B., Empirical Studies on Exchange Rate Puzzles and Volatility
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. C.G. Koedijk
ISBN: 90-5892-113-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8066
90. Vroomen, B.L.K., The Effects of the Internet, Recommendation Quality and
Decision Strategies on Consumer Choice
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses
ISBN: 90-5892-122-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8067
91. Groot, E.A. de, Essays on Economic Cycles
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur
ISBN: 90-5892-123-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8216
92. Schramade, W.L.J., Corporate Bonds Issuers
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. A. De Jong
ISBN: 90-5892-125-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8191
93. Heuvel, W. van den, The Economic Lot-Sizing Problem: New Results and
Extensions
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. A.P.L. Wagelmans
ISBN: 90-5892-124-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8193
94. Baquero, G, Capital Flows and Investor Psychology
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek
ISBN: 90-5892-131-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
95. Althuizen, N.A.P., Analogical Reasoning as a Decision Support Principle for
Weakly Structured Marketing Problems
Promotor(es): Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga
ISBN: 90-5892-129-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8190
96. Knapp, S., The Econometrics of Maritime Safety: Recommendations to Enhance
Safety at Sea
Promotor(es): Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses
ISBN: 90-5892-127-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
New Insights into Mutual Funds
Performance and Family Strategies
New Insights into Mutual Funds is a bundle of four empirical studies
on mutual funds. In the first two papers, we investigate persistence in
risk-adjusted fund returns. We show that the returns of both equity
and bond mutual funds are persistent. Funds that display strong
(weak) performance over a past period continue to do so in future
periods. More importantly, we demonstrate that some fund managers
are able to outperform a strategy that invests in passive indexes for a
short period of time. These results add new insights to long-running
debates on the benefits of actively managed funds vis-à-vis passive
portfolios. In the third paper, we test the cross-sectional explanatory
power of multi-factor models to explain mutual fund returns. We find
that performance estimates resulting from these models are biased
because the factor proxies do not incorporate transaction costs and
trading restrictions. We suggest that factor proxies based on mutual
fund returns rather than stock returns provide better benchmarks to
evaluate professional money managers. Finally, in the fourth paper
we investigate the impact of fund marketing on investor flows to
other funds in the family. We find that high-marketing funds
generate spillovers, and enhance cash inflows to low-marketing funds
in the family. An explanation of this observation is that funds with
low marketing expenses are directly subsidized by family members
with high marketing expenses. Our results indicate that at least part
of the spillovers can be attributed to favoritism. These findings
suggest that conflicts of interest between investors and fund families
have been exacerbated by competition in the mutual fund industry.
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